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Preface
This thesis is being submitted in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements for award
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Engineering Science and
Technology, the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU).
In a PhD study, one may experience possession by passion, dread of dead-
lines, weariness from workload, blur from burnout, vivacity of verbal presenta-
tions, articulation of arguments, feeling frail in failure, notching of novelty and
sounding strong in success - a mix of the good, the bad and the ugly.
Bang! Hitting a blind alley tends to get one discouraged and if consistent
tends to lead to frustration. I struggled several times, listened to music to relieve
my depression. I listened to Jimmy Cliﬀ’s “Struggling man,” and “You can get
it if you really want.” It was scary seeing some colleagues drop by the wayside.
I ran to a veteran professor and asked him the reason. We agreed that the fault
could be the student’s, the supervisor’s, the institution’s or a combination of
these. Then he advised that I must not relax, but continually work hard to get
at least three published journal papers. So, I worked each day as though I was
going to graduate the following day. It was not an easy road.
Will Durant said that it was all very funny, quoting Arthur Schopenhauer
thus: “ the life of every individual, if we survey it as a whole...and only lay stress
on its most signiﬁcant features, is really always a tragedy; but gone through in
detail it has the character of a comedy.” Research is a humbling experience. I
betrayed my emotion once, seeing a hard-earned result crumble like a crust of
snow being trodden. Scrap the crap! That sucks! But my will kept hope alive and
I had faith. Dreaming a PhD without revisions or rejections of costly purchases
of sweat is like imagining an omelett without breaking shells.
I wish everyone who reads this thesis a happy reading and the beneﬁt of
knowing more.
Trondheim, Norway ————–
October 09, 2015 Peter Okoh
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Summary
Summary
The overall objective of this PhD thesis has been to develop new strategies for
the prevention of maintenance-related major accidents in the process industries.
By virtue of the new knowledge developed in this PhD project, the decision-
makers are expected to gain a better insight into the pros and cons of main-
tenance, how maintenance inﬂuences major accidents, the maintenance-related
major accident trend, the degree and distribution of the causes of maintenance-
related major accidents as well as strategies for the prevention of such accidents.
This PhD thesis has been a mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis
and synthesis of concepts and theories in relation to major accident causa-
tion (e.g. organizational accident perspectives and previous accidents investi-
gation/analysis reports) and preventive initiatives in relation to maintenance-
related organizational robustness and resilience as well as maintenance opti-
mization (aimed at minimizing the major accident risk).
This PhD thesis investigates all the aforementioned aspects of maintenance-
related major accidents in the hydrocarbon and chemical process industries, and
signiﬁcant results have been achieved as regards a better understanding of the
characteristics of maintenance-related major accidents and the most reasonable
preventive eﬀorts. The main contributions of this PhD project to the body of
knowledge are documented in the form of six articles, ﬁve published and one
under review in international peer-review publication channels.
Maintenance-related major accidents, like other major accidents, can be
caused by technical, human and organizational factors. However, some indi-
viduals and organizations may tend to consider the technical and human factors
only, while neglecting the organizational. Since accidents are not only products
of technical/human failures, it is important to consider all the possible types of
inﬂuences in order to develop a comprehensive prevention strategy. In this PhD
v
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thesis, a better insight is given into how maintenance inﬂuences major accidents
with respect to the aforementioned types of inﬂuences.
Maintenance-related major accidents may be classiﬁed based on existing
schemes encompassing maintenance work/management process, threats and er-
ror management (TEM) framework and MTO (Man, Technology and Organi-
zation), but these fail to explicitly address the accident process itself. In this
PhD thesis, how maintenance inﬂuences the major accident risk has been ana-
lyzed and investigated. The work and accident processes combined into a new
scheme called Work and Accident Process (WAP) scheme is being proposed
for maintenance-related major accidents classiﬁcation. This scheme has been
tested with maintenance-related major accidents cases from the U.S. Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) and the validity has been demonstrated. The PhD thesis
also presents a classiﬁcation approach based on both the accident process and
the maintenance management process.
Statistics on maintenance-related major accidents are important for decision-
making, most especially, in relation to the prioritization of preventive eﬀorts.
However, most of the statistics identiﬁed on maintenance-related accidents are
about 25 years old. The validity of such statistics is constrained by the uncer-
tainty associated with the assumption that future failure will continue at the
same rate as immediate previous experience. Besides, some of the statistics were
a mixture of major accidents, occupational accidents and serious incidents and
this also adds to uncertainties in relation to maintenance-related major acci-
dents. This PhD thesis provides a current update on the trend of maintenance-
related major accidents in the 21st century and the degree and distribution of
the causes. The thesis also proposes WAP-FMEA (Work and Accident Process
Failure Modes and Eﬀects Analysis), i.e. a FMEA which integrates the mainte-
nance work process with the accident process for the purpose of prevention of
maintenance related major accidents. As regards the applicability of the statis-
tical ﬁndings, the frequencies can be used to determine probabilities which in
turn will be useful in maintenance-related, major-accident risk modeling and in
the probability column of the suggested WAP-FMEA.
The purpose of maintenance should not be limited to the traditional idea of re-
taining systems in or restoring them to a functioning state. Maintenance can also
contribute to improved system knowledge and interdisciplinary coordination
that may beneﬁt the entire organization. The organizational value-adding po-
tential of maintenance has never been investigated. Maintenance can be investi-
gated as a contributor to robustness and resilience of organizations such that the
ability to prevent or limit unexpected events is improved. Hence, maintenance-
related major accidents (i.e. maintenance-related organizational accidents) can
also be viewed from the six perspectives of organizational accidents, i.e. Energy-
Barrier model, Normal Accident Theory (NAT), High Reliability Organizations
(HRO), the Man-made Disaster (MMD) theory, Conﬂicting Objectives, Adap-
tation and Drift (COAD) theory and Resilience Engineering. These perspec-
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tives have been studied by several people, but have not been investigated thor-
oughly by any in relation to maintenance. This PhD thesis systematically inves-
tigates the relationship between maintenance and the six perspectives of orga-
nizational accidents. This encompasses the signiﬁcance of the perspectives to
maintenance. Finally, recommendations on how to improve the robustness and
resilience properties of maintenance within the process industries evolve from
the aforementioned investigation. This is an added knowledge for a better in-
sight into the link between maintenance and major accidents.
Increasing or decreasing frequency of maintenance increases the major ac-
cident risk when they are oﬀ the optimal level. Too much maintenance visits
increase the exposure of personnel to risk, the probability of introducing new
hazard and failures and the wear-out potential of safety barriers, whereas too
little maintenance visits provide an opportunity for failure mechanisms to de-
grade the major accident barriers. Hence, there is the need to optimize mainte-
nance. However, none of the existing optimization methods has accounted for
the exposure of personnel to the major accident risk. This PhD thesis improves
maintenance optimization in terms of risk such that the exposure of humans to
risk is being adequately accounted for.

Structure of thesis
Structure of the thesis
This PhD thesis has two main parts:
• Part I Main report: This part ﬁrst presents the background, the challenges
and research questions, as well as the objectives and the scope of this PhD
thesis, and then proceeds to a discussion of the research methodology and
approach. Finally the main results are summarized and the possible areas for
future research are indicated.
• Part II Articles: This part includes six articles published or prepared during
the PhD project. These articles consist of the main work and achievements
during the PhD.
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Part I
Main report

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Major accidents may be deﬁned as adverse events such as major leaks/releases,
major explosion, major ﬁre or major structural failure/loss of stability, leading
to serious danger/damage, to human life, the environment or material assets
[10, 18, 52, 81, 104].
Most industries that handle or store hazardous substances (e.g. the petroleum
and chemical industries) have a major accident potential and several major acci-
dents have also occurred during the last 35 years. Flixborough Disaster (1974),
Seveso Disaster (1976), Bhopal Gas Tragedy (1984), Sandoz Chemical Spill
(1986), Piper Alpha Disaster (1988), Philips 66 Disaster (1989), Esso Longford
Gas Explosion (1998), Texas City Reﬁnery Explosion (2005), and the Imperial
Sugar Company dust explosion and ﬁre (2011) are examples of accidents with
devastating consequences to personnel, the environment, the companies and the
local communities. Eﬀorts have been made to enhance defenses against major
hazards based on lessons learnt from the accidents. Despite this eﬀort, it can be
argued that the risk of major accident does not always show a positive trend. As
shown in Fig. 1.1, the number of major hydrocarbon leaks, a key indicator for
major accident risk in the Norwegian oil and gas industry, has for example in-
creased between 2008 and 2010 on the Norwegian continental shelf [81]. There
has also been a 50% increase in the number of hydrocarbon leaks in 2013 com-
pared to 2012 [82]. Although this is lower than in 2010, it may still be a source
of concern if the goal is continuous improvement.
The industry sectors associated with the aforementioned major accidents are
regulated by responsible national authorities. The Petroleum Safety Authority
(PSA) in Norway, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the UK, the Na-
tional Oﬀshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority
(NOPSEMA) in Australia, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the Bureau
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Fig. 1.1 Number of hydrocarbon leaks exceeding 0.1 kg/s, 1996-2013 [82]
of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) in the US, are examples of
national authorities that regulate the hydrocarbon and chemical process indus-
tries.
Major accidents are seldom the result of one failure, but often a combina-
tion of failures [75, 102]. High degree of technological and organizational com-
plexity may be mentioned as an attribute of industries with a major accident
potential [75, 87]. For this reason, it is common to deploy multiple and inde-
pendent safety barriers that are capable of preventing or mitigating the conse-
quences of unexpected events. This design philosophy is sometimes referred to
as defense-in-depth (in e.g. the nuclear industry) [87] and layers of protection
(in the process industry) [36]. Independence among barriers may be achieved
by the use of diﬀerent design principles, such as manual, mechanical and elec-
trical/electronic/programmable electronic systems.
The integrity of barriers cannot be maintained without adequate level of
maintenance. Maintenance is therefore a key activity to reduce the risk of major
accidents. On the other hand, maintenance may have a negative eﬀect on the
system’s performance if the execution is incorrect, insuﬃcient, delayed, or ex-
cessive. Maintenance can also be the triggering event, for example by operating
equipment wrongly. Furthermore, maintenance also exposes people to risk and
should be minimized from this point of view. However, it is worthwhile to note
that in spite of the aforementioned potential negative eﬀects, maintenance has
several other positive eﬀects such as promoting the following: system reliabil-
ity, production availability, productivity, occupational safety and health, product
quality and environmental integrity.
Several investigation reports (e.g. of Health and Safety Executive in the
UK and TNO in the Netherlands) have pointed at maintenance as a con-
tributing factor to accidents in the petroleum and petrochemical industries
[26, 56, 61, 62, 63, 92, 98]. Overall, the investigations indicate that about 30-
40% of all accidents and accident precursor events in the chemical process in-
dustry are due to maintenance-related factors. About 30% of all major accidents
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in the chemical process industry between 1982 and 1987 were linked to main-
tenance by UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE) [26, 98], whereas about
40% of accidents involving chemical releases as reported by Koehorst in 1989
based on the analysis of accidents in FACTS database were linked to main-
tenance [26]. Hurst et al in 1991, reported that about 40% of 900 accidents
associated with piping failures in the chemical industry were linked to mainte-
nance [26]. Reports from the hydrocarbon industry vary in their estimation of
how maintenance has contributed, and some studies attribute as much as 80% of
all accidents and precursor events in the hydrocarbon industry to maintenance:
About 65% of major hydrocarbon leaks on the Norwegian sector of the North
Sea were linked to maintenance [114], and about 33% of hydrocarbon topside
gas releases between 1985 and 1988 in Australia were linked to maintenance
[59]. The signiﬁcance of these statistics, coupled with the fact that most of the
studies are relatively old (needing an update), is a clear sign that the relationship
between maintenance and major accident risk is an important topic for further
research.
The impact of maintenance on personnel safety has been studied by a number
of authorities and research organizations, for example by SINTEF [61, 62, 63],
by VTT [49, 50, 74, 117], by TU-Delft [26], and HSE-UK [34]. A number of
strategies have been suggested to reduce the chance of personnel injuries and
damages, but it is not necessarily the case that the results of these studies ap-
ply to major accident prevention [77]. According to Pitblado [77], the idea that
battling minor incidents and personnel accidents will improve “safety culture”
which will in turn reduce major accidents in the same ratio [4] was refuted by
EU and USA data. He reiterated that “the approaches used to enhance personnel
safety do not speciﬁcally address the barriers which control major accidents and
thus it should be no surprise that the two do not correlate well.” Furthermore, the
study by [26] discusses, for example, the need to balance the trade-oﬀ between
the risk to the plant, which may be reduced by more maintenance, and the risk to
personnel, which is reduced by less maintenance (due to less exposure to major
hazards).
In light of the preceding discussions and lessons learnt in relation to recent
maintenance-related major accidents, it is reasonable to investigate and analyze
maintenance-related major accidents, the implication of maintenance in their
causation, how frequent they have manifested over time and how they can be
prevented based on an in-depth understanding of the mechanisms of their cau-
sation.

Chapter 2
State-of-knowledge of concepts and gaps
2.1 Chapter introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the state-of-the-art of concepts re-
lated to maintenance-related major accident risk and the need for increasing the
knowledge in this area. The chapter is structured as follows.
First, the major accident concept will be discussed since it is the main prob-
lem confronting us that we need to investigate in search of knowledge of possi-
ble causes and how to prevent the causes.
Second, the maintenance concept will be introduced, because by having the
potential to prevent or cause major accidents, maintenance obviously has a rela-
tionship with the major accident risk phenomenon. The PhD project is restricted
to maintenance of safety systems, which is an important aspect. The purpose of
these systems is to mitigate risk, and developing maintenance strategies with
respect to risk reduction in relation to these systems is highly relevant. For other
types of systems, there may be diﬀerent objectives that are equally important
(e.g. production availability vs cost), but these are outside the scope of this work.
Third, classiﬁcation of accidents will be presented. Given that various acci-
dent reports indicate that maintenance can be a cause of major accidents and
what the maintenance-related causes are, it is important to do some classiﬁca-
tion to harmonize/standardize the maintenance-related causes. This will make
the study of maintenance-related major accidents convenient and will help in
the speedy identiﬁcation of any given maintenance-related cause in the future.
It will also avoid duplicity and ambiguity, and will promote the repeatability of
the application of classiﬁcation schemes to accident analysis.
Fourth, organizational factors will be discussed. Attention need to be paid
to the factors that guarantee organizational balance, not only the technical pro-
tective systems and how they should be maintained to prevent major accidents.
A safely organized work environment is also necessary to bring the best out of
such protective systems.
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Fifth, the concept of robustness will be presented. It would be interesting to
investigate how this also ﬁts into making an organization, not only a physical
system, to possess characteristics of resistance to accidental events.
Sixth, the eﬀect of changing maintenance intervals will be treated. We need
to understand, not only the sudden inﬂuence of maintenance in relation to major
accidents, but also how changes to maintenance variables may inﬂuence risk
stepwise until they reach the level associated with major accidents. This will
help to promote monitoring in relation to risk control.
Finally, maintenance optimization will be presented. Given that there are sev-
eral independent maintenance variables that inﬂuence risk, it is necessary to bal-
ance all of them in order to realize a value of a dependent variable which will
oﬀer the most beneﬁcial risk reduction.
2.2 The major accident concept in the process industries
Before embarking on mapping out strategies to prevent maintenance-related ma-
jor accidents, it is important to investigate and understand how the major acci-
dent concept is being perceived within the process industries. “Process accident”
is probably more commonly used outside Norway than “major accident.” Be-
sides, there exists variations in its deﬁnition across several organizations, which
may inﬂuence what is being managed by the organizations.
The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) [81], the European Com-
mission (in relation to Seveso II directive) [18] and the UK government (in
relation to the Control of Major Accident Hazards regulations) [103] have quite
similar deﬁnitions for a major accident, which can be summarized as follows:
An acute/adverse event such as emission/discharge/release, ﬁre or explosion re-
sulting in a serious loss with regards to human life/health, the environment or
material assets.
The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers - OGP [65] and the
Commonwealth of Australia [11] also have similar deﬁnitions for a major ac-
cident, which can be summarized as follows: Events connected with an instal-
lation having the potential to cause multiple fatality/serious damage inside or
away from the facility.
The deﬁnitions of a major accident by the UK’s Health and Safety Exec-
utive (HSE) [33] and the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA)/US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) [104] also have ex-
pressions that imply the potential for serious loss and that the eﬀects may be felt
inside or outside the facility. Similarly, the US Department of Energy (DOE)
[17] deﬁnes an incident as “an unplanned event that may or may not result in
injuries and/or loss” and an accident/accident event sequence as “an unplanned
event or sequence of events that has an undesirable consequence.”
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Terms used to describe major accidents are “adverse”/ “unplanned” and
“acute”/ “sudden.” For the hydrocarbon/process industries it is releases of
ﬂammable and toxic material which is the main concern, although other types
of events may also be relevant.
The main aspect of the accidents which make them “major” is of course the
consequences. The exact deﬁnitions vary signiﬁcantly, but for this purpose con-
sequences to life and health, to the environment and to assets are all consid-
ered. Further, it is noted that some deﬁnitions require an actual consequence
to have occurred (“Death or serious injury,” “One or more human fatalities”).
However, in other cases, it is suﬃcient that there is a potential for a serious con-
sequence (“Serious danger to human health,” “Escalation potential for multiple
fatalities”). There is some diﬀerence in whether the eﬀects should be limited to
the facility where the event occurs or not, but this is considered to be mainly a
diﬀerence between deﬁnitions primarily relevant for oﬀshore facilities (which
usually are remote and will not aﬀect anyone outside the facility) and onshore
facilities.
Although there is no universally agreed deﬁnition of a major accident, the
various views of the aforementioned authorities may be harmonized to cover
both large consequences and the potential to cause them. This is borne from
the fact that there is more merit to look at the event from the perspective of
its development (causal to consequential) rather than just around its end-state
(consequential)[91]. The consequences are usually deﬁned by more or less ar-
bitrary factors, such as whether an ignition source is present at the time of a
combustible gas release.
2.3 The maintenance concept
The modern concept of maintenance may be deﬁned as the “combination of
all technical, administrative and managerial actions during the life cycle of an
item intended to retain it in, or restore it to, a state in which it can perform the
required function” [19]. The required function of interest in relation to major
accidents is safety function, speciﬁcally the mitigation of the major accident
risk, whereas the items of interest on same basis are safety-critical systems,
which pose a serious risk to the safe operation of the entire installation if they
fail, e.g. process containment and ignition control systems [35].
The aforementioned deﬁnition of maintenance implies a top level classiﬁ-
cation of maintenance into two main categories, preventive maintenance and
corrective maintenance, corresponding to retentive and restorative actions re-
spectively. These decompose further to more speciﬁc types of maintenance as
shown in Fig. 2.1. Introductory theories of the elements of the various classes of
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maintenance can be found in the European standard on maintenance terminol-
ogy [19].
Maintenance 
PrevenƟve 
CondiƟon-
based 
Scheduled, on-
request or 
conƟnuous 
Predetermined 
Scheduled 
CorrecƟve 
Deferred Immediate 
Fig. 2.1 Overall view of maintenance [19]
Furthermore, according to NORSOK Standard Z-008 [60], a generic main-
tenance concept is “a set of maintenance actions, strategies and maintenance
details, which demonstrates a cost-eﬃcient maintenance method for a deﬁned
generic group of equipment functioning under similar frame and operating con-
ditions.” This is also seen as “a collection of best practices for a company” that
“should ensure that all deﬁned HSE, production, cost and other operating re-
quirements are met.” It is partly implied that a negation of such best practices
in relation to safety-critical equipment increases the major accident potential,
thus failing to fulﬁll the HSE requirements. This is supported by Reason’s [87]
claim that safety systems require high level of maintenance contact, which im-
plies high level of exposure of personnel to risk.
According to [26], interesting standards such as IEC 706-4 (Guidelines on
maintainability) and ISO 9001 (Standard for assessing the quality management
of design) exist, but are lacking in important contents with respect to the rela-
tionship between safety and maintenance. The former has a section of mainte-
nance management, but does not feature maintenance personnel safety as a key
element in developing a maintenance concept. The latter has no clearly stated
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requirements for dealing with maintenance at the design stage wherein safety
considerations could be incorporated.
Based on the aforementioned knowledge, it is pertinent to investigate main-
tenance shortcomings that resulted or nearly resulted in major accidents. This is
necessary for continuous improvement of the process of maturing, reﬁning and
perfecting maintenance strategies. It will go a long way to enrich documents for
operational risk control, e.g. standard operating procedures, safe work proce-
dures, etc.
2.4 Classiﬁcation of maintenance-related major accidents
Having realized the signiﬁcant implication of maintenance in major accident
causation, as revealed in the aforementioned statistics, it is compelling to iden-
tify and classify maintenance-related causes based on existing theories and ob-
servations from accident investigation reports. The relationship between acci-
dent investigation and accident analysis as shown in Fig. 2.2 illustrates that the
former is usually done on accidents individually over time, whereas the latter
studies a deﬁned group of investigation reports on accidents that have occurred
within a given period of time.
Accident 1
Accident 2
Accident N
Accident 1
Accident 2
Accident N
2000 2001 2011 2013 Timeline
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
(Individual conclusions)
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
(CollecƟǀĞ conclusion)
Fig. 2.2 The relationship between accident investigation and accident analysis
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Classiﬁcation may be applied to accident analysis whereby it clearly delin-
eates and tends to standardize causes, the object of prevention. The merit is that
prevention eﬀorts become more focused and eﬃcient, instead of wasting time
trying to work out directions. Classiﬁcation of accidents is the assignment of
particulars/properties of accidents to groups within a system of categories dis-
tinguished by origin of event, end-state of event, mode of occurrence, magnitude
of event, physical appearance of event, impact of event, timing of impact, impact
location, etc [46, 51]. The origin of the event implies the cause of the accident.
This expression has the potential for misinterpretation, hence, it is important to
discuss it further. Interesting questions to ask here are “What is a cause?” and
“Is ignition the cause of an explosion?” These questions are diﬃcult to answer.
Although a scientist would seek to know exactly the mechanisms by which one
thing causes another, it is diﬃcult sometimes, as in this case, where there is
heterogeneity of causal circumstances. Therefore, it would be more convenient
for him/her to say, e.g. that A probably causes B based on statistical correlation
between A and B considerably greater than chance [29]. In fact, causal circum-
stances are broad in nature, covering not only technical circumstances, but also
human and organizational circumstances such as complexities, communication
gap, conﬂicting goals, etc. Hence, it is worthwhile to investigate and analyze all
of these to see, especially, how they combine to realize a major accident, since
“accidents are neither chance events, nor acts of God, nor triggered by a few
events and unsafe human acts immediately before they occur” [102]. This will
make our preventive measure all-encompassing and more eﬀective. Besides, the
way accidents are classiﬁed can inﬂuence how their preventive measures are
developed.
Diﬀerent studies [25, 26, 32, 62, 92, 98, 113, 115, 116, 119] have explicitly or
implicitly classiﬁed maintenance-related causes of major accidents in the chem-
ical process and hydrocarbon industries in diﬀerent ways as shown in Table 2.1.
All the classiﬁcation schemes are relevant, although no single scheme explicitly
covers all the relevant perspectives at a time - human, organizational, technical
and operational. Some of the researchers may have focused on a particular area
based on the prevailing purpose, the boundaries set by some authorities or some
other reasons. Overall, most of the work that has been done, has been from a
maintenance management perspective rather than the accident process perspec-
tive. Besides, some of the aforementioned categorization are coarse, thereby
overlooking certain important details.
2.5 Organizational factors in major accidents
Given that accidents are not the product of technical failures only [15], it is
important to also include organizational factors in analysis and investigation
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Table 2.1 Review of classiﬁcation of causes of maintenance-related major accidents
Sources Nature of classiﬁcation
On the analysis of hydro-
carbon leaks in the Nor-
wegian oﬀshore industry
[115]
Four main categories based on work process: Planning, preparation,
execution and reinstatement. Planning implied “long term and short
term planning, including overall schedules, Safe Job Analysis and
preparation of the isolation plan, whereas preparation implied “shut-
down, isolation and depressurization according to the isolation plan”
and reinstatement implied “resetting of valves and controls according
to isolation plan, as well as the leak testing and starting up.”
Evaluation of the Risk
OMT model for mainte-
nance work on major oﬀ-
shore process equipment
[25]
Two main categories based on initiating events: Human intervention
introducing latent error and human intervention causing immediate
release. This was integrated with Reason’s classiﬁcation [87].
Correct Maintenance
Prevents Major Accidents
[62]
Two categories: Insuﬃcient and poor maintenance.
Analysis of hydrocarbon
leaks on oﬀshore installa-
tions [114]
Two main categories based on initiating events: Human intervention
introducing latent error and human intervention causing immediate
release.
Maintenance-Induced Ac-
cidents and Process Piping
Problems [92]
Two maintenance-related categories: Improper and insuﬃcient main-
tenance.
Know when to say
“When”: A Review of
Safety Incidents Involving
Maintenance Issues [119]
Three categories: Causes present before, during and after mainte-
nance.
Major accidents in process
industries and an analy-
sis of causes and conse-
quences [45]
A more general classiﬁcation of major accidents in the process indus-
tries, but did not classify maintenance-related causes speciﬁcally.
Evaluating safety in the
management of mainte-
nance activities in the
chemical industry [26]
Classiﬁcation of causes in terms of maintenance management short-
comings in management of the preparation of resources, schedul-
ing and work planning, actual conduct of the work, maintainability
and external factors. It also featured classiﬁcation of causes in terms
of maintenance-related work phases: Preparation, maintenance itself,
handover, startup, shutdown and normal operation).
Managing the Risks of
Organizational Accidents
[87]
(1) There are two main classes of (maintenance-related) failures: Ac-
tive and latent conditions, (2) There are two main sources of mainte-
nance causes: Disassembly and reassembly, (3) There are three main
classes of (maintenance-related) human error: skilled based slips and
lapses, rule-based mistakes and knowledge-based mistakes, and (4)
Maintenance-related causes are due to: (i) neglected maintenance and
(ii) the likelihood of error of commission or omission.
The role of maintenance
management deﬁciencies
in major accident causa-
tion [98]
Classiﬁcation in terms of maintenance management inadequacies in
corporate and maintenance objectives, strategy and workload, re-
sources, administrative structure, work planning and work control,
and plant reliability control.
Human Error [86] Three main categories of (maintenance-related) causes based on hu-
man failures: Human error, violations and sabotage.
Dangerous maintenance:
A study of maintenance
accidents and how to
prevent them [32]
Classiﬁed maintenance-related causes according to timing of incident
as follows: Preparation (before maintenance), the job itself (during
maintenance) and the return of the plant to operation (after mainte-
nance)
Handbook of human relia-
bility analysis with empha-
sis on nuclear power plant
applications [100]
Classiﬁed errors into two: Errors of omission and errors of commis-
sion
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processes to better understand how to focus management and personnel orien-
tation/training in order to enhance prevention eﬀorts. Organizational factors in
relation to major accidents (also called organizational accidents) usually refer
to the organizational causes of major accidents.
The organizational accident perspectives include: Energy-barrier model, nor-
mal accident theory (NAT), high reliability organizations (HRO) theory, man-
made disaster (MMD) theory, conﬂicting objectives, adaptation and drift (COAD)
theory and resilience engineering. The energy-barrier perspective is dominant in
the list. However, it is necessary to improve accident analysis with the various
other perspectives as technology and organization become more and more com-
plex, since the technically-biased, energy-barrier principle is not suﬃcient in
dealing with organizational deﬁciencies.
The energy-barrier perspective, which is based on the hazard-barrier-target
model of Gibson [23], depicts a linear progression of events from the release
of energy (hazard) through interposed barriers to the interaction between the
energy (hazard) and the target (See Fig. 2.3). The model is hinged on the con-
cepts of linearity and monocausality, i.e., the transfer of a given energy from the
source to the target. This model also forms the basis for Reason’s Swiss Cheese
Model [87] and the “defense in depth” principle (See Fig. 2.4). An example
of how this has been institutionalized in risk management can be found in the
Norwegian regulations for oﬀshore installations, where a separate section in the
Management Regulations is dedicated to barriers [80].
 
 
 
 
Barrier 
(Maintainable item) 
Fire Hazard Target 
Fig. 2.3 The energy-barrier model [23]
Over time, other organizational accident perspectives evolved and found their
way into being accepted as valid major accident theories. These include: Normal
accident theory (NAT), high reliability organizations (HRO) theory, man-made
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Side view of a weak barrier Major accident hazard Barriers and major accidents 
Major 
release 
Major 
explosion 
Major fire Reminiscent of 
Swiss cheese 
Fig. 2.4 “Defense-in-depth” philosophy with weaknesses represented as Swiss cheese holes [87]
disaster (MMD) theory, conﬂicting objectives, adaptation and drift (COAD) the-
ory and resilience engineering.
The normal accident theory (NAT), proposed by Perrow [75], expresses the
concept of accident proneness (i.e natural tendency towards accidents) owing
to the interactive complexities (technological and organizational) and tight cou-
plings that evolve as our world of technologies continue to expand [75]. The
Normal accident perspective is hinged on complexity and coupling. Perrow [75]
believes that the multiple barriers and redundancies that characterize such high-
risk technologies (which are being managed on the premise of the energy-barrier
model) could oﬀer some level of safety, but will subsequently increase the sys-
tem’s degree of complexity and tightness of couplings. The policy reversal in
Germany (driven by the Fukushima disaster in Japan) that will see all her nu-
clear power plants abandoned by 2022 [3] may be seen as a logical and neces-
sary result of NAT.
The HRO theory has been developed from studies of organizations which,
according to normal accident theory, should experience major accidents, but
which still have excellent safety records [48]. The foremost example used to
illustrate this is aircraft carriers, but other organizations, like hospital emer-
gency rooms, have also been studied. A number of technologies we have to-
day have great productive potential and at the same time great destructive po-
tential, such that the avoidance of a signiﬁcant failure is imperative [48]. Ac-
cording to Sagan [90], HRO organizations inherently possess the best safety
records of all high-risk technologies. HRO theorists believe that through man-
agement commitment to safety, the establishment of safety culture, the main-
tenance of relatively closed systems, functional decentralization supported by
constant training, technical and organizational redundancies, and organizational
learning supplemented by anticipation and simulation (trial-and-error process),
organizations could achieve the consistency and stability required to support
failure-free operations [15, 48, 90, 91]. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.5, where the
shaded boxes and red arrows represent HRO elements, whereas the unshaded
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boxes and black arrows represent the accident process elements. The idea be-
hind the ﬁgure is adapted from the aviation industry [88] which may be seen as
an HRO [90]. The ﬁgure illustrates that threats and errors can occur separately
or at the same time and can cause undesired state of facility (e.g. hazardous
state), unless they are properly managed. In addition, the latent conditions, by
themselves, can also cause undesired state of facility, unless they are properly
managed. In a typical accident, these act together with threats and errors. In-
formation about latent conditions, threats and errors can be fed to the “organi-
zational learning and safety culture” element of the HRO safety management
system for analysis and appropriate corrective measures to be fed back to the
causal state (i.e. sources of latent conditions, errors and threats). The “organiza-
tional learning and safety culture” element can also receive useful information
about undesired state of facility, accidental event and consequential outcomes
for analysis and subsequent feeding of corrective actions to the causal state.
Besides, the “organizational learning and safety culture” element is being sup-
ported by other elements such as “failure analysis,” “decentralization of failure
management authority” and “balancing of safety and production goals” which
also inﬂuence each other as shown. Furthermore, the failure of redundant safety
functions (which inﬂuence risk management) can be corrected by the “technical
personnel redundancy” element with the help of the “failure analysis” element.
The man-made disaster (MMD) theory considers accidents to be the re-
sult of accumulated ﬂaws in information processing between various organi-
zational units, including the administrative, managerial and operational units
[102]. Turner [102], the initiator of the theory, calls the period of accumulation
an incubation period (i.e. a period of maturity). At the end of the incubation
period, the perceived organizational quality is unable to co-exist with the accu-
mulated organizational deviations, thus leading to an accident. A key point in
this theory is that there exist warning signs within the organization that could
have been used to prevent accidents, if it had been accumulated and commu-
nicated in the right way and to the right people as illustrated in Fig. 2.6. This
ﬁgure (presented according to IDEF0 functional modeling method) illustrates a
maintenance management exercise (i.e. the process) that is required to be im-
plemented by maintenance personnel (i.e. the mechanism), by applying a valid
method (e.g. Condition Based Maintenance) and maybe together with a “fa-
cilitator” (e.g. Computerized Maintenance Management System) - the control.
With respect to safety-critical systems, the failure to feed the aforementioned
elements with the right information (i.e. the input) leads to an accident (i.e. the
output). This perspective is hinged on multicausality and the concept behind it
is sociological; it holds that accidents are not just a technological phenomenon
[15].
The conﬂicting objectives/goals (or decision-making) perspective was pro-
posed by Rasmussen [84] and considers major accidents to be the result of or-
ganizational objectives clashing with each other (See Fig. 2.7). The result of
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this conﬂict is an organization in a state of dilemma that may drift over time due
to lack of information or inability to balance the objectives correctly. Examples
of organizational objectives that may come into conﬂict include production ob-
jectives, safety objectives etc. The basic resource used to drive the realization
of these objectives is money and the application of this resource must create a
balance between objectives to guarantee the survival of the organization. The
balance between production (economic objective) and protection (safety objec-
tive) was also discussed by Reason [87].
The resilience engineering perspective describes the ability of organizations
to achieve ultra-high levels of safety and response to the dynamics of other
organizational values (e.g. production, operations, economy etc.) despite com-
plexities, high risks, major accidents, disturbances, disruptions, continuous pres-
sure and change [89, 124]. Accidents, according to this perspective, are not the
product of normal system malfunction or breakdown, but rather a breakdown
in the adaptive capacity necessary to cope with the real world of complexity
[15]. In [31], resilience is deﬁned as “the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust
its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that
it can sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected condi-
tions.” Furthermore, the authors consider anticipation, responding, monitoring
and learning as the abilities necessary for engineering resilience into organiza-
tions [30, 31]. Resilience, as applied in this thesis, is about being able to adapt to
or recover from accidental events, while stability is acquired in a new state [2].
This deﬁnition is also associated with the aforementioned abilities of resilience.
The resilience engineering perspective encompasses core topics from the ﬁve
perspectives described earlier [15, 89]. A resilience engineering model based
on the aforementioned views is shown in Fig. 2.8.
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PROCESS
(Maintenance 
management)INPUT
(Maintenance-related ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƟŽŶ)
OUTPUT
(Major accident)
MECHANISM
(Maintenance personnel)
CONTROL
(E.g. RCM, CBM, CMMS, PTW etc.)CommuniĐĂƟon 
disconƟnuiƟes
Fig. 2.6 An illustration of man-made (maintenance-related) disaster theory with IDEF0 model
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Fig. 2.7 Rasmussen’s conﬂicting objectives model adapted to maintenance [84]
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Fig. 2.8 A model illustrating the resilience engineering concept
2.5.1 Final remarks
As mentioned above, a maintenance organization makes eﬀorts to keep major
accident barriers functional. This implies that there is an inducement of func-
tionality by the maintenance personnel to the barrier. Yet, we may be tempted
to ask: How can the integrity of the maintenance organization itself be main-
tained in order for it to be eﬀective in inducing functionality to the barriers?
This is a problem that the energy-barrier perspective cannot solve alone. It is
noted however, that few of the aforementioned perspectives have had signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on practical risk management. Although the energy-barrier principle
dominates completely, aspects of HRO and resilience are being used in some
contexts [16, 89]. Besides the energy-barrier perspective, the other perspectives
have no signiﬁcant evidence of having been suﬃciently investigated to uncover
all possible relationships with maintenance. The choice of perspective may have
important implications for how the management of major accident risk is ap-
proached. It may therefore also inﬂuence our view on maintenance-related ma-
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jor accidents; in other words, how we perceive maintenance, both as a means to
reduce risk and as a cause of accident.
2.6 The concept of robustness
Robustness is also an interesting concept that has featured in organizational the-
ories besides resilience. It is sometimes misconstrued for resilience, but they are
not the same. The deﬁnition of robustness varies from one ﬁeld of science to the
other, and so one has to be careful to apply the deﬁnition that is most meaningful
to the research depending on his/her ﬁeld. Robustness, according to Asbjørnslett
and Rausand [2], encompasses resistance to accidental events, restoration of
functionality and retention of original stability. Chandra and Grabis [9] deﬁnes
robustness as “the ability to withstand external and internal shocks.”
Furthermore, robustness as seen by Pavard [73], is the ability of a system “to
adapt its behavior to unforeseen situations, such as perturbation in the environ-
ment, or to internal dysfunctions in the organization of the system.” Other stud-
ies have been done on robustness by Anderies, Nielsen and Boissieres [1, 7, 58].
Few studies have analyzed organizational robustness in relation to major acci-
dents [58] or maintenance [7].
Various industrial settings have diﬀerent conﬁgurations of independent and
coordinated units aimed at realizing the set of organizational goals. It is impor-
tant to address this situation speciﬁcally to achieve a better solution for a given
industry. One of the organizational goals in the process industries is major acci-
dent prevention. To this end, maintenance may be investigated for the properties
of robustness by which the organization (not just systems alone) can be further
“strengthened.” Robustness, as applied in this thesis, is the ability to resist or
counteract accidental events.
2.7 Pros and cons of changing maintenance intervals
Beyond the inﬂuence of hands-on maintenance practice and its organization on
the barriers that prevent major accidents (at the “macro level”), it is also im-
portant to investigate in detail all possible causal relationships between major
accidents and maintenance, taking into consideration also the amount of main-
tenance, the maintenance decisions, the visitation frequency of the maintain-
ers, the number of the maintainers, etc (at the “micro level”). This is neces-
sary because it is not only maintenance-related barrier failure that inﬂuences the
maintenance-related major accident risk, even though the barriers are dedicated
to major accident prevention.
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With increasing complexity and dependency on technical systems, the need
for maintenance also increases. At the same time, maintenance may also repre-
sent a risk, because accidents may be initiated by maintenance itself.
As regards the eﬀects of increasing and decreasing maintenance, mainte-
nance when insuﬃcient or excessive involves avoidable risk. With low main-
tenance frequency (long intervals), it can be expected that the risk associated
with equipment failure will decrease as we increase the frequency. However,
we may also reach a point where the risk starts increasing again, because the
maintenance itself may wear out the equipment. Increasing maintenance fre-
quency in the process industries will also increase the exposure of personnel to
existing hazards, increase the potential to introduce new hazards and initiating
events, increase error opportunities and increase the potential to bypass/override
safety systems, whereas decreasing maintenance will increase the vulnerability
of items to failure mechanisms.
Neglected maintenance (an aspect of decreasing maintenance interval), if due
to lack of maintainability rather than nonchalance, may encourage technological
advancement for improving manufacturing techniques and the intrinsic reliabil-
ity of materials/components [87]. This is expected to diminish the risk due to
maintenance neglect, since the level of maintenance activity (i.e. amount of di-
rect human contact) will decrease [87]. However, there is a limit beyond which
we cannot go: It would be uneconomical (given the cost and complexity of a
modern technological system) to design systems for zero maintenance, whereby
all components have the same lifetime that is equal to the planned life of the en-
tire system [42]. This limitation may not apply to certain subsea systems, prob-
ably due to the challenges of carrying out regular maintenance underwater and
the vast income from oil and gas which proﬁtably pays for systems that tend to
be maintenance-free.
The goal is to apply the amount of maintenance that is necessary and suﬃ-
cient while considering a given item’s failure rate among other important fac-
tors. This brings about the need to establish a method for the minimization of
maintenance-related risk. It is therefore of interest to make a more holistic study
of the positive and negative impacts of maintenance and develop the most op-
timal strategy for doing maintenance. In a nutshell, this leads us to the issue of
maintenance optimization.
2.8 Maintenance optimization
Maintenance optimization is about balancing the beneﬁts of maintenance with
the cost or risk involved. The element of maintenance being optimized may be
the interval, the strategy, the manpower, the spare parts, the time of renewal,
grouped activities, etc [107]. The choice of whether to do a cost or risk based
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optimization is critical. For relatively low-risk operations, it may be acceptable
to do cost-based optimization while keeping safety as a constraint. However,
for high-risk operations (usually linked to the potential for a major accident),
a risk-based optimization is crucial due to the extreme, potential consequences
of insuﬃcient control. Besides, by assigning cost to risk we can optimize with
respect to both at the same time.
Several eﬀorts have been made with the aim of optimizing maintenance
frequencies in order to minimize equipment maintenance costs while safety
is not compromised. The early methods focused on test interval optimization
based on minimizing the time-average unavailability without considering cost
[28, 37, 96, 110]. This approach was later extended to optimization based on
cost with safety primarily being a constraint [13, 109, 106, 111, 112] and op-
timization based on equipment risk without consideration for risk to humans
[38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 111]. Cost-based optimization is being widely applied in
industrial engineering. The latter features as a step in the RCM (Reliability Cen-
tered Maintenance) process where it is used to optimize the maintenance interval
after a suitable maintenance task would have been selected with the RCM deci-
sion tree [85]. In addition, cost-based optimization has also found application in
the concept of maintenance grouping [27, 57, 66, 108, 122, 123].
Reason [87] in his book chapter titled “Maintenance can Seriously Dam-
age your System” highlights the eﬀect of the amount of direct contact between
people and the system. According to him, such contacts constitute the greatest
human performance problem in most high-risk industries where frequency of
contact can be seen as a greater error opportunity. The likelihood of error is
further analyzed together with neglected maintenance to explain the risks they
posed to the system [87]. Reason [87] phrased this as “the maintainer’s touch
can harm as well as heal.” Besides, Reason [87] views the safety-criticality of
items as a key contributor to the motivation for high level of maintenance contact
(which implies high level of exposure of personnel). As regards optimization to
justify the rationale for preventive maintenance, Reason [87] suggests a graphi-
cal approach (Cost Vs. Level of maintenance plot) whereby the optimal level of
preventive maintenance is determined by combining the cost of both preventive
and corrective maintenance and then selecting the level that coincides with the
lowest overall maintenance cost.
Some previous events can be seen to support the concept of risk-based opti-
mization with consideration for risk to humans. According to Evans and Thako-
rlal [20], the issue of maintenance frequency has resulted in a paradigm shift in
the design of unmanned platforms following the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988.
Fireﬁghting systems, e.g. ﬁre pumps, are usually not installed anymore based on
the reason that the risk reduction beneﬁt they oﬀer to maintenance personnel for
unmanned platforms is not commensurate with their frequency of visits unlike
in a manned facility [20]. In other words, safety systems such as ﬁre pumps are
considered to oﬀer negative risk balance with respect to an unmanned platform
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in relation to the frequency of visit of maintenance personnel. The aforemen-
tioned paradigm shift is also supported by the concept of inherently safer design
(ISD).
A human-risk-related preventive maintenance problem has also been studied
earlier in The Netherlands, where the focus is on scheduling maintenance to
prevent fatalities due to unmanageable railway track maintenance workload at
night [105]. However, as regards risk-based optimization with consideration for
risk to humans, a literature that treats it explicitly and comprehensively has yet
to be identiﬁed.
Chapter 3
Research questions and objectives
3.1 Research questions
Research questions indicate what the researcher wants to know ﬁrst and above
all. He/she then performs a research necessary and suﬃcient to ﬁnd answers to
the questions. The research questions also give cues on the research methods to
be applied in order to answer the questions. In addition, they help to identify
speciﬁc objectives that the research will be tied to. Besides, being able to ﬁnd
answer to a research question will help address a “research problem” which is a
problem “readers think is worth solving” [121].
Further to the aforementioned discussions and the lessons that recent main-
tenance related major accidents (e.g. Imperial Sugar dust explosion and ﬁre in
the U.S.) have taught us, it is reasonable to ask the following questions:
3.1.1 How does maintenance inﬂuence major accident risk?
Maintenance is a key means to improve and maintain the integrity of plant oper-
ations and systems. Lack of maintenance or erroneous maintenance may, how-
ever, cause a sudden or gradual development into a system failure. Even per-
fectly performed maintenance may have a negative impact on risk. Personnel are
exposed to more risk while executing maintenance than during normal operation
and too frequent maintenance may cause rapid wear-out of equipment. In the
execution of maintenance, new hazards and failures may be introduced without
being noticed [97]. Management decisions, sometimes distant from the main-
tenance planning and execution, may introduce small changes in prioritization,
organization, and resources available for maintenance, whose (unwanted) con-
sequences are not so easy to foresee. Complex organizations and systems, like
those that we ﬁnd in the petroleum and petrochemical industry, challenge sim-
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ple causal relationships between underlying events and major accidents. Main-
tenance may be a triggering event in an accident sequence, but also a direct or
indirect cause of barrier failures. Øein et al [62] have linked improper equip-
ment classiﬁcation to major accident risk; this study does not seem to be com-
plemented by other research initiatives. A conceptual and holistic model may
have to be established that relates diﬀerent kinds of maintenance and decisions
(at the “micro level”) to major accident events (at the “macro level”).
3.1.2 To what extent has maintenance been a cause of major
accidents?
There are always lessons to learn from prior accidents, from studying them in-
dividually and by analyzing them jointly to identify the more underlying phe-
nomena of causes. Many investigation reports, articles and books, published
after major accidents and precursor events, address maintenance-related issues.
What seems to be lacking is in-depth analysis of maintenance as a contributing
factor to major accidents when comparing the lessons learnt from several acci-
dents. To what extent has maintenance inﬂuenced the accidents, and what were
the most frequent causes? Do prior accidents point at particular types of main-
tenance deviations as more dominating in their contribution to major accidents?
3.1.3 How should maintenance be optimized in relation to the
major accident risk?
Prior knowledge reveals that increased preventive maintenance frequency im-
plies increased opportunity to prevent functional failure and this increases the
exposure of personnel to risk. Similarly, increased maintenance frequency also
increases the opportunity for making errors [87] and this may increase risk.
Hence, there is the need to establish a means of determining the optimal mainte-
nance that minimizes risk. Several cost-based maintenance optimization models
exist, wherein safety is being kept as a constraint. Besides, very few risk-based
maintenance optimization models have also been seen, where the focus is on
risks generally, not delineating a minor risk from a major risk. These are also
focused on risk to equipment, with little or no attention to human risk. We can-
not be certain that a risk-based optimization method that is suitable for minor
risk is equally suitable for major risk. Given our challenge of “confronting” the
major accident risk, cost-based optimization is not considered suitable. Yet, the
existing risk-based optimization may not be suﬃcient, which calls for further
investigation and validation.
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3.1.4 How can maintenance contribute to the robustness and
resilience of organizations?
The purpose of maintenance is to prevent failures and restore systems to a func-
tioning state. Maintenance also contributes to improved system knowledge and
interdisciplinary coordination that may beneﬁt the entire organization. This may
indicate that maintenance may be a contributor to robust and resilient organiza-
tions whose ability to act upon unexpected events is improved. It is therefore of
interest to investigate how maintenance can be performed to gain this “added
value” of increased organizational robustness and resilience.
3.2 Research objectives
Research objective is about what one’s goal is with respect to the research. In
other words, it is the contribution to the body of knowledge or the service of so-
ciety being pursued. The need for new knowledge led to the setting of academic
or scientiﬁc objectives and the determination of the scope of the thesis [54].
The overarching objective of this PhD project is the development of new
strategies for the prevention of maintenance-related major accidents in the pro-
cess industries. This objective encompasses the following set of objectives:
Objective 1: The realization of a well-structured framework and
expanded/modiﬁed knowledge about the causal relationship
between maintenance and major accident.
• 1st sub-objective: A completed investigation of how maintenance inﬂuences
major accident risk in relation to the energy-barrier perspective of major ac-
cidents.
• 2nd sub-objective: A developed classiﬁcation scheme for maintenance-related
eﬀects on major accident risk.
• 3rd sub-objective: A completed investigation of how maintenance inﬂuences
major accident risk in relation to other perspectives of major accidents.
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Objective 2: Enhanced demonstration of the applicability of the
knowledge derived from the causal relationship between
maintenance and major accidents.
• 1st sub-objective: Current ﬁgure on what percentage of major accidents is
caused by maintenance in addition to other relevant statistics.
• 2nd sub-objective: Empirical evidence showing the practicability of the
newly developed classiﬁcation scheme by using it to classify the maintenance
inﬂuence in a large number of major accidents.
• 3rd sub-objective: Applicability of the results (statistics) generated to main-
tenance management.
Objective 3: The proposal of novel risk reduction strategies for
maintenance-related major accidents.
• 1st sub-objective: An improved basis for maintenance optimization which
allows for optimization with respect to major accident risk, not just cost
• 2nd sub-objective: A developed framework of maintenance strategies for im-
proving the robustness and resilience of organizations
3.3 Scope
The scope of this PhD project covers the following:
• Major accidents: This will involve exploring theories and investigation re-
ports in relation to major accidents. It will focus on maintenance-related ma-
jor accidents and will consider both major accidents and precursor events.
• Sociotechnical system: The study will touch on human, organizational, tech-
nical and operational elements, but will not be a social science study. It will
also analyze the organizational accident perspectives and their relationship
with maintenance.
• Maintenance optimization: This will be based on optimizing maintenance
interval in terms of risk, while delimiting the optimization with no cost anal-
ysis. It will be limited to safety systems.
• Application areas: The research will be focused on the hydrocarbon and
chemical process industries, however, it may draw inspiration from other in-
dustries.
Chapter 4
Research methodology and approach
4.1 Overview of research
The purpose of this section is to present the background for the speciﬁc research
approach being applied in this PhD project.
Research, as deﬁned in Merriam-Webster dictionary [53], is “studious in-
quiry or examination; especially: investigation or experimentation aimed at the
discovery and interpretation of facts, revision of accepted theories or laws in
the light of new facts, or practical application of such new or revised theories
or laws.” Methods of research encompass scientiﬁc research and research in the
humanities. In this PhD project, the focus has been on the scientiﬁc.
Scientiﬁc method, as deﬁned in Merriam-Webster dictionary [53], is “prin-
ciples and procedures for the systematic pursuit of knowledge involving the
recognition and formulation of a problem, the collection of data through obser-
vation and experiment, and the formulation and testing of hypotheses.” Research
method is about how one wants to reach the goal of the research. In other words,
it is a means to realizing the research objective.
Generally, research may be classiﬁed in many diﬀerent ways. However, on a
broader level, all research can be classiﬁed in relation to the quantiﬁability of
data into:
• Qualitative: Qualitative research, as deﬁned by Saunders [93], is “research
dealing with phenomena that are diﬃcult or impossible to quantify mathe-
matically, such as beliefs, meanings, attributes, and symbols.”
• Quantitative: Given [24] sees quantitative research as “the systematic empir-
ical investigation of any phenomena via statistical, mathematical or compu-
tational techniques.”
It is arguable that quantitative research and qualitative research can go hand
in hand, with the latter supporting the former. This is maintained by Kuhn [47] in
the following words: “large amounts of qualitative work have usually been pre-
requisite to fruitful quantiﬁcation in the physical sciences.” In addition to being
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either qualitative or quantitative, research, depending on the discipline (whether
arts, humanities, social sciences, pure sciences or applied sciences etc.) may be
classiﬁed further into several types such as [93]: Basic, applied, correlational,
descriptive, ethnographic, experimental, exploratory, grounded theory, histori-
cal and phenomenological.
This PhD research project falls into the technological/engineering science
category of four research cultures including natural science, social science and
humanities. In the technological/engineering science category, research may be
classiﬁed also in relation to the degree of practicability according to the follow-
ing.
• Basic research: This is also called fundamental research and is pursued to
increase the knowledge base of a particular ﬁeld of study [8]. It may be clas-
siﬁed into two: Pure basic research and oriented basic research.
– Pure basic research: This is “research carried out for the advancement
of knowledge, without working for long-term economic or social beneﬁts
and with no positive eﬀorts being made to apply the results to practical
problems or to transfer the results to sectors responsible for its applica-
tion” [64].
– Oriented basic research: This is “research carried out with the expecta-
tion that it will produce a broad base of knowledge likely to form the
background to the solution of recognized or expected current or future
problems or possibilities” [64].
• Applied research: This is “original investigation undertaken in order to ac-
quire new knowledge which is directed primarily towards a speciﬁc practical
aim or objective” [64]. Applied research uses the knowledge base created by
basic research to devise solutions, often technological, to speciﬁc problems
[8].
Scientiﬁc research may also be seen from the following main perspectives
[21, 22, 54, 76]:
• Theoretical research: A theoretical research may involve a novel application
of an existing theory, the extension of the theory, the modiﬁcation of the the-
ory, the validation of the theory (with rational arguments) or the development
of a new theory.
• Empirical research: An empirical research may involve observation, exper-
imentation or experience. Empirical evidence may be collected through ex-
periments, from investigation reports, in-service data etc. They have the po-
tential to validate a theory or refute it. This is subject to the fulﬁllment of
some criteria, including statistical signiﬁcance of the empirical data, repeat-
ing experiments etc.
One thing both perspectives have in common is that they are methods of ac-
quiring knowledge and involve a careful perusal of mostly published works like
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international peer-reviewed journals and conference proceedings. The perspec-
tives may also involve the use of reports from reputable research institutes and
the R&D (research and development) department of companies.
The data collection method in research may also be qualiﬁed as scientiﬁc
or otherwise. In addition to literature review (which cuts across nearly every
academic ﬁeld), scientiﬁc methods that can be used for collecting data include
the following [6, 55]:
• Case study: This is useful in getting a comprehensive contextual view of
a particular phenomenon. Generalization should be handled carefully, since
case studies are focused on special cases as implied in the name. It is advis-
able that theoretical concepts are used in relation to generalization.
• Textual analysis: This can be an interpretative textual analysis or a quan-
titative content analysis (e.g. how many times an event features in a given
medium). The textual extracts have to be clear, consistent and logical. Logic
enhances plausibility of reasoning, enables distinction between correct rea-
soning and incorrect reasoning and enable the evaluation of reasoning that
links premises to conclusion [79].
• Experiment: This involves the manipulation of an independent variable under
well-controlled conditions to know whether and how it causes a change in the
dependent variable and by how much.
• Action research: This is peculiar to social sciences and involves real-life set-
tings of which the researcher forms a part of the operation.
• Natural observation: This is an observation in the ﬁeld or in real-life settings
without interferences such as artiﬁcial interventions and laboratory limita-
tions.
• Survey: This is carried out with data collected through standardized inter-
views or questionnaires.
• Statistical sampling: This involves identifying relevant statistical popula-
tions, selecting a subset of individuals (i.e. sample) and collecting informa-
tion related to the latter to evaluate characteristics of the former.
How data are interpreted depends on the theoretical background (previous
knowledge) [55]. Theory encompasses concepts (i.e. measurable objects, phe-
nomena, events etc.), causal relationships, structural pattern, lawfulness, or ex-
planations, models (mathematical, analogy, etc) [55]. Theories/models enable
theoretical integration of knowledge (systematics), predictability of behavior
and generalizability of experiences (data), although the imperfection of theories
is not improbable [55]. Aristotle, the great philosopher, says: There is noth-
ing like improbability; sometimes the most improbable thing happens. It is also
required of researchers to justify or validate theories with empirical evidence.
However, the theories may be false even though there may be a match between
them and a limited amount of data, so Popper [79] suggests that it is equally
reasonable to also try to falsify the theory and see what happens.
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Furthermore, scientiﬁc research may also be classiﬁed according to some
methodological traditions which encompasses the following [5, 6, 41, 55]:
• Positivism: According to Kasim [41], modern quantitative research evolved
from Auguste Comte’s philosophy of positivism, which emphasized “the use
of the scientiﬁc method through observation to empirically test hypotheses
explaining and predicting what, where, why, how, and when phenomena oc-
curred.”
• Interpretivism: This considers social sciences to be about the qualitative un-
derstanding of an artiﬁcial object within its cultural, historical, and in situ
context.
• System theory: This is partly critical of positivism but premised on the same
scientiﬁc ideal, and encompasses system thinking (i.e. inquiring to under-
stand how things, regarded as systems, inﬂuence one another within a whole),
system decomposition (i.e. breaking down a system into its components sub-
system and analyzing each separately, e.g. hierarchical decomposition), sys-
tem aggregation (i.e. putting the analyzed components subsystem back into
the system), systems integration (i.e. integrating information sources and
prior knowledge), veriﬁcation (i.e. conﬁrming that that research was carried
out in accordance with the requirements) and validation (i.e. an acceptance
that the research truly solves the problem that it was intended for).
4.2 Overview of scientiﬁc method
Generally, research can be seen as structured in nature, although there may be
variations in the sequence of steps depending on the subject matter and the
researcher’s disciplinary leaning. The formalities of scientiﬁc research usually
align with the following systematic procedures and steps [99, 101, 118, 120]:
• Observation and formulation of question: This begins with observations
about the unknown, the vague or novelty, and is followed by thorough in-
vestigation of theories related to what was observed. The theories should be
screened for relevance and not chosen randomly. This helps to narrow down
as much as possible to the main focus area of the research and saves time and
eﬀort since extensive review of literature is necessary to identify research
gaps. The justiﬁcation for the research should be established by linking its
signiﬁcance to existing knowledge about the topic. A research gap in exist-
ing literature, as identiﬁed by the scientist, provokes a research question. The
research question may be parallel to the hypothesis - the supposition that
requires testing.
• Hypothesis: Hypothesis is a conjecture, a suggested explanation for our ob-
servation, whose trial conﬁrms or falsiﬁes the perceived relationship between
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two or more variables. It is based on knowledge obtained while formulating
the question.
• Predictions: Predictions by reasoning (including deductive reasoning) are
made possible by a good hypothesis. Deductive reasoning, also called deduc-
tive logic or logical deduction or, informally, “top-down” logic, is the process
of reasoning from the more general (theories) to the more testable speciﬁc
(hypotheses) to reach a logically certain conclusion. Furthermore, predic-
tions may be developed in relation to theoretical (or conceptual) deﬁnition
or operational deﬁnition. Theoretical deﬁnition contains built-in theories and
inductive or deductive consequences related to the theories being presented
as products of the research. It involves the description of a concept by re-
lating it to other concepts. Operational deﬁnition deﬁnes the variables and
how they will be evaluated and assessed in the study. Besides, the relation-
ship between both types of deﬁnition is such that an operational deﬁnition is
usually dedicated to modeling a theoretical deﬁnition in relation to empirical
experience.
• Gathering of data: This involves collecting and measuring information on
variables of interest, according to established methods that enable the an-
swering of research questions, the testing of hypotheses, and the evaluation
of results.
• Analysis and interpretation of data: This involves decomposing the individ-
ual pieces of data for the purpose of drawing conclusions about them. This
may be reported/represented through tables, ﬁgures, pictures or words.
• Testing of hypothesis: The hypothesis is tested with the collected data. The
hypothesis is considered true or false based on the analysis of the test result. If
the hypothesis is false, it could be revised and tried again or lead to redeﬁning
the subject. This indicates the iterative nature of the scientiﬁc method.
• Communicating research ﬁndings: This involves the documentation, report-
ing, peer review and publishing of the research ﬁndings at the end of the
research.
4.3 The research content of this PhD project
4.3.1 Application of the scientiﬁc methodology to this PhD project
The scientiﬁc method as applied to individual research articles is described in
the following:
• Observation and formulation of question: I established a description of state-
of-the-art research on the topic of major accident risk and maintenance. The
amount of literature directly related to this topic was limited and a wide
search was performed, to ensure that related literature that also may be of
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interest were identiﬁed. The literature reviewed were related to system re-
liability, maintenance management, risk analysis, human and organizational
factors, systems theories, major accident perspectives and major accident in-
vestigation reports. Meanwhile, some research gaps were identiﬁed, leading
to the formulation of research questions.
• Hypothesis, predictions and gathering/analysis of data: There was no formal
formulation of hypotheses, but the research questions had the same tendency
or direction as would formal hypotheses. In other words, the objectives of
the research questions were closer to hypotheses. Similar to hypotheses, re-
search questions are bound to lead to answers by reasoning and this can be
tested for being realistic or not. This PhD research work built on the literature
reviews, applying the principles of theoretical/operational deﬁnitions in rela-
tion to logical reasoning and this brought about signiﬁcant innovation and/or
creativity as presented in the following.
– Classiﬁcation schemes for maintenance inﬂuence on major accidents were
developed based on literature review, systematic analysis of accident re-
ports and of the problem area using diﬀerent perspectives (e.g. mainte-
nance management perspective, accident process perspective and work
performance perspective). Both direct inﬂuence (e.g. through maintenance
correcting errors and ensuring reliability or through maintenance errors
inducing errors in the system) and indirect inﬂuence (e.g. through inade-
quate maintenance planning, inadequate procedures for performing main-
tenance, inadequate training of maintenance personnel) were considered
and included in the classiﬁcation scheme.
– The analysis of accident reports integrated with the already developed
classiﬁcation scheme also provided information about the extent of the
problem (i.e. to what degree maintenance has been a cause of major acci-
dents) and the key mechanisms (i.e. the most important factors). Data was
collected from the accident investigation reports, broken down ﬁnely and
interpreted. According to the aforementioned description of scientiﬁc data
collection methods, the method here conforms to statistical sampling.
– The relationship between key maintenance factors (i.e. the independent
variables) and the major accident risk they inﬂuence (i.e. the dependent
variable) was analyzed. This led to the development of individual risk
models (from the individual maintenance factors) which served as basis
for the overall maintenance optimization model for major accident risk re-
duction. As far as possible, the ﬁnal model was also applied to a case to
test its suitability. It was also compared with existing models to show its
novel contribution.
– A combined robustness and resilience framework for maintenance in as-
sociation with other key departments was established. This was intended
to improve the ability of an organization to prevent or survive major ac-
cidents. It was realized through a thorough analysis of existing organi-
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zational accidents perspectives and theories of maintenance management
and departmental interfaces within the process industries.
• Testing of hypothesis: Since there was no formal formulation of hypothesis
in this PhD project (as mentioned earlier), there was no basis for testing any
hypothesis. Yet, there was the burden of testing that the research questions
were answered correctly and that the research objectives were fulﬁlled. To
this end, a selection of accidents from various sources were used to test the
suitability of the classiﬁcation schemes. This led to extensions of the original
classiﬁcation schemes. Based on the revised classiﬁcation schemes, a better
insight into the inﬂuence of maintenance on major accident causation was
presented. Peer-review comments from editors and reviewers of internation-
ally reputed journals also served as part of the test mechanism.
• Communicating research ﬁndings: The research was reported in the form of
original articles and published in international publication channels such as
journals and conferences.
An overview of the research attributes of this thesis is presented in the fol-
lowing, in relation to quantiﬁability of data, degree of practicability, main per-
spective, data collection method and methodological tradition.
There is a mixture of qualitative and quantitative characteristics obviously
due to the nature of what is required in the PhD project: (i) a research associated
with a collection of scientiﬁc opinions (i.e. qualitative, as shown in articles 1, 2,
4, 5 and 6) and (ii) a research associated with a collection of facts and ﬁgures
(i.e. quantitative, as shown in articles 3 and 4). Article 4 may be seen as being
semiquantitative, since it is made up of both original qualitative and quantitative
parts, whereby the former served as a basis for the latter.
The research is entirely applied since all the articles have the potential for
addressing immediate practical needs. The articles (1, 2 and 5) on description
and/or classiﬁcation of maintenance-related causes of major accidents are ap-
plied, since the prevention of an eﬀect is based on the identiﬁcation of the causes
of the eﬀect. The article on statistical analysis (article 3) is applied, since the re-
sults can have immediate impact on decision-making as regards the prevention
of maintenance-related major accidents. The articles on maintenance optimiza-
tion (article 4) and maintenance robustness/resilience (article 6) are also applied,
since they can also be used readily to reduce the major accident risk.
Some aspects of the research are both theoretical and empirical (i.e articles
1, 2, 3 and 4) since they combined major accident theories with data from acci-
dent investigation reports and other sources. Articles 5 and 6 were theoretical.
The theoretical research perspective involved organizing and documenting phe-
nomena in the form of models, e.g., gathering and structuring information about
how maintenance has inﬂuenced major accidents and precursor events and sub-
sequently developing new models to describe these phenomena. It also involved
the extension of previous theoretical or applied type of research in a given disci-
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pline or sub-discipline, e.g. developing new models for optimizing maintenance
intervals with respect to major accident risk. Methods for optimization with re-
spect to cost are well known, where safety is kept as a constraint. However,
optimization with respect to risk only is not a topic that has been studied much
earlier. In addition, the theory of robustness and resilience were extended to
maintenance in relation to improving these qualities in a process industry orga-
nization as a whole. The empirical research perspective involved the statistical
analysis of data collected from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board and the Bu-
reau for Analysis of Industrial Risks and Pollution in France, culminating in the
interpretation of the statistical results. This includes the trend of maintenance
related major accidents in the process industries in addition to statistics on the
degree and distribution of the causes of the major accidents. The Work and Ac-
cident Process (WAP) classiﬁcation scheme developed in this PhD project was
applied to the data which covered the U.S. and Europe geographically.
The entire research employed literature review for information collection.
This involved the collection of information from theories related to system reli-
ability, maintenance management, risk analysis, human and organizational fac-
tors, systems theories, major accident perspectives and from major accident in-
vestigation reports. Besides, statistical sampling was also applied as a data gath-
ering method when accident data were needed in relation to articles 1, 2 and 3.
Furthermore, the methodological tradition in this PhD project is related to
systems theory due to the systematic and systemic characteristics of the re-
search. Some examples are presented as follows: System thinking (e.g. this en-
compasses viewing maintenance-related factors as part of the overall system,
maintenance-related major accident risk, and the process of understanding how
the factors, which may be regarded as systems themselves, inﬂuence one an-
other within the whole. This is akin to smaller problems working together to
produce a bigger problem. System thinking example also include the process
of understanding how relevant theories, major accident information sources and
prior knowledge can work together to solve the maintenance-related major ac-
cident problem), system decomposition (e.g. breaking down data from acci-
dent theories and reports and analyzing each separately for improved under-
standing), system aggregation (e.g. putting the analyzed data pieces back into
a whole), systems integration (e.g. using logical reasoning to integrate knowl-
edge from accident theories/reports with prior knowledge in order to realize
new solution-oriented frameworks and methods), veriﬁcation (e.g. conﬁrming
that the research was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the
scientiﬁc method, by testing ﬁnished work with statistical samples from acci-
dent databases and subjecting same to universal criticism) and validation (e.g.
applying the new knowledge to more realistic situations to prove that it truly
contributes signiﬁcantly to the advancement of the body of knowledge). The
systemic nature is indicated by the fact that the failure to correctly analyze the
factors that inﬂuence the maintenance-related major accident risk (seen as parts
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of the system) will make prevention of major accidents (seen as a system) dif-
ﬁcult to realize. This relationship is depicted in the bigger picture of the PhD
project as shown in Fig. 4.1.
4.3.2 The bigger picture of the entire PhD research process
As regards the bigger picture (See Fig. 4.1), it can be seen that basic risk man-
agement principles were covered in the compilation of the various articles that
comprise this PhD project. Fig. 4.1 shows a systematic transition from one
“project subsystem” to another. Besides, more insight was given into the princi-
ples in relation to the maintenance-related major accident risk. This is summa-
rized in the following.
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ASSESSED (staƟsƟcs of maintenance-related MAs) 
ArƟcle 3: A study of maintenance-related major accident cases in the 21st century 
IDENTIFIED (causes of maintenance-related MAs) 
ArƟcle 1: The inŇuence of 
maintenance on some selected 
major accidents 
ArƟcle 2: Maintenance-related 
major accidents: ClassŝĮcaƟon of 
causes and case study 
ArƟcle 5: The eīect of 
maintenance seen from dŝīerent 
perspecƟves on major accident risk 
Fig. 4.1 Classiﬁcation of research ﬁndings
• IDENTIFY: “Whymaintenance-related major accidents happen” were uncov-
ered in articles 1, 2 and 5.
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• ASSESS: “What proportion of major accidents is linkable to maintenance
and where the various distributions are most concentrated” were revealed in
article 3.
• CONTROL: “How to control the risk of maintenance-related major acci-
dents” was oﬀered suggestions in articles 4 and 6.
4.3.3 The detailed picture of the entire PhD research process
The basis for the detailed picture (See Fig. 4.2), which shows transitions be-
tween individual research articles (i.e. parts of the project subsystems), was set
by the bigger picture. The former shows how the individual articles inﬂuence
each other for the purpose of realizing the overarching objective which is to
prevent maintenance-related major accidents (i.e. the end of the bigger picture).
This is described with respect to the relationship between the appended papers
in the following.
  ArƟcle 1:  
The inŇuence of 
maintenance on 
some selected 
major accidents 
ArƟcle 2: 
Maintenance-
related major 
accidents: 
ClassiĮcaƟon of 
causes & case study 
ArƟcle 5:  
The eīect of 
maintenance seen 
from diīerent 
perspecƟves on 
major accident risk 
ArƟcle 4: 
Maintenance 
opƟmizaƟon for 
major accident risk 
reducƟon 
ArƟcle 3:  
A study of 
maintenance-
related major 
accident cases in the 
21st century 
ArƟcle 6:  
Improving the 
robustness and 
resilience properƟes 
of maintenance 
Fig. 4.2 Relationship between the appended papers
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The research process for Article 1 built on a review of literature related to the
management of major accident risk in the process industry, theories of the causal
relationship between maintenance and major accidents and accident investiga-
tion reports from the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-
OSHA), the U.S. Chemical Safety Board and Failure Knowledge Database in
Japan. The research resulted in the development of causal classiﬁcation schemes
in terms of the accident process and the maintenance management cycle. The
main purpose of Article 1 was to develop a classiﬁcation scheme, apply it on a
few accidents to see whether it works and then adjust/ﬁnalize it.
The need to contribute exhaustively to the same theme as in Article 1 justiﬁed
the extension of Article 1 to Article 2. The accident process perspective features
in both articles. However, Article 2 combined this with the maintenance work
process perspective, unlike Article 1 which combined it with the maintenance
management cycle perspective. The maintenance management cycle perspective
is related to the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle of the traditional management system
(i.e. a bigger picture), whereas the maintenance work process perspective shows
a more elaborate technical and operational scope (i.e. a detailed picture). The
research process for Article 2 built on theories related to Article 1 and more the-
ories of the causal relationship between maintenance and major accidents. The
ﬁrst task was to establish a suitable classiﬁcation scheme that could form a basis
for analyzing the inﬂuence of maintenance on historical accidents. This would
enable identiﬁcation of where improvement is most needed. The Work and Ac-
cident Process (WAP) scheme was developed for this purpose. It was tested with
sample cases from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board database and found suitable
for all the accident cases selected from a variety of process industries.
To assess the current status (based on empirical evidence) of the extent of
maintenance inﬂuence on major accidents, Article 3 applied the WAP scheme
(developed in Article 2) on a much larger number of major accidents and re-
vealed novel facts in relation to the maintenance inﬂuence over a decade. This
includes the identiﬁcation of the most important causes of major accidents re-
lated to maintenance.
The ﬁndings from Article 3 justiﬁed further research aimed at developing
Article 4, which is about devising a means of reducing the maintenance-related
major accident risk perceived in Article 3. Article 4 focused on how to optimize
the frequency of maintenance in order to minimize the major accident risk as-
sociated with it. It built on theories related to maintenance optimization and the
accident process perspective of the classiﬁcation schemes developed in Articles
1 and 2.
Article 5, which is about the inﬂuence of maintenance based on various ex-
isting organizational accident perspectives, was triggered by the observation of
organizational factors among technical factors in all the major accident investi-
gation reports used in Articles 1 and 2. Therefore, it was important to look more
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into the theories of the diﬀerent organizational accident perspectives in order to
gain as much knowledge as possible.
Article 6, which is dedicated to the 4th research question - How can main-
tenance contribute to the robustness and resilience of organizations?, was natu-
rally inﬂuenced by Article 5. Robustness is about the ability of organizations to
resist or counteract accidental events, whereas resilience is about organizations
being able to adapt to or recover from accidental events. Hence, the results of Ar-
ticle 5, being about how maintenance can inﬂuence the prevention/causation of
organizational accidents, was of signiﬁcant relevance to Article 6. The research
process for Article 6 built on inputs from Article 5 and on theories of robustness
and resilience, industrial organization and maintenance work process.
The development of all the articles was integrated with critical thinking and
creativity. The elements of critical thinking as deﬁned by The National Coun-
cil for Excellence in Critical Thinking (NCECT) was applied in the develop-
ment of all the articles: i.e., “the intellectually disciplined process of actively
and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evalu-
ating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, re-
ﬂection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action. In its
exemplary form, it is based on universal intellectual values that transcend sub-
ject matter divisions: clarity, accuracy, precision, consistency, relevance, sound
evidence, good reasons, depth, breadth, and fairness. . . incorporated in a family
of interwoven modes of thinking, among them: scientiﬁc thinking, mathemat-
ical thinking, historical thinking, anthropological thinking, economic thinking,
moral thinking, and philosophical thinking” [94].
Overall, the ﬁrst author conceptualized and planned all the articles with the
supervisor/co-author. As the ﬁrst author of all the articles, I conceived the ideas
for the research, carried out information analysis, developed and submitted the
abstracts, then did the structuring and writing of the ﬁrst version of the articles. I
was also responsible for further iterations following criticisms from myself, my
supervisor/co-author and the reviewers. The reasoning was formal, logical and
traceable. Furthermore, uncertainties surrounding the ﬁndings, together with ap-
propriate generalizations, were deﬁned, e.g. the validity of the statistical ﬁnd-
ings being constrained by the uncertainty associated with the assumption that
future failures will occur at the current rate which was established based on
historical experience. All the articles were eventually subjected to international
peer-review.
Chapter 5
Main results
5.1 Main results
The main results of this PhD project are originally presented in six articles. Five
of the articles are published with one under review. The articles were aimed at
providing answers to the research questions posed in Section 3.1 and realizing
the research objectives mentioned in Section 3.2.
In this chapter, a summary of the main results is provided by matching the
research questions and objectives with the corresponding contributions that rep-
resents results from an article. An overview of the distribution of the results
from the articles in relation to the research questions and objectives is shown in
Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Overview of distribution of results
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4
Objective 1 Articles 1, 2, 5
Objective 2 Article 3
Objective 3 Article 4 Article 6
5.1.1 “How does maintenance inﬂuence major accident risk?”
(question 1) - “The realization of a well-structured
framework and expanded/modiﬁed knowledge about the
causal relationship between maintenance and major
accident.” (objective 1)
This has been addressed in Articles 1 [69], 2 [68] and 5 [67].
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5.1.1.1 Contributions from Article 1 [69]
The aforementioned question was answered and the research objective fulﬁlled
from the perspectives of both maintenance management and the accident pro-
cess. By combining the perspectives, a simple classiﬁcation scheme was real-
ized. This was used to reanalyze some selected maintenance-related major acci-
dents, giving new insights into their causation. The accidents were also used to
test the scheme. The main intention in article 1 was to develop a classiﬁcation
scheme, demonstrate it with few accidents to see whether it is applicable and
then modify/conclude it. This turned out successful on all the accidents con-
sidered from diﬀerent sources in diﬀerent countries (CSB in USA, EU-OSHA
in Europe and FKD in Japan). The accident process perspective is described as
shown in Table 5.2, whereas the maintenance management perspective is de-
scribed as shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.2 Factors based on the accident process perspective
Factors Deﬁnition
Lack of barrier mainte-
nance
Lack of barrier maintenance which allows barriers
to be breached by failure mechanisms (e.g. lack of
maintenance leading to corrosion).
Barrier maintenance
error
Wrong maintenance directly breaching safety barri-
ers (e.g. wrong calibration of level transmitter).
New hazard Maintenance introduces new hazards, which may be
triggered by events (e.g. hot tapping).
Initiating event Maintenance being an initiating event for an accident
scenario (e.g. loss of containment due to a wrong
valve being operated).
5.1.1.2 Contributions from Article 2 [68]
The aforementioned question was answered and the objective fulﬁlled from the
perspectives of both the maintenance work process and the accident process, the
combination of which is called the Work and Accident Process (WAP) classiﬁ-
cation scheme. The accident process part was divided, like in article 1 [69], into
both active failures and latent failures, but in this case there was further reﬁne-
ment to the latent failures categorization. The classiﬁcation related to the active
failures is identical to the one developed in article 1 [69], whereas the classiﬁ-
cation related to the latent failures is described as shown in Table 5.4. The latent
failure classiﬁcation is based on Reason’s [87] view of its being characterized
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Table 5.3 Factors based on the maintenance management perspective
Factors Deﬁnition
Lack of maintainabil-
ity
Lack of the ability to retain an item or restore it to a
state in which it can perform its required functions,
e.g. lack of testability/accessibility.
Deﬁcient fault diagno-
sis
Deﬁciency in fault detection, fault localization and
identiﬁcation of causes, e.g. insuﬃcient test coverage
[19].
Deﬁcient planning Deﬁciency in the organization and documentation of
a set of maintenance tasks that include the activities,
procedures, resources and time scale required to ex-
ecute maintenance, e.g. communication gap between
maintenance and production units [19].
Deﬁcient scheduling Deﬁciency in predetermined detailing of when a spe-
ciﬁc maintenance task should be executed, e.g. too
late timing [19].
Deﬁcient execution Deﬁciency in the hands-on actions taken to retain an
item or restore it to a state in which it can perform
its required functions, e.g. wrong performance of a
correct task.
Deﬁcient checking Deﬁciency in supervision, conﬁrmation or perfor-
mance evaluation, e.g. inadequacy of checklists.
by management failure and on similar information obtained from accident in-
vestigation reports [12].
The work process classiﬁcation is described as shown in Table 5.5. This fo-
cuses more on operational elements in addition to management elements unlike
the corresponding perspective of the scheme in article 1 [69].
In addition, some other classiﬁcation schemes, e.g. Threat and Error Man-
agement (TEM) and Man-Technology-Organization (MTO) framework were
adapted to maintenance-related major accidents from other industrial (e.g. avi-
ation) or application areas. This increased the range/variety of classiﬁcation
schemes that may be useful in certain maintenance-related situations. However,
they were considered less suitable for this PhD project because they did not
treat major accident hazards explicitly or did not describe the accident process.
The Work and Accident Process (WAP) scheme, which is a combination of the
work process and accident process schemes was recommended. This is because
the accident process scheme would provide a better insight into the underlying
and contributing causes in relation to the barriers dedicated to preventing major
accidents, while the work process scheme identiﬁes the starting, intermediate
and terminal phases of the accidents in relation to the maintenance operational
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Table 5.4 Latent failures of the accident process
Latent Failures Deﬁnitions
Deﬁcient regulatory
oversight
Inadequacies of regulatory bodies in directing, guid-
ing, inspecting, auditing and sanctioning companies
under their watch.
Deﬁcient risk assess-
ment
Inadequacies in identifying hazards, analyzing and
evaluating associated risks.
Deﬁcient implementa-
tion of requirements
This refers to inadequacies in adopting external re-
quirements.
Deﬁcient Management
of Change (MOC)
Inadequacies in handling changes, especially non-
routine permanent and temporary changes in physi-
cal systems, organizations, operations and the opera-
tional environment.
Deﬁcient documenta-
tion
Inadequacies in safety-related documentation
Deﬁcient design, or-
ganization or resource
management
Inadequacies in design, layout, coordination, com-
munication, safety culture and management of hu-
man, material and ﬁnancial resources etc.
Unbalanced safety and
production goals
This is the disproportionate allocation of resources to
production at the expense of safety.
Deﬁcient monitoring
of performance
This covers inadequacies in measuring performance
and detecting trends.
Deﬁcient audit Inadequacies in checking the conformity of the status
of personnel, organization, systems and processes to
established requirements.
Deﬁcient learning Inadequacies in learning from safety reviews, safety
audit reports, industry news, etc.
process. This would also contribute to a better understanding of the underlying
and contributing causes, thus promoting prevention eﬀorts.
The main intention in Article 2 was to develop a causal classiﬁcation scheme,
test it with few maintenance-related major accidents to see if it is implementable
and then revise/ﬁnish it. The focus covered the identiﬁcation of the underlying
and contributing maintenance-related causes of major accidents, and by impli-
cation, gave more insight into how maintenance inﬂuences the major accident
risk. The rigorous iterative veriﬁcation process and the harmonization of the
independent analysis of both authors resulted in the ﬁne and comprehensive
categorization of maintenance-related major accidents. Meanwhile, the test also
provided an opportunity to help improve the scheme. The resulting Work and
Accident Process (WAP) scheme is based on the combination of the accident
process and the maintenance work process classiﬁcation schemes developed in-
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Table 5.5 Factors based on the work process
Factors Deﬁnition
Deﬁcient planning,
scheduling and failure
diagnosis
Planning is the organization and documentation of a
set of tasks that include the activities, procedures, re-
sources and time scale required to carry out mainte-
nance, whereas scheduling is the predetermined de-
tailing of when a speciﬁc maintenance task should
be carried out and by whom [19]. Failure diagnosis
refers to actions taken for fault detection, fault local-
ization and identiﬁcation of causes [19].
Deﬁcient mobiliza-
tion/shutdown
Mobilization is the supply, movement and deploy-
ment of resources. Shutdown is outage implemented
in advance for maintenance, or other purposes [19].
Deﬁcient preparation
for maintenance work
Preparation refers to provision of required informa-
tion and applying the requirements (e.g. Permit to
work-PTW, Lockout/Tagout-LOTO procedure, haz-
ardous material evacuation, securing of isolation
points, etc.) that will enable maintenance to be per-
formed eﬀectively and safely.
Deﬁcient performance
of the maintenance
work
Performance implies hands-on actions taken to retain
an item in or restore it to a state in which it can per-
form its required functions.
Deﬁcient startup Startup is a state in which a maintained item is being
made “live,” i.e. the item is being activated or actu-
ated.
Deﬁcient normal oper-
ation
Normal operation is a state in which an item is in
service.
dividually earlier. WAP was used to reanalyze a larger number of accidents,
giving more insights into their occurrence.
5.1.1.3 Contributions from Article 5 [67]
The aforementioned question was answered and the objective fulﬁlled on the
basis of six existing organizational accident perspectives. The perspectives have
not all been thoroughly investigated before with the relationship between main-
tenance and major accidents in mind. Hence, it was interesting to look at the
perspectives from a maintenance point of view to see what new knowledge they
might oﬀer or whether they could support some prior knowledge related to the
subject of this PhD project. The results from the investigation are presented in
Table 5.6.
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Table 5.6 The eﬀects of maintenance seen from from diﬀerent major accident perspectives
Perspective Implication Maintenance eﬀects (Results)
Energy-
barrier
Major accidents result from the
failure of the barrier between a
hazard and an asset.
Maintenance is seen as a
key means of retaining major-
accident barriers in or restoring
them to a functional state.
Normal acci-
dent
Major accidents are inevitable
in high-risk technologies due
to their interactive complexities
and tight couplings.
Maintenance is seen only as
a safeguard for the individual
parts of high-risk systems, but
not ensuring the safety of the
whole system. Maintenance is
also seen as adding complexity
and tight couplings.
High reliabil-
ity organiza-
tion (HRO)
Major accidents are pre-
ventable through diligence in
failure analysis, learning, bal-
ancing production and safety
goals, decentralization and
centralization of authorities
and redundancy.
HRO organizations are proac-
tive in failure management and
this should also extend to en-
suring good maintenance, to
avoid technical failures.
Man-made
disaster
Major accidents result from
lack of information ﬂow.
The technical and maintenance
status of systems is key infor-
mation that should ﬂow to the
right persons.
Conﬂicting
objectives
Major accidents result from or-
ganizational objectives clash-
ing with each other, leading to
drift towards accidents.
Maintenance costs are under
pressure to be reduced.
Resilience
engineering
Major accidents are due to a
breakdown in the adaptive ca-
pacity necessary to cope with
the real world of complexity.
Being a synthesis of ideas on
barriers, complexity, conﬂict-
ing goals and HRO, how main-
tenance is viewed will tend to
be coincidental to these.
The various perspectives gave us diﬀerent views, and by implication, diﬀer-
ent insight into how maintenance inﬂuences major accidents. The energy-barrier
perspective clearly emphasizes the role of maintenance as a key means of en-
suring the availability and reliability of barriers to prevent accidents, whereas
other perspectives highlight the importance of maintenance to maintain organi-
zational balance in relation to other elements within the industrial organization
as shown in Table 5.6. Given that there is merit in all the perspectives, it ap-
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pears reasonable to give attention to all, thus consolidating strategies for major
accident prevention as demonstrated in Article 6.
5.1.2 “To what extent has maintenance been a cause of major
accidents?” (question 2) - “Enhanced demonstration of the
applicability of the knowledge derived from the causal
relationship between maintenance and major accidents”
(objective 2)
This has been addressed in Article 3 [70]. A much larger number of major ac-
cident cases from the US and Europe between 2000 and 2011 were studied.
The Work and Accident Process (WAP) scheme developed in Article 2 was ap-
plied/tested further on 183 major accident cases. This resulted in the statistics
presented in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7 Statistics of maintenance-related major accidents
Year USA & Moving
Europe Average
2000 7
2001 6
2002 9 7.3
2003 12 9.0
2004 9 10.0
2005 8 9.7
2006 4 7.0
2007 4 5.3
2008 8 5.3
2009 4 5.3
2010 5 5.7
2011 4 4.3
Total 80
Sample size 183
Percentage 44%
Table 5.7 indicates that, overall, maintenance is a causal factor in 44% of ma-
jor accidents in the process industries, and the proportion per year has decreased
over the period.
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Further results relevant to research objective 2 are presented as shown in
Fig. 5.1, Fig. 5.2, Fig. 5.3, Fig. 5.4, Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6. These consist of the
most common causes associated with maintenance-related major accidents in
the process industries. The most frequent cause in terms of the active accident
process is “lack of barrier maintenance” (42% of 96 active causal occurrences -
See Fig. 5.1) and (50% of 80 maintenance-related accidents - See Fig. 5.2). The
most frequent cause in terms of the latent accident process is “deﬁcient design,
organization and resource management” (25% of 276 latent causal occurrences -
See Fig. 5.3) and (85% of 80 maintenance-related accidents - See Fig. 5.4). This
may be due to the fact some related factors which are individually signiﬁcant
were merged for simplicity sake. In addition, the most frequent cause in terms of
the work process is “deﬁcient planning/scheduling/fault diagnosis” (36% of 150
work-process causal occurrences - See Fig. 5.5) and (69% of 80 maintenance-
related accidents - See Fig. 5.6). This may be due to the fact that planning can
inﬂuence all the other phases of the work process without exception.
Lack of barrier 
maintenance 
42 % 
 Maintenance 
directly breaching 
barriers 
18 % 
 Maintenance 
introduces new 
hazards 
12 % 
 Maintenance being 
an iniƟĂƟng event 
for an accident 
scenario 
28 % 
Fig. 5.1 Percentages of diﬀerent categories of active failures in 96 active causal occurrences
More results are shown in Table 5.8, Table 5.9 and Table 5.10. It can also
be seen from Table 5.8 that the most frequent combination of active failures is
“maintenance introduces new hazards - maintenance being an initiating event”
(42% of all the combinations). This combination is likely in safety-critical main-
tenance work in plants with signiﬁcant amounts of hazardous substances. The
new hazards are those generated by maintenance e.g. through the application of
new, unvalidated procedures, processes, conditions and equipment or existing
undervalidated ones. These may become triggered by events (e.g. certain main-
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50% 
21% 
15% 
34% Lack of barrier
maintenance
Maintenance error
directly breaching barrier
Maintenance introduces
new hazard
Maintenance being an
iniƟĂƟng event
Fig. 5.2 Percentages of diﬀerent categories of active failures in 80 maintenance-related accidents
Table 5.8 Combinations of active failures (number of occurrences)
Mainte- Mainte- Mainte-
nance error nance nance
directly induces being an
breaching new initiating
barriers hazards event
Lack of barrier 6 2 3
maintenance
Maintenance 8
introduces new hazards
tenance interventions) that favor their development into an accident. Table 5.9
also shows that the most frequent combination of latent failures is “deﬁcient risk
assessment - deﬁcient design, organization and resource management” (36% of
all the combinations). These two sets of elements are such that they can inﬂu-
ence each other: deﬁcient risk assessment may inﬂuence deﬁcient design and on
the other hand deﬁcient organization and resource management may inﬂuence
risk assessment. In addition, Table 5.10 reveals that the most frequent combi-
nation of work-process related failures is “deﬁcient planning/scheduling/fault
diagnosis - deﬁcient normal operation” (33% of all the combinations).
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Fig. 5.3 Percentages of diﬀerent categories of latent failures in 276 latent causal occurrences
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Fig. 5.4 Percentages of diﬀerent categories of latent failures in 80 maintenance-related accidents
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Table 5.9 Combinations of latent failures (number of occurrences)
Deﬁcient Deﬁcient Deﬁcient
docum- design, or- monitor-
entation ganisation ing of
or resour- perform-
ce mana- ance
gement
Deﬁcient risk 28 48
assessment
Deﬁcient implementation 30 5
of requirements
Deﬁcient management of 9
change (MOC)
Deﬁcient monitoring of 14
performance
DeĮcient planning / 
scheduling / fault 
diagnosis 
36 % 
 DeĮcient 
mobilizaƟon / 
shutdown 
5 % 
DeĮcient 
preparĂƟon for 
maintenance 
6 % 
 DeĮcient 
performance of 
maintenance work 
21 % 
 DeĮcient startup 
7 % 
 DeĮcient normal 
operĂƟon 
25 % 
Fig. 5.5 Percentages of diﬀerent categories of work-process failures in 150 work-process causal
occurrences
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Fig. 5.6 Percentages of diﬀerent categories of work-process failures in 80 maintenance-related
accidents
Table 5.10 Combinations of work-process failures (number of occurrences)
Deﬁcient Deﬁcient Deﬁcient Deﬁcient Deﬁcient
mobili- prepara- perform- startup normal
zation/ tion for ance of operation
shutdown mainte- mainte-
nance nance
Deﬁcient planning/ 4 4 20 7 27
scheduling/fault diagnosis
Deﬁcient mobilization/ 1 1
shutdown
Deﬁcient preparation 4 1
for maintenance
Deﬁcient performance 2 10
of maintenance work
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5.1.3 “How should maintenance be optimized in relation to the
major accident risk?” (question 3) - “The proposal of novel
risk reduction strategies for maintenance-related major
accidents” (objective 3)
This has been addressed in Article 4 [71] by establishing a basis for optimizing
preventive maintenance interval with respect to risk. Optimizing the mainte-
nance interval implies optimizing the exposure of personnel to major hazards,
thus reducing the major accident risk. Prior to the development of the quanti-
tative part of the optimization, the personnel risk associated with maintenance
was systematically analyzed based on the eﬀects of increasing and decreasing
maintenance interval. The risk contributions were deﬁned in terms of the po-
tential loss of life (PLL) and this has been illustrated in the event tree shown in
Fig. 5.7.
/ŶŝƟĂƟŶŐ Event (IE)
(E.Ő. leak)
Safety system 
unavailability 
durinŐ 
maintenance
Safety system 
unavailability
Prob. of fatality 
ŐŝǀĞŶ the IE 
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system is 
unavailable / 
available
Outcome 
Fatality
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No fatality
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No fatality
No fatality
Frequency = fFH +  fm
1 - pm
1
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Maintenance 
not onŐoinŐ
0
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pFSA
pFSU
pFSA
1-pFSA
1-pFSU
pFSU
Number 
of people 
exposed
No + Nm
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No
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1-pFSU
Fig. 5.7 An event tree analysis in relation to personnel risk in the process industry
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This event tree is much simpliﬁed compared to typical event trees applied in
QRAs (Quantitative Risk Assessments) for process plants. However, it has been
simpliﬁed to enable illustration of the eﬀects of maintenance, while all other
eﬀects are assumed to be compiled into the initiating event frequency and the
probabilities applied in the event tree. This can easily be done if a valid QRA is
available.
The optimization equation derived from the event tree, is given by:
PLL = ( fFH + fm) ∗ pm ∗ pFSU ∗ (Nm + No)
+ ( fFH + fm) ∗ (1 − pm) ∗ pSSU ∗ pFSU ∗ No
+ ( fFH + fm) ∗ (1 − pm) ∗ (1 − pSSU) ∗ pFS A ∗ No (5.1)
Where the following notations and meanings are used,
• fFH - frequency of initiating event (can be determined from QRA for plant).
• fm - additional contribution to frequency due to maintenance. This will be
dependent on the maintenance interval. Assuming that there is a constant
contribution ( fc) per maintenance interval, this can be expressed as fc/τ.
• pm - probability that maintenance is ongoing. This is assumed to be equal to
the proportion of time when maintenance is ongoing. This will be dependent
on how often maintenance is performed (maintenance interval) and the dura-
tion of the maintenance period and can be calculated as d/τ. This is the only
time when both maintenance and operations personnel are present.
• pFSU - probability of fatality when the safety system is unavailable (can be
determined from QRA for the plant).
• pFS A - probability of fatality when the safety system is available (can be
determined from QRA for the plant).
• Nm - number of maintenance personnel required for the work.
• No - number of operations personnel normally present.
• pSSU - probability of safety system being unavailable.
The PLL equation assumes that optimization takes place with regard to single
components only (or that the entire system is considered as a whole). This equa-
tion is valid for one initiating event. To optimize with respect to total risk would
imply adding together the eﬀects over all initiating events. Only risk contribu-
tions that are aﬀected by the maintenance of the safety system being considered
need to be included in the optimization. This approach was adapted from the nu-
clear industry, where maintenance optimization based on risk to equipment (e.g.
the core damage frequency of a nuclear power plant) was performed by Vaurio
[111] for a single component or a train of components in series, on standby
or in normal operation. This involved the deﬁnition of a risk function, R(τ), as
equal to the product of the frequency of initiating event (f) and the product of
unavailability states (basic events) of safety systems, such that,
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R(τ) = f ∗ (ρ + d
τ
+
λτ
2
) (5.2)
Where the terms in the equation are deﬁned as [111, 38]:
• f - the frequency of initiating event
• ρ - the safety system unavailability consisting of various contributions, in-
cluding the probability of introducing new failures during maintenance.
• τ - the maintenance interval.
• d - the maintenance duration.
• λ - the failure rate of the safety system.
• d/τ - the safety system unavailability owing to maintenance being carried out
at intervals.
• λτ/2 - the average unavailability of the safety system due to failure between
maintenance.
• ρ + d/τ + λτ/2 - the total average unavailability of the safety system.
Equation 5.2 implies that if we set dR/dτ to zero, the optimal maintenance
interval, τ∗, can then be expressed as:
τ∗ =
√
2d
λ
(5.3)
Furthermore, pSSU can be seen also as the combination of all factors that
inﬂuence the safety system unavailability. In relation to this, we can apply the
formula from the nuclear industry given by Vaurio (i.e. Equation 5.2), and as-
sume that the average unavailability due to failure of the system is λτ/2 and the
constant contribution from maintenance errors is ρ. If maintenance is ongoing,
pSSU is set to 1, in accordance with the assumption in Article 4 [71].
Hence, Equation 5.1 may be rewritten as:
R(τ) = ( fFH +
fc
τ
) ∗ d
τ
∗ pFSU ∗ (Nm + No)
+ ( fFH +
fc
τ
) ∗ (1 − d
τ
) ∗ (ρ + λτ
2
) ∗ p f su ∗ No
+ ( fFH +
fc
τ
) ∗ (1 − d
τ
) ∗ (1 − (ρ + λτ
2
)) ∗ pFS A ∗ No (5.4)
By setting dR/dτ to zero, the optimal maintenance interval, τ∗, can be ob-
tained. The general solution is however quite complex and is not described here.
Use of mathematical tools such as MAPLE and MATLAB is recommended.
Using a graphical solution, we then arrive at an optimal maintenance interval
of about 3050 hours given the following parameters: fFH = 1 • 10−3 per year,
fm = 1 • 10−6 per maintenance operation, d = 6 hours, pFSU = 0.001, pFS A =
0.0008, Nm = 2 persons, No = 10 persons, ρ = 1•10−4 and λ = 1•10−5 per hour.
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Comparatively, if we apply Equation 5.3, using λ and d from above, we get
1100 hours, i.e. a considerably shorter interval. This diﬀerence in maintenance
interval is to be expected, since the negative eﬀects on personnel risk are taken
into account, tending to increase the intervals. How changes in the various pa-
rameters aﬀect the maintenance interval is described in Table 5.11.
In conclusion, we can say that a new approach for risk-based maintenance op-
timization has been developed for the process industry. This has been adapted
from the nuclear industry. In the nuclear industry method proposed by Vaurio
[111], an optimization procedure involving a complete risk function was devel-
oped and it was suggested that the risk function could be e.g. the core-damage
frequency. This is a highly relevant risk measure in the nuclear industry, but not
directly applicable in the process industry.
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Table 5.11 Eﬀect of changes in parameters on the optimal maintenance interval
Parameter Eﬀect of changes
fFH The existing risk level in the plant will aﬀect both operational person-
nel and maintenance personnel and the eﬀect of this will depend on
the balance between the risks for these two groups. However, since
the operations personnel normally is most exposed to risk (because
they are there the whole time), a high risk level will normally imply
that we want a high availability of the safety systems and the mainte-
nance interval is therefore shorter. Reduced frequency will have the
opposite eﬀect.
fm This is the additional risk introduced by maintenance. Obviously, the
higher this value is, the larger the maintenance interval will tend to
be. On the other hand, if this is equal to or very close to zero (which
may be the case for many maintenance operations), the maintenance
interval will approach the interval calculated with Equation 5.3 (i.e.
assuming fm = 0 implies a maintenance interval of 1550 hours).
d The duration of the maintenance operation has two eﬀects: It in-
creases the exposure of maintenance personnel and it increases the
unavailability of the safety system. Increased duration will therefore
always lead to increased maintenance interval.
pFSU
pFS A
These values are the probabilities of fatalities, given that the safety
system is unavailable/available respectively. First, it is noted that if
these values are the same, no optimal maintenance interval can be
found. The reason is that this implies that the safety system has no
eﬀect, and optimization with respect to risk is then not possible. In
eﬀect, it is therefore the diﬀerence between these two values that
is important for the maintenance interval. If the diﬀerence increases
(implying that the diﬀerence in risk when the system is unavailable
compared to available increases), the maintenance interval will de-
crease, because it is more attractive to have a working system.
Nm
No
The number of people exposed, maintenance and operations person-
nel, will inﬂuence the maintenance interval in diﬀerent ways. First
of all, for a given ratio between Nm and No (regardless of the ac-
tual values), the maintenance interval will remain constant. How-
ever, increasing No will generally decrease the maintenance inter-
val, whereas increasing Nm will increase the interval. Increasing No
increases the “everyday” risk (which normally will be the biggest
portion of risk), making it beneﬁcial to do maintenance more often.
On the other hand, more maintenance people implies more additional
people exposed to risk.
ρ Changing this will have no eﬀect since this is a constant contribution
that will not change with the maintenance interval. The risk level will
increase/decrease, but the optimal point remains the same.
λ The failure rate for the safety system obviously inﬂuences the main-
tenance interval. High failure rate implies short maintenance interval
and vice versa.
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5.1.4 “How can maintenance contribute to the robustness and
resilience of organizations?” (question 4) - “The proposal of
novel risk reduction strategies for maintenance-related major
accidents” (objective 3)
The has been addressed in Article 6 [72] by investigating and identifying robust-
ness and resilience properties in the maintenance process and how these could
be improved in relation to maintenance interaction with other activities such
as production and support. This implies improvement of the robustness and re-
silience of the industrial organization as a whole. The properties were derived
from the organizational accident perspectives described earlier in article 5 and
they are presented as shown in Table 5.12.
Table 5.12 Robustness and resilience properties
Properties Meanings Perspectives
Proactivity Foreseeing what can go wrong and deploy-
ing barriers in advance.
Energy-barrier,
HRO and resilience
engineering
Redundancy Deploying more than one means to a re-
quired function.
Energy-barrier and
HRO
Simplicity Making the design of organizational interac-
tions simple.
Normal accident
Loose couplings Allowing slacks, variant sequences, alterna-
tive means and independent events in orga-
nizations.
Normal accident
Learning Reviewing incidents and near-misses, shar-
ing/updating situation or industry knowl-
edge.
HRO and resilience
engineering
Decisiveness Successfully balancing goals, e.g.
production-safety goals.
Conﬂicting objec-
tives, adaptation
and drift
Communication
and coordination
Exchanging information and acting on it
harmoniously.
Man-made disaster
Emergency
response
The quality to readily intervene in accidental
events.
Resilience engineer-
ing
Management of
change
Management of organizational-related, op-
erational and environmental changes.
Resilience engineer-
ing
The energy-barrier, normal accident, HRO, man-made disaster and conﬂict-
ing objectives perspectives indicate various causes of organizational accidents.
The negative qualities that best describe these causes are identiﬁed and the op-
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posite, positive qualities are derived as properties with which such unwanted
events can be resisted or counteracted. This provides a basis for establishing ro-
bustness, retaining the original stability of the system being protected [2]. The
resilience engineering perspective also presents another view about the causes
of organizational accidents and the presence of resilience deﬁnes the ability to
adapt to or recover from accidental events, while stability is realized in a new
state. Since this also includes core topics from the other perspectives [15, 89], it
is expected that some recommended properties would overlap between robust-
ness and resilience as shown in Table 5.12.
Based on the results from Table 5.12, concrete suggestions were provided in
article 6 [72] in relation to the link between the various phases of the mainte-
nance work process, the production and support units of the process industry
organization and the operating environment. These suggestions were oﬀered as
shown in Table 5.13, Table 5.14 and Table 5.15 for the Maintenance-Production
link, the Maintenance-Support link and the Maintenance-Environment link re-
spectively.
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Table 5.13 Robustness/resilience improvement suggestions for the Maintenance-Production link
Properties Suggestions
Proactivity Proactivity to risk management in maintainable production sys-
tems. E.g. Joint job safety analysis (JSA) or toolbox meetings
prior to inter-departmental work.
Redundancy Organizational and technical redundancy for safety-critical pro-
duction systems. E.g. Joint agreement on training and keeping
standby personnel who are multi-skilled in both production and
maintenance regardless of any existing outsourcing policy.
Simplicity Simplicity in maintenance planning, procedures and organization
in relation to safety-critical production systems. E.g. Simpliﬁca-
tion of production-maintenance interfaces and elimination of bu-
reaucracies in the network between production-maintenance.
Loose cou-
plings
Looseness of couplings in maintenance organization to tolerate
shortcomings in production organization. E.g. Putting joint al-
ternative operational plans in place and being tolerant of delays,
errors and failures in mutual interaction.
Learning A learning culture that promotes safety in maintenance of haz-
ardous production systems. E.g. Joint planning of HSE review
meetings, participation in HSE workshops and other related fo-
rums.
Decisiveness Decisiveness in discouraging risky imbalances between mainte-
nance and production. E.g. Joint agreement on guidelines for po-
tential trade-oﬀs that will not create imbalance between business
and safety objectives.
Communication
and coordina-
tion
Communication and coordination between maintenance and pro-
duction staﬀ in the maintenance work process of safety-critical
production systems. E.g. Cooperation on PTW, CMMS, HAZID,
safety planning and maintenance/production interface lead.
Emergency re-
sponse
Emergency preparedness and response to accidental events aris-
ing from maintenance-production interactions. E.g. Joint emer-
gency exercises and drills planning/participation and emergency
maintenance of deﬁcient process safety equipment.
Management
of change
Management of change (MOC) related to alterations in the
maintenance-production network. E.g. Joint development of
MOC procedure relevant to maintenance-production relations
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Table 5.14 Robustness/resilience improvement suggestions for the Maintenance-Support link
Properties Suggestions
Proactivity Proactivity to management of obsolescence of critical parts. E.g.
Anticipating the obsolescence of critical items and hence doing
timely upgrade.
Redundancy Organizational redundancy in relation to suppliers of critical
parts. E.g. Keeping redundant suppliers of critical maintenance-
related resources on vendors list.
Simplicity Simplicity of maintenance support systems. E.g. Making
maintenance-related cyber-physical systems user-friendly.
Loose cou-
plings
Looseness of couplings in relation to fault tolerance of mainte-
nance support systems. E.g. Procuring a bug-tolerant computer-
ized maintenance management system.
Learning Learning on critical part veriﬁcation. E.g. Training maintenance
staﬀ to acquire the know-how of verifying critical parts before
and after supply.
Decisiveness Decisiveness in conﬁrming the responsible party for critical part
replacement between maintenance and external technical sup-
port. E.g. Consulting in-house documentations on after-sales ad-
vice/agreement.
Communication
and coordina-
tion
Communication and coordination for technical support via elec-
tronic channels. E.g. Interacting with sales/service engineers to
ensure the availability of critical maintenance related resources
such as e-PTW and CMMS supplied earlier.
Emergency re-
sponse
Emergency preparedness in conjunction with the dedicated emer-
gency response department. E.g. Emergency maintenance plan-
ning for deﬁcient emergency response equipment.
Management
of change
Management of change with respect to alterations in the
maintenance-support network. E.g. Development of MOC pro-
cedure relevant to maintenance-support relations.
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Table 5.15 Robustness/resilience improvement suggestions for the Maintenance-Environment
link
Properties Suggestions
Proactivity Proactivity to management of unsafe environmental conditions
arising during maintenance, e.g. through maintenance optimiza-
tion in relation to dynamic grouping of maintenance activities.
Simplicity Simplicity in maintenance operations in relation to concurrent
activities in neighboring areas. E.g. Postpone maintenance activ-
ities such as abrasive blasting in relation to concurrent fueling
activity nearby.
Loose cou-
plings
looseness of couplings with respect to decentralizing mainte-
nance for speedy response to hazardous eﬀects from environmen-
tal forces.
Learning Learning on keeping a conducive working environment.
Decisiveness Decisiveness in adapting maintenance operations to the liveli-
hood of the host community, e.g. through diligent waste man-
agement and site reinstatement eﬀorts.
Communication
and coordina-
tion
Communication and coordination on weather forecast and cul-
tural issues related to the host community.
Emergency re-
sponse
Emergency maintenance to prevent or mitigate the eﬀects of sud-
den environmental hazards.
Management
of change
Management of change (MOC) procedure relevant to
maintenance-related environmental changes.
Besides, the maintenance organization itself can also experience drift, which
will aﬀect the process industry organization at large. Drift is “a metaphor for
the slow, incremental movement of systems operation toward (and eventually
across) the boundaries of their safety envelope” [14, 84]. Some suggestions on
how this could be prevented in maintenance were also oﬀered as presented in
Table 5.16.
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Table 5.16 Suggestions on drift prevention in maintenance
Drift source Preventive measure
Maintenance postponement to satisfy a time-based
customer demand rather than lose the order to com-
petitors
Avoid maintenance post-
ponement of safety-critical
elements.
Accumulated errors in maintenance-related deci-
sion making, e.g. accumulated errors in critical
spare parts management.
Use eﬀective maintenance
management tools.
Increase in annual maintenance risk Optimize maintenance in-
tervals in terms of risk to
minimize the major acci-
dent risk.

Chapter 6
Discussion and conclusion
Overview
The chapter will feature criticisms, quality assurance, conclusion, expected in-
dustrial applications and possibilities for future research in relation to the thesis.
6.1 Criticisms
Various aspects of research within this PhD project are subject to criticisms, e.g.
there have been some deviations from the traditional scientiﬁc method. There
are reasons why certain things appeared as seen. However, it is of utmost impor-
tance to ensure that this does not aﬀect the results negatively. This was addressed
with some compensating measures.
• Formulation of hypothesis: This PhD project deviated from the traditional sci-
entiﬁc method by not formulating hypotheses. However, the research ques-
tions were oriented towards the same goal as would formal hypotheses. A
research question could be e.g. “Why do we experience day and night?” and
a corresponding hypothesis could be e.g. “We experience day and night, be-
cause the earth rotates on its axis.” The former poses a question which needs
to be investigated and answered correctly, whereas the latter proposes a solu-
tion/answer which needs to be tested.
• Testing of hypothesis: Another deviation, in some cases, was not using ex-
periment, case study or statistical sampling for testing of hypotheses. This
was not necessary since we did not formulate hypotheses at the beginning.
However, since the objectives of the research questions were close to poten-
tial hypotheses, we decided to show the fulﬁllment of the objectives (which
were set in relation to the research gaps) by e.g. testing the developed classi-
ﬁcation schemes for suitability with accident cases from a variety of process
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industries. Furthermore, the subjection of the ﬁnished research work to peer
review both internally and internationally also served for testing.
• Uncertainty associated with accident report authors: We had no control over
the errors that may have originated from the investigators of the accidents
whose reports we used for testing the classiﬁcation schemes developed in
articles 1 and 2. The errors may be associated with the type of method used
in the investigation or the type of scheme they applied.
• Uncertainty associated with accident report users: We may have misunder-
stood the accident reports. To limit this as much as possible, we did indepen-
dent reviews of the accident reports and compared our results.
• The Work and Accident Process (WAP) classiﬁcation scheme: It was shown
that the most frequent cause in terms of the latent accident process is “de-
ﬁcient design, organization and resource management” (25% of 276 latent
causal occurrences). This may be due to the fact some related factors which
are individually signiﬁcant were merged for simplicity sake. This points to a
weakness in the scheme, however it applies only to a subcategory element and
does not weaken the basis for the main categorization. Besides, the aforemen-
tioned three-in-one element could also be split into three separate elements
without aﬀecting the basis for the classiﬁcation scheme.
6.2 Generic tools for measuring quality of research
The quality of research may be checked by using applicable criteria in the fol-
lowing list [54, 83, 95].
• Originality
– Theme (oﬀ-road, niche, novel combination or unexplored area)
– Problem (novel challenge)
– Diﬃculty (attacking hard challenges)
– Methods (novel developments, improvements or novel applications)
– Theory (original and well-supported by hypotheses and theories)
– Results (new knowledge)
• Solidity
– Data quality (clear, obvious, large eﬀects, many experiments, suﬃcient
statistics)
– Methodological quality (suﬃcient methods; advanced methods)
– Control (adequate positive and negative control experiments, checking and
excluding ambiguities)
– Information power (well-deﬁned and solid conclusions)
• Informativity
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– Clarity (of problem formulation, results and conclusions)
– Objectivity (critical evaluation of own data; balanced evaluation of similar
research from other authors, fair credit attribution)
– Knowledgeability (expertise, broad knowledge and insight, relevant and
representative reference choice)
– Technical quality (clear, well-organized and informative ﬁgures and ta-
bles)
6.3 Quality assurance of this PhD project
All the articles have been subjected to international peer review. Besides, the
aforementioned criteria for research quality can be recognized in this PhD
project as described in the following.
• Solidity: The scientiﬁc method was applied to the research which is about a
problem within the applied sciences.
• Solidity: The descriptions of accident data in the investigation reports were
detailed enough to permit classiﬁcation in Articles 1 and 2. They gave suf-
ﬁcient details to enable analysis of causal factors. The variety of sources of
data used in Articles 1 and 2, and the reputation of the collectors and custo-
dians of the data boosted our conﬁdence in the diﬀerent causal factors iden-
tiﬁed. The accident sources used in Articles 1 and 2 focused broadly in the
same direction.
• Originality, solidity and informativity: The classiﬁcation schemes developed
in Articles 1 and 2 are comprehensive, complete and ﬁnely categorized to
address speciﬁc industrial challenges, encompassing technical, human and
organizational factors. The processes of developing the schemes were rigor-
ous and iterative. They were characterized by independent analysis by both
authors, which were compared afterward. This helped in reﬁning and perfect-
ing the schemes, eliminating overlaps and ambiguities.
• Informativity: The classiﬁcation schemes developed in Articles 1 and 2 were
also used as a basis for developing other researches - Articles 3 and 4.
• Informativity: The relationship established between maintenance and indi-
vidual major accident perspectives in Article 5, provided a basis for further
research which was realized in Article 6.
• Informativity: Being objective in self-criticism of one’s research in addition
to demonstrating a balanced evaluation of the optimization formula of Vaurio
[111] which is the most related to the new formula we developed in Article
4.
• Solidity: The suﬃciency of statistical sampling (183 accidents) collected
from identiﬁed populations of accidents with respect to the intention in Arti-
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cle 3 - to determine the extent of maintenance inﬂuence on major accidents
quantitatively.
• Originality: Improving an existing risk-based, maintenance optimization method
with the results of Article 4.
• Solidity: The research methods are repeatable and the results are repro-
ducible.
• Originality: The conﬁrmation of the results of the articles as new knowledge
by international peer review teams.
6.4 Conclusion
This PhD project has provided insights into the maintenance-related causes of
major accidents in the process industries, the frequency of occurrence of such
accidents and the causes, how to prevent the accidents by strengthening the
maintenance organization itself and in relation to collaborating departmental or-
ganizations and how to prevent the accidents by minimizing the risk of exposure
of maintenance personnel to major hazard facilities.
The most important achievements in this PhD project are the following three
main contributions to the process industries for the prevention of maintenance-
related major accidents:
1. Novel frameworks for maintenance-related major accident classiﬁcation and
the identiﬁcation of the main causes: The research has reaﬃrmed that main-
tenance related major accidents pose a big problem to the process industry
and it clearly identiﬁed and prioritized factors for appropriate improvement
eﬀorts. In addition, the research informs the process industries to look be-
yond searching for safety through only best practice of maintenance man-
agement/work process, but to consider also the accident process in relation
to maintenance.
2. A novel maintenance optimization formula for the reduction of major acci-
dent risk in the process industries: The research has established a new rela-
tionship that balances the equipment and human risk, which is important con-
sidering the unavoidable contact between maintainers and equipment: The
maintainers may be harmed by the equipment, by other workplace hazards
or a combination of these, and the equipment may be neglected to failure or
compromised by the maintainer.
3. A novel framework for improving the robustness and resilience properties in
the organizational network encompassing maintenance and other key units
within the process industry organization: The research informs the process
industries that in order to counter the challenge of major accidents related
to maintenance, there has to be a transition from just concentrating on the
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maintenance of physical systems to a holistic focus on this and the robustness
and resilience of the links between the maintenance organization and others.
The aforementioned contributions satisfy the overarching objective of this
PhD project which is the development of new strategies for the prevention of
maintenance-related major accidents in the process industries. Similarly, they
justify the topic of the PhD project: Maintenance strategies for major accident
prevention.
6.5 Expected beneﬁts of this PhD project to the industry
This project will give the industry better tools for managing maintenance-related
major accident risk on the basis of the following:
• The accident process perspective (barrier-related) of the scheme supports the
suggestion for the broadening of the process safety management (PSM) fo-
cus to cover barrier maintenance as a key feature [78]. According to Pitblado
[78], process safety management alone, based on its current composition,
had not shown reasonable reduction in major accident risk. Furthermore, the
maintenance management perspective will sensitize establishments on eval-
uating appropriate attention for the management-related factors at the “blunt
end” of operation rather than concentrating only on improvement in execu-
tion. This is supported by the fact that most accidents occur during work
execution ( i.e. at the “sharp end” of operation) and tend to make the per-
sonnel in this phase of operation the most investigated, limiting focus on the
management’s inﬂuence [84, 87, 102].
• In addition to the accident process perspective which features barrier-related
and organizational causes, the maintenance work process perspective identi-
ﬁes the origin, intermediate (if applicable) and manifestation phases of the
accident. It is important to know how maintenance can cause major accident
barriers to fail and how this is inﬂuenced by the state of maintenance activi-
ties. The coverage of technical, human, organizational and operational factors
makes the scheme suitable for supporting a far-reaching prevention strategy
against maintenance-related major accidents. The scheme is readily practica-
ble for describing/analyzing accidents, since it consists of key unambiguous
and non-overlapping terms peculiar to the industry.
• The classiﬁcation schemes developed can be used as a basis/templates to as-
sess data from other reported accidents and precursor events in the future.
The categories were clearly deﬁned, such that they can be applied by dif-
ferent persons and still arriving at the same result (repeatability). Coherence
and consistency of information was guaranteed by using key terms that are
familiar to the process industry. The aforementioned template can serve dual
purpose, being applicable to both investigation and analysis of accidents.
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• The classiﬁcation schemes, by being barrier-related, will promote the exist-
ing barrier management concept in the process industry. Barriers are indis-
pensable and critical to the prevention of major accidents. It is important to
know both how maintenance can cause barriers to fail and which phase of the
work process is most frequently involved in order to improve major accident
prevention strategies. The identiﬁcation of the underlying and contributing
maintenance-related causes is the ﬁrst step in the prevention of the associ-
ated major accidents.
• Hale et al. [26] highlighted also the need for encouraging the development of
auditing techniques. The WAP scheme is ﬁnely categorized and consists of
both technical and organizational elements which are adaptable to an auditing
template. This can be consolidated with the robustness and resilience related
recommendations for maintenance in article 6.
• Concerning the use of the statistical ﬁndings in relation to maintenance
management, the knowledge of the percentage of major accidents that are
maintenance-related would give us an updated picture/awareness of the phe-
nomenon. Working with older statistics may lead to excessive, insuﬃcient or
unnecessary use of time and resources to tackle a prevailing problem whose
status may have changed over time. In addition, the knowledge of the most
important causes will help to prioritize decisions related to developing an
eﬃcient and eﬀective prevention program.
• The new robustness/resilience framework creates new awareness about some
hidden robustness and resilience potentials of maintenance and how to ap-
ply these to a large extent in managing the organizational factors of major
accidents.
• Improved methods for analysis of potential positive and negative eﬀects of
maintenance on safety, speciﬁcally in relation to major accidents. This in-
cludes methods for optimization of maintenance with respect to minimizing
major accident risk, not just cost.
• Further application is possible with the maintenance optimization formula
developed such that speciﬁc data are applied in relation to safety systems
such as pressure safety valves (PSV) and emergency shutdown valves (ESDV)
within, say, the Norwegian continental shelf. This will go a long way in im-
proving activities such as re-certiﬁcation of valves.
6.6 Future research
This PhD project is valuable as a basis for future research in the following ways:
• The application of the knowledge of the Work and Accident Process (WAP)
classiﬁcation scheme and the observed causal frequencies in the modeling of
maintenance related major accident risk in the process industries.
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• The robustness and resilience properties of maintenance identiﬁed can also
be used in future as a basis for the quantiﬁcation of risk reduction in relation
to maintenance-related, human and organizational factors.
• Further optimization may be done, focusing on systems other than safety
systems. There may be diﬀerent or several important bases (including risk)
to optimize with respect to, which would lead to diﬀerent models.

Chapter 7
Acronyms and abbreviations
BP British Petroleum
BSEE Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
CBM Condition Based Maintenance
CM Corrective Maintenance
CMMS Computerized Maintenance Management System
COAD Conﬂicting Objectives, Adaptation and Drift
CSB U.S. Chemical Safety Board
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
FMEA Failure Modes and Eﬀects Analysis
HAZID Hazard Identiﬁcation
HRO High Reliability Organizations
HSE Health and Safety Executive
IChemE Institution of Chemical Engineers
IDEF0 Integration Deﬁnition for Function Modeling
IEC International Electrotechnical Committee
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
ISD Inherently Safety Design
JSA Job Safety Analysis
MAs Major Accidents
MMD Man-Made Disaster
MOC Management of Change
NAT Normal Accident Theory
NCS Norwegian Continental Shelf
NOPSEMA National Oﬀshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Manage-
ment Authority
NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGP International Association of Oil and Gas Producers
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PM Preventive Maintenance
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PSA Petroleum Safety Authority
PSM Process Safety Management
PTW Permit To Work
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety
RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance
SINTEF Stiftelsen for Industriell og Teknisk Forskning
TEM Threat and Error Management
TU-Delft Delft University of Technology
UK United Kingdom
US United States
USEPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
VTT VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd
WAP Work and Accident Process
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In spite of large and increasing efforts to control major accident risk, a number of serious accidents 
over the last few years have shown that control still is not sufficient in some cases. Examples of such 
accidents within the chemical process and oil and gas industries are Flixborough Disaster, Bhopal 
Disaster, Piper Alpha Disaster, Phillips 66 Disaster, Sodegaura Refinery Disaster, DSM Chemical Plant 
Explosion, Stockline Plastics Factory Explosion and Texas City Refinery Explosion. 
Investigations of the accidents have uncovered a variety of causes and in recent years focus have 
tended to switch more and more towards organizational and management issues. However, in this 
paper, we want to focus on how maintenance has influenced some of these major accidents. 
Safety barriers are installed to control the risk but this may fail due to barrier vulnerability and/or 
deficiencies imposed by maintenance itself or due to postponement of maintenance. Maintenance 
activities in themselves may also trigger events which may develop into major accidents. Maintenance 
may therefore influence accidents in many ways. 
The main objective of the paper is to discuss how maintenance has influenced some major accidents in 
the oil and gas and chemical process industry.  
The paper builds primarily on a thorough literature review, including review of earlier literature on this 
topic and review of investigation reports from a selection of accidents. 
1. Introduction 
Major accidents are typically defined as adverse events such as major leaks/releases, fire, explosion or 
loss of structural integrity, leading to serious danger/damage, to multiple deaths and/or major damages 
to the environment or properties, as supported by the views of ComLaw (2007), EC (2005), Maguire 
(2007), OGP (2008) and PSA (2010).  
Most industries that handle hazardous substances such as the petroleum and chemical industries have 
a major accident potential. Several major accidents have occurred during the last 35 years. 
Flixborough Disaster, Bhopal Disaster, Piper Alpha Disaster, Phillips 66 Disaster, Sodegaura Refinery 
Disaster, DSM Chemical Plant Explosion, Stockline Plastics Factory Explosion and Texas City Refinery 
Explosion are a few examples of accidents with devastating consequences to personnel, the 
environment, the companies and host communities. 
Efforts have been made to enhance defences against major accidents based on lessons learnt from 
accidents. Despite this effort, it can be argued that the risk of major accidents does not always show a 
positive trend. The number of major hydrocarbon leaks, a key indicator for major accident risk in the 
Norwegian oil and gas industry, has for example increased between 2008 and 2010 (PSA, 2010). 
Major accidents are seldom the result of one failure, but often a combination of failures (Turner, 1978). 
High degree of technological and organizational complexity is usually mentioned as an attribute of 
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industries with a major accident potential (Perrow, 1984). For this reason, it is common to deploy 
multiple and independent safety barriers that are capable of preventing or mitigating the consequences 
of unexpected events. This design philosophy is sometimes referred to as defense-in-depth (e.g. in the 
nuclear industry) (Reason, 1997) and layers of protection (in the process industry) (IEC 61511, 2003). 
Independence among barriers may be influenced by the use of different design principles, ranging from 
physical, mechanical to electrical/electronic/programmable systems. 
The integrity of the barriers cannot be maintained without adequate level of maintenance. Maintenance 
is therefore a key activity to reduce the risk of major accidents. On the other hand, maintenance may 
have a negative effect on barrier performance if the execution is incorrect, insufficient, delayed, or 
excessive. Maintenance can also be the triggering event, e.g. by operating equipment wrongly. 
Besides, maintenance also exposes people to risk and should be minimized from this point of view. 
Major accidents have been investigated and/or analyzed by some authors such as Khan (1999), Kletz 
(2001), Lees (2005), Øien et al. (2010) and CSB (2007), but they have tended to view the maintenance 
complicity in them more from a maintenance management perspective. In this paper, we will look at the 
accidents from the perspectives of both the accident process and the maintenance management 
process. 
The objective of this paper is to review these accidents and to identify if and how maintenance has 
influenced each of the events. A simple causal classification is applied to each of the cases. At the end, 
some conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. Review of Selected Major Accidents 
Some authors have offered maintenance management related insights into the classification of 
maintenance factors influencing major accidents in the hydrocarbon and process industries: Examples 
are lack of or erroneous maintenance (Hale et al., 1998), poor communication between maintenance 
and operations staff (Sanders, 2005), maintainability (Hale et al., 1998) and the maintenance 
management cycle as a whole (Smith and Harris, 1992). 
However, in the context of the aforementioned insights, enough focus has not been directed at safety 
barriers which are critical and crucial to the prevention of major accidents. Hence, it is pertinent to build 
on the ideas from above and still consider an additional basis that is focused on safety barriers.  
In this section, the major accidents will be analyzed on the bases of both the accident process 
(including safety barriers) and maintenance management cycle. The factors based on safety barriers 
are as follows: (1) Lack of maintenance: Lack of barrier maintenance which allows barriers to be 
breached by failure mechanisms (for e.g. lack of maintenance leading to corrosion of barriers), (2) 
Maintenance error: Wrong maintenance directly breaching safety barriers (for e.g. wrong calibration of 
level transmitter), (3) New hazard: Maintenance introduces new hazards, which may be triggered by 
events (for e.g. hot tapping – an ignition source), and (4) Initiating event: Maintenance being an 
initiating event for an accident scenario (for e.g. loss of containment due to a wrong valve being 
operated as part of preparations). The factors based on maintenance management cycle are as 
follows: (1) Lack of maintainability (EN 13306, 2010): Lack of the ability to retain an item or restore it to 
a state in which it can perform its required functions (for e.g. lack of testability/accessibility), (2) 
Deficient fault diagnosis (EN 13306, 2010): Deficiency in fault detection, fault localization and 
identification of causes (for e.g. too little test), (3) Deficient planning (EN 13306, 2010): Deficiency in 
the organization and documentation of a set of maintenance tasks that include the activities, 
procedures, resources and time scale required to execute maintenance (for e.g. poor communication 
between maintenance and operations staff), (4) Deficient scheduling (EN 13306, 2010): Deficiency in 
predetermined detailing of when a specific maintenance task should be executed (for e.g. too late 
timing), (5) Deficient execution: Deficiency in the hands-on actions taken to retain an item or restore it 
to a state in which it can perform its required functions (for e.g. wrong performance of a correct task) 
and (6) Deficient checking: Deficiency in supervision, confirmation or performance evaluation (for e.g. 
inadequacy of checklists). 
In this paper, the term “active influencing maintenance factors” refers to the maintenance factors which 
directly influence the realization of an accident, while the term “latent failure” refers to the dormant 
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factors which contribute indirectly to the realization of the accident (Reason, 1997). The latent failures 
contribute to the weakening of defences and thus increase the probability of occurrence of accidents 
through the active failure pathway as shown in Figure 1. 
  
2.1 Case 1: The Texas City Refinery Explosion (March 23, 2005) 
On March 23, 2005, at the BP Texas City Refinery, the startup of an isomerization unit whose raffinate 
tower was overfilled, led to overheating of the raffinate and the opening of pressure relief devices. This 
resulted in a flammable liquid geyser from a blowdown stack unequipped with flare, leading to an 
explosion and fire, killing 15 workers and injuring over 170 (CSB, 2007). 
The major hazard is flammable and explosive liquid - raffinate. The active influencing maintenance 
factors include the following (CSB, 2007): (1) Failure to calibrate level transmitter correctly 
(maintenance error), (2) Failure to clean sight glass (lack of maintenance), and (3) Failure of high level 
alarm (lack of maintenance), which were in turn influenced by deficient maintenance program. The 
latent failures include (CSB, 2007): (1) Business objectives and cost unbalanced with maintenance, 
and (2) Lack of effective process mechanical integrity program. These causes can be illustrated as 
shown in Figure 1. The influence of maintenance is also associated with deficient fault diagnosis, 
deficient planning, deficient execution and deficient checking as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Maintenance-related accident scenario for the Texas City Refinery 
 
2.2 Case 2: Stockline Plastics Explosion (May 11, 2004) 
On May 11, 2004, at Stockline Plastics industry in Glasgow, an ageing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 
pipe with inadequate protection when buried, failed due to corrosion and released gas which ignited, 
exploded and razed the factory building to the ground, killing 9 workers and injuring 40 (OSHA, 2012). 
The major hazard is flammable LPG. The active influencing maintenance factor is failure to inspect and 
maintain an LPG pipe (lack of maintenance) (OSHA, 2012). The latent failures include (OSHA, 2012): 
(1) Failure to perform suitable and sufficient risk assessments, and (2) Very weak health and safety 
procedures. The influence of maintenance is also associated with lack of maintainability and deficient 
fault diagnosis as shown in Table 1. 
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2.3 Case 3: DSM Chemical Plant Explosion (April 1, 2003) 
On April 1, 2003, the DSM melamine plant at Geleen in the Netherlands experienced an explosion as a 
maintenance crew was restarting the oven; this caused the top cover to collapse and topple over while 
three workers who were standing on the cover fell into the oven and died (OSHA, 2012). 
The major hazard is flammable natural gas and residual gases from other plants; this was ignited by a 
stray spark. The usually contaminated residual gases had to be filtered, the plant had to be shut down 
regularly to clean the filters and restarting takes a lot of time; hence a fast-track starting procedure was 
developed, albeit without adequate testing. The active influencing maintenance factors are: (1) Difficult 
maintenance (lack of maintainability) and (2) Combustive mixture of gas and air resulting from untested 
fast-track procedure (new hazard) (OSHA, 2012). The latent failures include (OSHA, 2012): (1) 
Business objectives and cost unbalanced with maintenance, and (2) Poor safety culture. The influence 
of maintenance is also associated with deficient planning as shown in Table 1. 
 
2.4  Case 4: Sodegaura Refinery Disaster (October 16, 1992) 
On October 16, 1992, the Sodegaura refinery in Japan experienced an explosion and fire, following the 
breaking-off of the lock ring of the channel cover of a heat exchanger and the blowing-off of the lock 
ring, channel cover and other parts; ten people died while seven were injured (FKD, 2012). 
The major hazard is an explosive gas – hydrogen. The active influencing maintenance factors include 
the following (FKD, 2012): (1) Repeated ratcheting, leading to reduction in the diameter of the gasket 
retainer which keeps the heat exchanger airtight (maintenance error), (2) Incorrect replacement of the 
gasket retainer which contributed to hydrogen gas leak (maintenance error), (3) Removal of insulation, 
which induced temperature difference (new hazard) that led to thermal deformation of the inner parts of 
the tube area and contributed to the increase of the diameter of the channel barrel, (4) Inadequate 
replacement of the internal flange set bolts, leading to their destruction, increased load on the channel 
cover set bolts, bending and diameter decrease in the lock ring (maintenance error). The latent failures 
include (FKD, 2012): (1) Misjudgement of whom between the user and manufacturer of the heat 
exchanger is responsible for the decision and confirmation of the parts replacement, (2) Poor 
management, and (3) Incomplete standard of replacement. The influence of maintenance also includes 
lack of maintainability, deficient planning, deficient execution and deficient checking (see Table 1). 
 
2.5 Case 5: The Phillips 66 Disaster (October 23, 1989) 
On October 23, 1989, the polyethylene unit of Phillips 66 at Pasadena in USA experienced a chemical 
release, which subsequently formed flammable vapors and ignited, resulting in a vapor cloud explosion 
and series of further explosions and fires, killing 23 and injuring between 130 and 300 people; this 
happened during scheduled maintenance to clear three of the settling legs on a reactor (Lees, 2005). 
The major hazard is the buildup of hazardous chemical. The release of the hazard was initiated by 
wrong maintenance. The active influencing maintenance factors include the following (Lees, 2005): (1) 
Consolidated isolation via double-block valve or blind flange was not stipulated in existing maintenance 
procedure (maintenance error), and (2) The only isolating ball valve was kept open by wrongly 
connected air supply hoses (maintenance error). The latent failures are (Lees, 2005): (1) Non-
compliance to company/industry isolation procedure, (2) Non-compliance to site procedure, and (3) 
Inadequate Permit-To-Work (PTW) system. The influence of maintenance is also associated with 
deficient planning, deficient execution and deficient checking as shown in Table 1. 
 
2.6 Case 6: The Piper Alpha Disaster (July 6, 1988) 
On July 6, 1988, the Piper Alpha offshore platform being operated by Occidental Petroleum 
experienced a series of explosions in the North Sea, resulting in gas risers ruptures, subsequently 
causing the structural collapse of the platform and the death of 167 people (Kletz, 2001). 
The major hazard is flammable condensate; its leakage was preceded by delayed maintenance 
schedule and poor maintenance planning; a condensate pump under repair and not tagged-out was 
mistakenly used to replace another one that failed during operation. The active influencing 
maintenance factors include the following (Kletz, 2001): (1) Disassembled and non-isolated defective 
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pump (new hazard), and (2) Replacement with defective pump due to communication gap between 
maintenance and operations staff at shift handover (initiating event). The latent failures are (Kletz, 
2001): (1) Poor quality of safety audits and training, (2) Inadequate maintenance and safety 
procedures, and (3) Lack of emergency planning. The influence of maintenance is also associated with 
deficient planning, deficient scheduling and deficient checking as shown in Table 1. 
 
2.7 Case 7: The Bhopal Gas Tragedy (December, 1984) 
In December, 1984, about 4000 people were killed and 500,000 injured by toxic release from a 
chemical plant in Bhopal, following a runaway reaction between Methylisocyanate (MIC) in a storage 
tank and uncontrolled water for cleaning product lines, which led to vigorous boiling, overpressure of 
the MIC tank and MIC vapor expulsion to the atmosphere via a rupture disc (Kletz, 2001). 
The major hazard is a toxic, unstable chemical - MIC; its runaway reaction with water was initiated by 
maintenance. The active influencing maintenance factors include the following (Kletz, 2001): (1) Failure 
of product-line valves due to corrosion (lack of maintenance), (2) Omission of an isolating blank/spade 
between the MIC tank and the connected product line being cleaned with water (maintenance error), 
(3) Failure of Nitrogen-line valves due to neglect (lack of maintenance) and (4) Maintenance execution 
initiating a hazardous reaction between water and MIC (initiating event). The latent failures are (Kletz, 
2001): (1) Excessive storage of (MIC) Methlyisocyanate, (2) Business objectives and cost unbalanced 
with maintenance, and (3) Unavailable safety features: The refrigeration system which could have 
provided cooling for the storage tank was turned off, the scrubber which should have absorbed the 
vapour was inoperative, and the flare stack which should have burnt off any residual vapour was out of 
service. The influence of maintenance also includes deficient fault diagnosis, deficient planning, 
deficient execution and deficient checking as shown in Table 1. 
 
2.8 Case 8: Flixborough Disaster (June 1, 1974) 
On June 1, 1974, twenty-eight workers were killed and 36 injured at the Nypro (UK) site at Flixborough, 
when a bypass system ruptured and released cyclohexane which formed a combustible mixture with 
air and exploded on coming into contact with an ignition source (OSHA, 2012). 
The major hazard is flammable cyclohexane. The active influencing maintenance factors include 
(OSHA, 2012): (1) Limited calculations were done on the bypass line (lack of maintenance), (2) Bypass 
line was not pressure-tested after plant modification (lack of maintenance). The latent failure includes 
the absence of full risk assessment to support plant modification (OSHA, 2012). The influence of 
maintenance also includes deficient planning, deficient execution and deficient checking (see Table 1).  
Table 1:  Maintenance influence on major accident cases 
Barrier-based maintenance factors  
Lack of maintenance  Maintenance error  New hazard  Initiating event 
Lack of                      Case 2                        Case 4                    Case: 3,4          
maintainability 
Deficient fault            Cases: 1,2,7                 
diagnosis 
Deficient planning     Cases: 1,7,8               Cases: 1,4,5,7        Cases: 3,4,6      Cases: 6,7 
Deficient scheduling                                                                    Case 6 
Deficient execution                                      Cases: 1,4,5,7                                  Cases: 6,7 
Mainte- 
nance 
manage- 
ment 
cycle   
factors 
Deficient checking    Cases: 1,7,8               Cases: 1,4,5,7        Cases: 3,4,6      Cases: 6,7     
 
3. Conclusion 
This paper is one in a planned series of publications dedicated to a research project titled 
“Maintenance Strategies for Major Accidents Prevention.” The paper has reanalysed some selected 
maintenance-related major accidents and given further insights into their causation mechanisms. It has 
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linked causes to both barrier-based and maintenance management cycle factors. Although the number 
of cases considered is few, the most occurring barrier-based factor is maintenance error and the most 
occurring maintenance management factors are deficient planning, deficient execution and deficient 
checking. This is not indicative enough of what is expected of the result of a larger sample size; 
however, it will stimulate the sharing of focus to planning, checking and barrier maintenance. Barrier 
maintenance will augment Process Safety Management which has failed to yield significant reduction 
in major accident risk (Pitblado, 2011). Besides, industries will be guided against concentrating only on 
improvement in execution despite the fact that most accidents occur during work execution. 
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The potential for major accidents is inherent in most industries that handle or store hazardous sub-
stances, for e.g. the hydrocarbon and chemical process industries. Several major accidents have been
experienced over the past three decades. Flixborough Disaster (1974), Seveso Disaster (1976), Alexander
Kielland Disaster (1980), Bhopal Gas Tragedy (1984), Sandoz Chemical Spill (1986), Piper Alpha Disaster
(1988), Philips 66 Disaster (1989), Esso Longford Gas Explosion (1998), Texas City Reﬁnery Explosion
(2005), and most recently the Macondo Blowout (2010) are a few examples of accidents with devastating
consequences.
Causes are being exposed over time, but in recent years maintenance inﬂuence tends to be given less
attention. However, given that some major accidents are maintenance-related, we intend to concentrate
on classifying them to give a better insight into the underlying and contributing causes.
High degree of technological and organizational complexity are attributes of these industries, and in
order to control the risk, it is common to deploy multiple and independent safety barriers whose
integrity cannot be maintained without adequate level of maintenance. However, maintenance may have
a negative effect on barrier performance if the execution is incorrect, insufﬁcient, delayed, or excessive.
Maintenance can also be the triggering event.
The objectives of this article are: (1) To investigate how maintenance impacts the occurrence of major
accidents, and (2) To develop classiﬁcation schemes for causes of maintenance-related major accidents.
The paper builds primarily on model-based and empirical approaches, the latter being applied to
reports on accident investigation and analysis. Based on this, the Work and Accident Process (WAP)
classiﬁcation scheme was proposed in the paper.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The list of major accidents in the hydrocarbon and chemical
process industries over the last three decades is long. Maintenance
has been a contributing factor in a number of the cases, such as the
Texas City Reﬁnery Explosion (2005), the Phillips 66 Disaster
(1989), the Piper Alpha Disaster (1988) and the Bhopal Gas Tragedy
(1984). The hydrocarbon and chemical process industry handle
hazardous substances and thereby have an inherent potential for
major accidents. Safety barriers are usually installed to control the
risk associated with such industrial facilities (Sklet, 2006b) and the
barriers depend on maintenance to sustain their integrity (Okoh &
Haugen, 2012). Control of hazards might sometimes be lost due to
barrier degradation or failure introduced by maintenance.
Maintenance may also cause major accidents directly by triggering
unwanted events. Hence, there is a need to prevent maintenance-
related causes of major accidents.
In recent years, attention in accident investigations has tended
to be more on organizational issues than technical and human
causes of accidents. When BP set up the Baker Panel following the
Texas City Reﬁnery Explosion in 2005, the mandate was to inves-
tigate process safety management and safety culture in all its US
reﬁneries (Pitblado, 2011), although deﬁcient safety barrier main-
tenance was a contributing factor to the event (U.S. Chemical Safety
and Hazard Investigation Board, 2007). Maintenance management
features prominently in this report as an element in Process Safety
Management. The obvious, potential, maintenance-related im-
provements among all ten of the panel’s recommendations are: (i)
making provision for a cross-functional team of auditors with
substantial expertise covering maintenance and other departments
(Recommendation No.8) and (ii) making provision for process
safety awareness training for maintenance personnel and others
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(Recommendation No.3) (The BP U.S. Reﬁneries Independent Safety
Review Panel, 2007). The panel’s recommendations did not address
technical safety barriers (Pitblado, 2011; The BP U.S. Reﬁneries
Independent Safety Review Panel, 2007) and the maintenance of
these (The BP U.S. Reﬁneries Independent Safety Review Panel,
2007). According to Pitblado (2011), many US-based companies
have accepted the Baker Panel recommendations, and a suggestion
to those that intend to use the recommendations as their primary
driver, is to ﬁll the gap.
Signiﬁcant effort has been expended in the modeling of major
accident risk in relation to maintenance and modiﬁcation works in
the hydrocarbon industry and this include the works of Gran et al.
(2012), Røed, Mosleh, Vinnem, and Aven (2009), Sklet (2006a),
Sklet, J. E. Vinnem, and Aven (2006), Sklet, J. Vinnem, and Aven
(2006), Skogdalen and Vinnem (2012), Vinnem (2012, 2013) and
Vinnem et al. (2012). In some of these works, maintenance work on
process equipment has been classiﬁed according to type of work, as
a basis for modeling risk.
Some studies (Gran et al., 2012; Hale, Heming, Smit,
Rodenburg, & van Leeuwen, 1998; Øien, Schjølberg, Meland,
Leto, & Spilde, 2010; Sanders, 2005, chap. 5; Smith & Harris,
1992; Vinnem, 2012, 2013; Vinnem et al., 2012; Wallace,
Stephen, & Merritt, 2003) have discussed or applied mainte-
nance related causes of major accidents. According to Hale et al.
(1998), such major accidents may occur in the course of produc-
tion or maintenance itself as a result of deﬁciencies in mainte-
nance management or ﬂawed transition between both phases. In
Sanders (2005, chap. 5), the causes of such major accidents in
chemical piping are considered to be improper or insufﬁcient
maintenance and lack of a comprehensive maintenance program.
The research of Smith and Harris (1992) also linked the causes of
such major accidents to deﬁciencies in maintenance management.
Furthermore, the work of Øien et al. (2010) implies that such
major accidents are linkable to incorrect classiﬁcation of equip-
ment. Gran et al. (2012), Vinnem et al. (2012) and Vinnem (2012,
2013) applied Reason’s classiﬁcation (Reason, 1997, 1980) and
work process based classiﬁcation respectively to maintenance
work in hydrocarbon process plants. However, an article on clas-
siﬁcation of causes of maintenance related major accident which
has seen it from the perspective of an accident process has yet to
be identiﬁed. Most of the work that has been done, has been from
a maintenance management perspective.
Several investigation reports have pointed at maintenance as a
contributing factor to accidents in the hydrocarbon and chemical
process industries (Hale et al., 1998; National Commission on the
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011; Øien
et al., 2010; Sanders, 2005, chap. 5; Smith & Harris, 1992). Overall,
the investigations indicate that about 30e40% of all accidents and
precursor events in the chemical process industry are due to
maintenance-related factors. 30% of all accidents in the chemical
process industry between 1982 and 1985 were linked to main-
tenance by UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (HSE, 1987;
Smith & Harris, 1992). The data for the analysis were a mixture of
major accidents, occupational accidents and serious incidents.
Koehorst reported in 1989, based on the analysis of accidents in
FACTS database, that about 40% of accidents involving chemical
releases were linked to maintenance (Hale et al., 1998). Hurst
et al. reported in 1991 that about 40% of 900 accidents associated
with piping failures in the chemical industry were linked to
maintenance (Hale et al., 1998), and maintenance accounts for
about 30% of major factors leading to accidents in the chemical
industries as reported by Lees in 1996 (Khan, 1999). Reports from
the hydrocarbon industry vary in their estimation of how main-
tenance has contributed, and some studies attribute up to 70% of
all accidents and precursor events in the hydrocarbon industry to
maintenance: Considering both immediate (4.1%) and latent er-
rors (15.3%) from intervention together with an uncertain per-
centage of 11.8% of technical faults, over 65% of major
hydrocarbon leaks on the Norwegian sector of the North Sea were
linked to maintenance (Vinnem, Seljelid, Haugen, & Husebø,
2007), and about 33% of hydrocarbon topside gas releases be-
tween 1985 and 1988 in Australia were linked to maintenance
(NOPSA, 2008).
One of the objectives of this paper is to propose a scheme for
classiﬁcation of maintenance related causes of major accidents in
the hydrocarbon and chemical process industries. This is in addi-
tion to the objective of understanding howmaintenance inﬂuences
major accidents in the aforementioned industries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, some dis-
cussion on what constitutes a major accident, based on deﬁnitions
from different sources, is presented. This is followed by a review of
classiﬁcations applied in other industries, before moving on to
some suggestions for how the classiﬁcation can be performed. The
classiﬁcation scheme that is proposed is then described, and some
results from a test of the scheme are provided. Finally, some
concluding remarks are provided.
In view of the objectives of this paper, the Work and Accident
Process (WAP) classiﬁcation scheme has been proposed. The clas-
siﬁcation will view maintenance related major accidents from
different perspectives, taking into account the increased focus on
organizational inﬂuence on accidents, not just the direct causes.
The intention is that an improved classiﬁcation scheme will give a
better basis for identiﬁcation of the most common causes, to help
drive improvement.
2. The concept of major accident in hydrocarbon/process
industries
Since the purpose of this paper is to establish a classiﬁcation
scheme for maintenance related causes of major accidents, we also
need to discuss the concept of major accidents. There is no uni-
versally accepted deﬁnition of a major accident. Within the process
industry, the term process accident is also frequently used with
more or less the same meaning. Key elements of major accident
deﬁnitions by different organizations (Comlaw, 2007; EC, 2005;
HSE, 1992; Maguire, 2007, chap. 8; OGP, 2008; PSA, 2010; USEPA-
OSHA, 1996) are presented in Table 1.
Terms used to describe major accidents are “adverse”/“un-
planned” and “acute”/”sudden”. The event types included in the
deﬁnitions vary somewhat, mainly because the different organi-
zations focus on different industries where different types of events
are relevant. For the hydrocarbon/process industries it is releases of
ﬂammable and toxic material which is the main concern, although
other types of events may also be relevant.
The main aspect of the accidents which make them “major” is of
course the consequences. The exact deﬁnitions vary signiﬁcantly,
but for this purpose consequences to life and health, to the envi-
ronment and to assets are all considered. Further, it is noted that
some deﬁnitions require an actual consequence to have occurred
(“Death or serious injury”, “One or more human fatalities”). How-
ever, in other cases, it is sufﬁcient that there is a potential for a
serious consequence (“Serious danger to human health”, “Escala-
tion potential for multiple fatalities”). This is an important
distinction, also for our purpose. We cannot be certain that the
causes of events with actual consequences are the same as events
with potential consequences, and since it is actual consequences
we want to reduce, we should perhaps limit ourselves to events
with actual consequences only.
We have chosen to include also events with potential conse-
quences in our deﬁnition. The advantage is that the database is
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extended signiﬁcantly. This introduces some uncertainty since
there may be differences in causes, but this is considered to be a
limited problem. The consequences are often determined by more
or less arbitrary factors not related to the causes at all, such as
whether an ignition source is present at the time of a release of
ﬂammable material.
There is a broad agreement that both immediate and delayed
effects should be considered and this is therefore adopted also in
our deﬁnition. There is some difference in whether the effects
should be limited to the facility where the event occurs or not, but
this is considered to be mainly a difference between deﬁnitions
primarily relevant for offshore facilities (which usually are remote
and will not affect anyone outside the facility) and onshore facil-
ities. For our purpose, we will consider effects both inside and
outside the facility.
To summarize the above, we have, for the purpose of this paper,
deﬁned amajor accident as “an unexpected event that causes or has
the potential to cause serious consequences such as several serious
casualties, extensive environmental or asset damage, with imme-
diate or delayed effects experienced, within or outside the incident
facility.”
3. Lessons from other industries
This section seeks to present an overview of accident classiﬁ-
cation in other industries and ﬁnd classiﬁcations that may be
relevant to consider also for the hydrocarbon and chemical process
industries.
In the nuclear industry, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) has classiﬁed accidents in order of increasing severity from
Table 1
Elements of major accident deﬁnitions.
Authority Mode or magnitude
of event
Event types Impact Timing of impact Impact location
(as per facility)
Seveso/COMAH,
EU/UK,
(EC, 2005;
UK, 1999)
Adverse occurrence Major emission,
ﬁre or explosion
Serious danger to human health
or the environment
Immediate or
delayed
Inside or outside
PSA, Norway
(PSA, 2010)
Acute incident Major discharge/
emission or a ﬁre/
explosion
Several serious injuries and/or
loss of human life, serious harm
to the environment and/or loss
of substantial material assets
Immediate or
delayed
HSE, UK (HSE,
1992)
Fire, explosion,
dangerous release,
loss of structural
integrity and helicopter,
diving and other
work-related events
(a) Death or serious personal
injury to persons in the vicinity
of the installation, (b) Major
damage to the structure of the
installation, (c) Collision of a
helicopter with the installation,
(d) Critical failure of diving
operations in connection to the
installation and (e) Death or
serious personal injuries to ﬁve
or more persons in the vicinity
of the installation arising from
other events, excluding hazards
such as slips, trips and falls.
Vicinity of installation
NOPSA, Australia
(Comlaw, 2007)
Sudden occurrence Serious danger or harm to a
relevant person, an at-risk
community, a property or the
environment
Immediate or
delayed
At facility
OSHA/USEPA,
USA (USEPA-
OSHA, 1996)
Major chemical accident
or release
At least one of the following:
(1) Results in one or more
human fatalities, (2) Results in
the hospitalization of three or
more workers or members of
the public, (3) Causes property
damage (on- and/or off-site)
initially estimated at $500,000
or more in total, (4) Presents a
serious threat to worker health
or safety, public health,
property, or the environment,
(5) Has signiﬁcant off-site
consequences, such as large-
scale evacuations or protection-
in-place actions, closing of
major transportation routes,
substantial environmental
contamination or substantial
effects (e.g., injury, death) on
wildlife or domesticated
animals, or (6) Is an event of
signiﬁcant public concern
Immediate or
delayed
On-site or off-site
OGP, International
(OGP, 2008)
Unplanned event Hazardous releases and
major structural failure
or loss of stability that
could put the whole
asset at risk
Escalation potential for
multiple fatalities and/or
serious damage
Possibly beyond
the asset itself
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anomaly to major accidents, has deﬁned a major accident and also
classiﬁed the initiating events (IAEA, 2003, 2005, 2008). The prin-
ciple of classiﬁcation based on initiating events is an idea that is
relevant to consider also for maintenance related accidents. The
initiating event classiﬁcation developed for the nuclear industry is
however not directly relevant.
In the marine industry, the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) has also provided a standard deﬁnition for a marine accident,
and classiﬁed such accidents based on causes and severity of events
(Mullai, 2006). Some ﬂag states, e.g. US and Sweden, also use their
own deﬁnitions and/or classiﬁcation schemes (Mullai, 2006).
Railway accidents have been classiﬁed in various ways in Evans
(2000) and Edkins and Pollock (1997). Evans (2000) classiﬁed fatal
train accidents both in terms of causes and consequences, whereas
Edkins and Pollock (1997) classiﬁed the accidents only with respect
to causes and with emphasis on the following: (i) outcome, (ii)
principal unsafe acts, (iii) psychological precursors, and (iv) latent
organizational factors. Some of this structure may be relevant to
consider also for maintenance related causes.
In the aviation industry, there has been an evolution of accident
classiﬁcation by the International Air Transport Association (IATA)
over the years (Reisinger, 2008). The IATA Accident Classiﬁcation
Task Force (IATA-ACTF) has classiﬁed accidents based on the TEM
(Threat and Error Management) framework in relation to the
following major characteristics (Reisinger, 2008): (1) Latent con-
ditions, (2) Threats, (3) Errors, (4) Undesired aircraft state, (5) End
state, and (6) Post-crash event. The IATA-ACTF reviews accidents
every year and this is published in annual safety reports (Reisinger,
2008). In the UK’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) safety review
(2008), a summary of an industry-wide classiﬁcation scheme of air
accidents based on ﬂight phases was presented (CAA, 2008). An
equivalent approach would be to classify the maintenance-related
causes in terms of the phases of the maintenance management
process. An additional lesson for the hydrocarbon and chemical
process industries (with respect to maintenance inﬂuence classi-
ﬁcation) is to consider further decomposition of the classiﬁcation to
cover threats and error management; this will address the associ-
ated human and organizational factors that contribute to organi-
zational accidents (Reason, 1997; Turner, 1978). Furthermore,
according to Goldman, Scott, Fiedler, Edna, and King (2002) of the
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), the National Trans-
portation Safety Board (NTSB) classiﬁed general aviation
maintenance-related accidents in terms of type of maintenance
activity, which include: (1) installation, (2) maintenance, (3)
maintenance inspection, (4) annual inspection, (5) service of
aircraft, (6) adjustment, (7) modiﬁcation, (8) overhaul, and (10)
other. The primary focus of the analysis performed in Goldman
et al. (2002) with the NSTB classiﬁcation include the comparison
of the categories of maintenance activities on the bases of fre-
quency of types of maintenance, maintenance personnel status,
frequency of occurrence of accidents and number of casualties
(Goldman et al., 2002). Also in Goldman et al. (2002), installation
errors are classiﬁed into: (1) wrong part, (2) reversed installation,
(3) incorrect attachment, (4) omission, and (5) incorrect
connection.
The aforementioned ﬁndings support the view of Saleh, Marais,
and Cowlagi (2010) that accidents are often classiﬁed based on
consequence across industries wherein threshold values such as
number of fatalities etc are set. An example is the American mining
industry where an event involving ﬁve fatalities constitutes a
mining disastere a potential administrative tool (Saleh et al., 2010).
Saleh et al. (2010), however, pointed out (by virtue of a biological
analogy) that a threshold-based classiﬁcation is only “phenotyp-
ical”, i.e. not recognizing the underlying factors in an accident un-
like a “genotypical” classiﬁcation. In other words, the phenotypical
looks at the consequences (i.e. the end states) of an accident (an
event), whereas the genotypical looks at the antecedents (i.e. the
preceding states) usually from the origin.
According to Lortie and Rizzo (1999), the knowledge of the
underlying causes of accidents is necessary for their prevention.
Besides, Larsson (1990) advised earlier that accident prevention
objectives are unrealizable with only accident information collec-
tion. This is a basis for the genotypical analysis being applied in the
following sections.
4. Classiﬁcation of maintenance-related major accidents
Based on the review of literature and based on the problem
being considered, some alternative approaches to classiﬁcation of
causes of maintenance-related accidents are explored. At the end of
this section, this is concluded with a proposed classiﬁcation
scheme. Initially, we will however give some reﬂections on what is
a useful classiﬁcation scheme in this context.
It is important to understand the basis for an intended classiﬁ-
cation before undertaking it. A relevant guide for the purpose of
this paper is presented in the following subsection.
4.1. Criteria for a useful classiﬁcation scheme
There may be many purposes for developing a classiﬁcation
scheme, and the objectives will also inﬂuence what is a useful
classiﬁcation scheme. Some comments are therefore provided to
this:
 First of all, the purpose of the classiﬁcation is to develop a
better understanding of causes of accidents. In other words, the
focus must be on causal classiﬁcation and not severity classi-
ﬁcation. By focusing on only major accidents, we have estab-
lished a “lower limit” on the actual or potential severity of the
consequences.
 The causal classiﬁcation may take on different shapes, and
several alternatives are discussed in the following sections.
 We are focusing on maintenance and maintenance related
causes. This means that it may be useful to focus on
maintenance-speciﬁc factors, such as the maintenance process
or the types of systems inﬂuenced by maintenance. This will
enable identiﬁcation of which parts of the process most often
are causes of accidents. For improvement purposes, this is
useful.
 In addition to this, we are also looking to ﬁnd out more about
both direct causes and root causes. A suitable classiﬁcation
scheme therefore needs to consider both groups of causes.
In addition to this, we may also put forward some more general
criteria (Kjellen, 1984; Lortie & Rizzo, 1999):
 The deﬁned categories must be such that they do not overlap
and should as far as possible also be exhaustive (although this
can be solved by adding an “other” category).
 The categories must be clearly deﬁned, such that they can be
applied by different persons and still arriving at the same
result.
 On a more pragmatic level, it is also necessary to consider the
availability of information in the accident reports being used as
a basis for classiﬁcation. There is no point in deﬁning a classi-
ﬁcation scheme if the information is not available in the
sources we have.
 Suitable sorting strategies, e.g. typology, must be used to make
data coherent in a situation of variability of key terms.
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 String of words categorizing a set of data must not be abridged
without considering whether it would lead to information loss
or not.
 Literal or automatic classiﬁcation of terms may lead to signif-
icant bias. Termsmust be investigated for implicit or contextual
interpretation.
 There is an optimum degree of structuring, i.e. the number of
classes of the classiﬁcation scheme. A coarse categorization
may lead to information too generic for peculiar preventive
purposes, whereas a too detailed categorization may be too
complicated for statistical surveys and inferences.
 Delimitation of the accident process analysis is essential. The
starting point of an accident sequence must be well-deﬁned, if
the accident or near-accident process is being deﬁned with
respect to time and space.
4.2. Classiﬁcation in relation to accident process
The maintenance related causes linked to accident process may
be described as shown in Fig. 1. Fig. 1 is a bow-tie diagram which
illustrates the relationship between a given hazardous (or acci-
dental) event, it’s maintenance related causes, the consequences,
the deployed safety barriers, and the failure pathways. The active
failure pathway in this paper refers to the direct/immediate route
to the realization of a major accident, whereas the latent failure
pathway refers to the indirect/dormant route to the realization of
the major accident (Reason, 1997). The probability of occurrence of
major accidents via the active failure pathway can be increased or
decreased by changes in the degree of latent failures/conditions.
Based on Fig.1, there are fourmain scenarios associatedwith the
barrier-based, maintenance related causes; namely, (1) Lack of
barrier maintenance: Lack of barrier maintenance which allows
barriers to be breached by failure mechanisms (e.g. corrosion of
safety valves due to neglected maintenance), (2) Barrier mainte-
nance error: Maintenance error directly breaching safety barriers
(e.g. wrong calibration of a safety device), (3) New hazard: Main-
tenance introduces new hazards, which may be triggered by events
(e.g. a metallic tool forgotten inside a tank containing hazardous
chemical after cleaning could become a source of localized corro-
sion e a weakening of the “containment barrier”), and (4) Initiating
event: Maintenance being an initiating event for an accident sce-
nario (e.g. loss of containment due to a wrong valve being operated
as part of preparations). For a major accident to occur, “lack of
barrier maintenance” or “barrier maintenance error” must be in
combination with “new hazard”, “initiating event” or other non-
maintenance related causes. The safety barriers may be physical
(e.g. smoke detector, ﬁrewall, containment, corrosion inhibitor etc.)
or non-physical (for e.g. maintenance procedure, permit to work,
warning signs etc.) (Sklet, 2006b).
“Lack of barrier maintenance” is associated with either the
latent failure pathway (e.g. a lack of maintenance program with
effective condition monitoring) or the active failure pathway (e.g.
failure to pressure-test a new gas bypass system after plant modi-
ﬁcation, leading to rupture and explosion). “Barrier maintenance
error”, “new hazard” and “initiating event” are all related to the
active failure pathway.
“Lack of barrier maintenance”, “barrier maintenance error”,
“new hazard” and “initiating event” may be gradual or sudden,
partial or complete. They may also be classiﬁed in terms of errors of
omission and commission (Swain & Guttmann, 1983).
A summary of the classiﬁcations is presented in Table 2.
This classiﬁcation scheme presents technical, human and
organizational factors comprehensively in the pattern of an acci-
dent process. It unfolds the various failure mechanisms (both hu-
man and technical) of barriers, which are critical to major accident
prevention. It also includes various organizational inﬂuences in the
form of latent failures.
4.3. Classiﬁcation in relation to work process
Taking cues from Hale et al. (1998), HSE (1987) and NEA (2001),
we can also classify maintenance related causes in terms of work
process as shown in Fig. 2. Maintenance errors can occur in one of
the following two situations: (1) During turnaround or outage, and
(2) During normal operation. The situations are characterized by
similar work processes with certain exceptions in relation to
shutdown and startup. Shutdown is not necessary in situations of
unplanned outages and during such activities as hot tapping and
hot bolting. Startup is not necessary either for the latter. Potential
deﬁciencies for each phase are also listed in Fig. 2. According to Hale
et al. (1998), out of the 30e40% of serious accidents in the chemical
process industry attributable tomaintenance, 17% of these occurred
during preparation of site for maintenance, 76% during mainte-
nance itself, 7% during or soon after handover to production, and
not less than 8% in other phases (start-up, shutdown or normal
operations) due to technical failures linked to insufﬁcient mainte-
nance. As regards preparation for maintenance, Wallace and
Merritt (2003) suggest that inspection under safe conditions to
ensure that equipment is free from residual hazardous materials,
testing for pollution, and securing isolation points are imperative.
However, the effectiveness of inspection and testing depends on
correct calibration of the tools being used.
This classiﬁcation scheme identiﬁes the various phases of a
work process in which something can wrong and it demonstrates
what can go wrong in each phase. This will enable us to go into
speciﬁc details phase-wise when managing safety rather than
sorting information from a more general source associated with
normal operations or just overlooking a phase as not important for
speciﬁc risk analysis. Some of the phases such as shutdown, prep-
aration and startup need to be given adequate concern, because
accidents involving them could also have serious consequences in
like manner accidents associated with the actual performance of
Fig. 1. Classiﬁcation of barrier-based maintenance-related causes.
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maintenance work and normal operations. According to Malmén,
Nissilä, Virolainen, and Repola (2010), a lot of companies in the
hydrocarbon and chemical process industries tend to focus their
systematic safety management system on normal operations even
though many major accidents have happened during shutdown
and startup. Even if an accident manifests during the actual per-
formance of maintenance work or normal operations, it may have
started from an earlier phase in the work process! The starting and
terminal phases of the accident in the work process are all impor-
tant in order to better understand the underlying and contributing
causes e this enhances their prevention (Lortie & Rizzo, 1999).
4.4. Classiﬁcation in relation to Threat and Error Management
(TEM) Framework
In Section 3, the Threat and Error Management Framework
from the aviation industry was mentioned and we can also apply
this for our purpose. This is shown in Fig. 3. Maintenance-related
major accidents are preceded by latent conditions, threats, errors
and undesired maintenance states. The end state is the
maintenance-related accidental event. The post-incident events,
which are associated with consequences and emergency response,
inﬂuence the potential for escalation; they can prevent an acci-
dental event from becoming a full-blown accident, an accident
from becoming a major accident or a major accident from getting
worse. The bold lines indicate the pathways of unmanaged situ-
ations, while the broken lines indicate the pathways of managed
situations. Latent conditions in combination with either errors or
threats or both can create an undesired maintenance state which,
if unmanaged, would lead to an accidental state. Safety barriers
are required to prevent the undesired maintenance state from
reaching the end state. The latent conditions, which include de-
ﬁciencies in regulatory oversight, safety management system
(SMS), training, backlog management etc., are (same as latent
Fig. 2. Classiﬁcation in relation to maintenance-related work process.
Table 2
Summary of barrier-based classiﬁcations.
Maintenance-related causes Active path Latent path Gradual Sudden Partial Complete Error of omission Error of commission
Lack of barrier maintenance      
Barrier maintenance error       
New hazard       
Initiating event      
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failures) as deﬁned earlier. The threats may include equipment
malfunction, unfavorable weather condition, unavailability of
maintenance support, etc. The errors may be errors of commission
or omission. The undesired maintenance state refers to a neglec-
ted, ineffective or dangerous state.
This classiﬁcation scheme, like the barrier-based scheme
(mentioned earlier), describes an accident process which is
important in understanding the root and contributing causes of
accidents. Good knowledge of the underlying causes of accidents is
necessary for their prevention (Lortie & Rizzo, 1999). However, the
scheme focuses more on human and organizational than on tech-
nical factors. The issue of major accident hazards is not explicitly
treated. Although the analysis of threats is involved, it does not
mean the same thing as the analysis of hazards. According to
Rausand (2011), hazard is “a source of danger that may cause harm
to an asset.”, whereas threat is “anything that might exploit a
vulnerability” or in other words “any potential cause of an inci-
dent.” A spark, for example, is a threat that could exploit the
vulnerability due to hydrocarbon leak (Rausand, 2011). This is
similar to the TEM-based deﬁnition of threats e “events or errors
that occur beyond the inﬂuence of cabin crew, increase operational
complexity, and which must be managed to maintain the margins
of safety” (IATA, 2012). In the aviation industry, insufﬁcient sepa-
ration between two aircrafts, for example, is a threat that could
exploit the vulnerability due to wake vortices.
4.5. Classiﬁcation in relation to Man, Technology and Organisation
(MTO)
The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) have sug-
gested a MTO (Man, Technology and Organisation) based classiﬁ-
cation of causal factors relating to hydrocarbon leaks (PSA, 2010).
Adopting this basis, we can also classify causal factors of
maintenance-related major accidents as shown in Fig. 4. According
toWallace andMerritt (2003), the process equipment design phase,
should be given timely consideration in order to avoid maintain-
ability challenges later on during usage. Moreover, the unavail-
ability and vulnerability of safety-critical systems are also related to
accident causation and they, together with lack of maintainability,
belong to the “technology” category (PSA, 2010). The “organization”
category constitutes causal factors of major accident according to
the theories of Rasmussen (1997), Turner (1978) and Reason (1997).
The “man” category represents the contributions of an individual
(usually a hands-on personnel) to major accidents (Edkins &
Pollock, 1997; PSA, 2010; Reason, 1997).
This classiﬁcation scheme covers human, organizational and
technical factors. However, it does not describe an accident process.
The accident process gives a better insight into the underlying
causes of accidents and hence promotes their prevention (Lortie &
Rizzo, 1999).
4.6. Recommended classiﬁcation scheme for maintenance related
causes
Our recommendation is associated with the two types of cau-
sality, the deterministic and probabilistic. Although the theories
belong to opposing schools of thought, there is still the possibility
of combining both as may be necessary. The deterministic causality
of David Hume implies that if A causes B, then B must follow A, but
this was countered by the probabilistic causality of Salmon et al.
with analogies such as day follows night but night does not cause
day (Hitchcock, 2011). The heterogeneity of circumstances inwhich
the cause develops challenges the Humean causality (Hitchcock,
2011). Scientists are usually interested to know precisely the
mechanisms by which A causes B, but this is difﬁcult sometimes in
the presence of heterogeneity of causal circumstances (Hitchcock,
2011); so it is more convenient for scientists to say that A prob-
ably causes B based on statistical correlation between A and B
considerably greater than chance (Hitchcock, 2011); this makes the
scientists both deterministic and probabilistic in this case
(Hitchcock, 2011).
Furthermore, the recommendation is linked to two research
approaches, a model-based approach and an empirical approach.
Fig. 3. TEM-based framework as applied to maintenance-related accident process.
Fig. 4. MTO-based classiﬁcation of maintenance related causes.
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The former is the basis for deriving maintenance-related causes
from the work and accident processes, whereas the latter is the
basis for deriving the categories of latent failures from the accident
reports of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board and French’s ARIA data-
base. From amore practical point of view, the quality of information
in the accident reports being analyzed can inﬂuence its use as a
basis for classiﬁcation. It is pointless to develop a classiﬁcation
scheme that cannot be supported by the sources of information
being used.
We recommend a combination of the following types of classi-
ﬁcation presented earlier: (1) Classiﬁcation in relation to accident
process and (2) Classiﬁcation in relation to work process. The
resulting classiﬁcation scheme is called the Work and Accident
Process (WAP) scheme. The active failures are as presented earlier
in the accident-process-related scheme; the same is the case with
the latent failures, although these have been dimensioned in this
recommendation, based on insights from the accident reports of
the U.S. Chemical Safety Board and French’s ARIA database, into the
following: (1) Deﬁcient regulatory oversight, (2) Deﬁcient risk
assessment, (3) Deﬁcient implementation of requirements, (4)
Deﬁcient Management of Change (MOC), (5) Deﬁcient documen-
tation, (6) Deﬁcient design, organization or resource management,
(7) Unbalanced safety and production goals, (8) Deﬁcient moni-
toring of performance, (9) Deﬁcient audit, and (10) Deﬁcient
learning. All the features of the work-process-related scheme
mentioned earlier have also been retained. The latent failures are
deﬁned in details as shown in Table 3.
5. Case study
In order to test the suitability of the proposed classiﬁcation
scheme and also to improve and reﬁne it, the scheme was applied
to a selection of major accident cases.
Twenty major accident cases from the U.S. Chemical Safety
Board (CSB) reports were analyzed and classiﬁed with the Work
and Accident Process (WAP) scheme and thirteen of them were
found to be maintenance-related, see Table 4. Binary numbers
0 and 1 indicate “no” and “yes” (or false and true) respectively.
In the case of the Texas City Reﬁnery Explosion (March 23,
2005), the failures of high level alarm and level sight glass (lack of
barrier maintenance e active failure) were associated with deﬁ-
cient planning/scheduling/failure diagnosis, the wrong calibration
of level transmitter (barrier maintenance error e active failure)
happened via deﬁcient performance of maintenance work and the
occurrence of the hazardous events (explosion and ﬁre) is linked to
deﬁcient startup. The latent failures include: (i) Deﬁcient imple-
mentation of requirements, (ii) Deﬁcient management of change
(MOC), (iii) Deﬁcient design, organization or resource manage-
ment, (iv) Unbalanced safety and production goals, (v) Deﬁcient
monitoring of performance and (vi) Deﬁcient learning.
The process of veriﬁcation of WAP was rigorous and iterative.
Both authors worked independently on all of the selected cases and
classiﬁed the accidents in accordance with the proposed scheme.
This served several purposes. It gave an indication of the usability
and suitability of the classiﬁcation scheme and whether the avail-
able reports could form a sufﬁcient basis for classiﬁcation. In this
way, both the completeness of the categories suggested inWAP and
also potential overlaps between categories were evaluated. By
performing the reviews independently, we were also able to
identify ambiguities in the categories that could lead to differences
in classiﬁcation. The case study review thus led to several changes
and clariﬁcations of the original proposal, leading to the categori-
zation shown in this paper.
Since the scheme is intended for practical use in the industry,
we have endeavored to make it as pragmatic as possible by making
the most use of information from accident reports from the in-
dustry that it is intended for. Besides, our categorization was as far
as possible exhaustive and we ensured coherence of information by
using key terms that are familiar to the industries. Furthermore, we
arranged the work process in a sequential pattern such that the
starting point of an accident process can be traced to the point
where it manifests.
A further attestation to the suitability of the scheme is that it is
currently being applied on a much wider set of cases. The objective
of this work is to determine to what extent maintenance has been a
cause of major accidents in the hydrocarbon and chemical process
Table 3
Latent failures deﬁnitions.
Latent failures Deﬁnitions Comments
Deﬁcient regulatory oversight Inadequacies of regulatory bodies in directing,
guiding, inspecting, auditing and sanctioning
companies under their watch.
Regulatory bodies like OSHA, HSE and PSA have the responsibility
of overseeing the activities of the companies under their watch.
Deﬁcient risk assessment Inadequacies in identifying hazards, analyzing
and evaluating associated risks.
Process hazard analysis, environmental impact assessment,
workplace hazard assessment etc. should be directed by the
management.
Deﬁcient implementation of
requirements
This refers to inadequacies in adopting
external requirements.
Safety requirements are expected to be implemented by the
company’s management.
Deﬁcient Management of
Change (MOC)
Inadequacies in handling changes, especially
non-routine permanent and temporary changes
in physical systems, organizations, operations
and the operational environment.
It is important to have a situation-speciﬁc procedure for
non-routine organization of personnel and plant before
maintenance linked to dangerous transitory phases.
Deﬁcient documentation Inadequacies in safety-related documentation Safety policies and safe work procedures should be included in
personnel orientation program.
Deﬁcient design, organization
or resource management
Inadequacies in design, layout, coordination,
communication, safety culture and management
of human, material and ﬁnancial resources etc.
Designs/layouts should aim to achieve inherent safety.
Asset integrity program, effective hiring, coordination, training,
safety program, safety culture, communication etc. are vital.
Unbalanced safety and
production goals
This is the disproportionate allocation of
resources to production at the expense of safety.
The management has to see both goals as concomitant.
Deﬁcient monitoring of
performance
This covers inadequacies in measuring
performance and detecting trends.
Monitoring is expected to be performed by the company’s
management continuously in order to detect safety-related
deviations on time.
Deﬁcient audit Inadequacies in checking the conformity of the
status of personnel, organization, systems and
processes to established requirements.
This may be performed by the company on itself or by an
external organization.
Deﬁcient learning Inadequacies in learning from safety reviews,
safety audit reports, industry news, etc.
Management review meetings are necessary for organizational
learning and continuous improvement.
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Table 4
Work and Accident Process (WAP) classiﬁcation scheme.
Hydrocarbon/
Chemical process
accidents from
The U.S. CSB
Mainte-
nance
related
Accident process based class. Work process based class.
Active failures Latent failures
Lack of
barrier
mainte-
nance
Mainte-
nance
directly
breach-
ing
barriers
Mainte-
nance
induces
new
hazards
Mainte-
nance
being
an initi-
ating
event
Deﬁ-
cient
regu-
latory
over-
sight
Deﬁ-
cient
risk
assess-
ment
Deﬁ-
cient
implem-
entation
of requ-
irements
Deﬁcient
Manage-
ment of
Change
(MOC)
Deﬁ-
cient
docum-
entation
Deﬁcient
design, or-
ganization
or resour-
ce
manage-
ment
Unbalanc-
ed safety
& produc-
tion
goals
Deﬁ-
cient
monito-
ring of
perform-
ance
Deﬁ-
cient
audit
Deﬁ-
cient
learn-
ing
Deﬁcient
planning/
schedul-
ing/fault
diagnosis
Deﬁ-
cient
mobili-
zation
/shut-
down
Deﬁ-
cient
prepara-
tion
for main-
tenance
Deﬁ-
cient
perform-
ance
of main-
tenance
work
Deﬁcient
star-
tup
Deﬁcient
normal
opera-
tion
Texas City Reﬁnery
Explosion, USA
March 23, 2005
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
Allied Terminals
Tank Collapse,
USA
Nov. 12, 2008
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Hoeganaes Metal
Dust Flash Fire,
USA
Jan. 31, 2011
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Hoeganaes Metal
Dust Flash Fire,
USA
March 29, 2011
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
Hoeganaes Hydrogen
Explosion, USA
May 27, 2011
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
DuPont Flammable
Vapor Explosion,
USA
Nov. 10, 2010
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
Goodyear Ammonia
Release, USA
June 11, 2008
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Giant Oil Reﬁnery
Fire and Explosion
USA
April 8, 2004
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
EEI Hydrogen Sulﬁde
Release, USA
Dec. 11, 2002
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Kleen Energy Gas
Explosion, USA
Feb. 7, 2010
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
ConAgra Gas
Explosion, USA
June 9, 2009
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Bayer CropScience
Tank Explosion,
USA
Aug. 28, 2008
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
DuPont Toxic
2Chemical Release
Jan. 23, 2010
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Total 13 8 4 1 4 6 10 12 4 7 12 1 1 0 5 9 1 3 7 5 2
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industries over the years between 2000 and 2012. Themost current
statistics is about 25 years old and needs to be revised. This work is
still under way, but experience is that the proposed categories are
robust and that information to categorize cases usually can be
found in accident reports.
6. Conclusion and recommendation
This paper is part of an ongoing study to gain more insight into
how maintenance can be a causal factor in major accidents in the
hydrocarbon and chemical process industries. The ﬁrst task in this
study has been to establish a suitable classiﬁcation scheme that can
form a basis for analyzing the inﬂuence on historical accidents. This
will again enable identiﬁcation of where improvements will be
most effective.
Classiﬁcation schemes from a variety of industries such as nu-
clear, marine, railway and aviation have been considered for useful
contributions to the hydrocarbon and chemical process industries.
The schemes focus on different aspects, and are valuable to a
smaller or larger extent. Based on this review, experience from the
process industry and based on the objectives of the ongoing study, a
novel classiﬁcation scheme, the Work and Accident Process (WAP)
scheme has been developed.
WAP is based on a combination of an accident process and work
process classiﬁcation scheme. The accident process consists of
explicit and comprehensive barrier-based and organizational cau-
ses of maintenance related major accidents. Barriers are indis-
pensable and critical to the prevention of major accidents. Thework
process perspective identiﬁes both the origin and manifestation
phase of the accident. It is imperative to know both how mainte-
nance can cause barriers to fail and which phase of the work pro-
cess is most frequently involved in order to improve major accident
prevention strategies.
WAP is comprehensive, complete and ﬁnely categorized to
address speciﬁc industrial challenges. It adequately addresses
technical, human and organizational factors. This will be useful for
a comprehensive analysis and guidance on the control of
maintenance-related major accidents. It will enhance the identiﬁ-
cation of the underlying and contributing maintenance-related
causes, which is the ﬁrst step in the prevention of the associated
major accidents.
WAP has been tested on some accident cases of the U.S.
Chemical Safety Board with success. The testing has also served as a
basis for improving the scheme. There is further work ongoing to
apply the scheme on amuch larger data set and it is the intention to
report the results from this work in a later paper.
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This paper is based on a review of 183 detailed, major accident investigation and analysis reports related to the
handling, processing and storage of  hydrocarbons and hazardous chemicals over a decade from 2000 to 2011.  The
reports cover technical, human and organizational factors. In this paper, the Work and Accident Process (WAP)
classiﬁcation scheme is applied to the accident reports with the intention of investigating to what extent maintenance
has been a cause of major accidents and what maintenance-related causes have been the most frequent.
The main objectives are: (1) to present more current overall statistics of maintenance-related major accidents, (2)
to  investigate the trend of maintenance-related major accidents over time, and (3) to investigate which maintenance-
related  major accident causes are the most frequent, requiring the most attention in  the drive  for improvement.
The  paper  presents statistical analysis and interpretation of maintenance-related major accidents’ moving aver-
ages as well as data related to the types of facility, hazardous substances, major accidents and causes. This is based
on  a thorough review of accident investigation reports.
It  is found that  out of 183 major accidents in the US and Europe, maintenance was linked to 80 (44%) and that
the  accident trend is decreasing. The  results also show that  “lack of barrier maintenance” (50%), “deﬁcient design,
organization and resource management” (85%) and “deﬁcient planning/scheduling/fault diagnosis” (69%) are the
most frequent causes in terms of the active accident process, the latent accident process and the work process
respectively.
© 2014 The Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Maintenance; Major accident; Statistics; Hydrocarbon; Chemical; Process
1.  Introduction
The handling, processing and storage  of hydrocarbons and
hazardous chemicals by industries whether small or large
scale, inherently  implies a potential for major accidents. Main-
tenance can keep the integrity of safety barriers and thus
contribute to the prevention of major accidents. On the con-
trary, it can also be a cause of the major accidents themselves
through insufﬁciency,  incorrectness, new  hazard  inducement
or being an initiating event for an accident scenario (Okoh and
Haugen, 2013a, 2013).
Several investigations reveal that 30–40% of all accidents
and precursor events in the chemical process industry are
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +47 40309367.
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maintenance related. The UK’s Health and Safety Executive
linked maintenance to  30% of all accidents (a mixture of major
accidents, occupational accidents and serious incidents) in the
chemical process industry between 1982  and 1985 (HSE, 1987;
Smith and Harris, 1992). As reported by Hale et al. (1998), out of
30–40% of serious accidents in the chemical process industry,
17% occurred during preparation for maintenance, 76% during
maintenance itself and 7% during or  soon after handback to
production, whereas at least 8% of the chemical process acci-
dents occurred in other phases (start-up, shutdown or  normal
operations) due to technical failures inﬂuenced by inadequate
maintenance. In the same reference by Hale et al. (1998),
Koehorst’s report of 1989 based on the analysis of accidents
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2014.03.001
0957-5820/© 2014 The Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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in FACTS database (formerly  of TNO, The Netherlands) indi-
cates that 38.5% of accidents involving chemical releases were
linked to maintenance. Furthermore, as  cited by Hale et al.
(1998), the 1991 report of Hurst et al. links 38.7% of 900  acci-
dents associated with piping failures in the chemical industry
to maintenance. In  the hydrocarbon industry reports, there
are also some statistics showing maintenance contribution. A
report from Australia indicates that 33% of hydrocarbon top-
side gas releases between 1985 and 1988 in Australia were
linked to maintenance (NOPSA, 2008). A similar study of gas
releases in the Norwegian  offshore  industry shows that over
65% of major hydrocarbon leaks on the Norwegian sector of
the North Sea  were linked to maintenance (Vinnem et al.,
2007). Furthermore, a study of 242 accidents in relation to stor-
age tanks in both industries between 1960 and 2003 reveals
that about 30% of such accidents were caused by human errors
including poor operation and maintenance (Chang and Lin,
2006).
Most of the aforementioned statistics are about 25 years
old. In addition, the most recent statistics do  not cover all
equipment, being limited to  storage  tanks only. The data in
this paper are  recent and  cover all types of equipment. The
objectives of this paper are: (1) to present more  current over-
all statistics of maintenance-related major accidents, (2) to
investigate what the accident trend has been over the period
2000–2011, and (3) to determine which causes are the most
frequent, requiring the most preventive efforts. To this end,
the Work and  Accident Process (WAP)  classiﬁcation scheme
(Okoh and Haugen, 2013a) will be  applied to 183 major accident
cases consisting of 63 from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board
(CSB) reports (Chemical Safety Board, 2013) and 120 from the
BARPI’s ARIA database (Bureau for Analysis of Industrial Risks
and Pollution, 2013). The accident reports cover technical,
human and organizational factors associated with the hand-
ling, processing and  storage of hydrocarbons and hazardous
chemicals in the process industries. Many  of the accident
reports also point to other causes than just maintenance.
However, our intention in this paper is  to focus on only  the
maintenance-related causes.
The rest of the paper is structured as  follows. The paper
will discuss the concept of major accident and present sta-
tistical analysis and interpretation of maintenance-related
major accidents trend as well as  data and interpretations
related to the types of incident facility, hazardous  substances,
major accidents, causes and combination of causes. This will
be followed  by discussion and  recommendations, and ﬁnally,
concluding remarks will be  presented.
The study is  carried out by both authors independently
and with iterative scrutiny. The Work and Accident Pro-
cess (WAP)  scheme is applied after having sorted the major
accidents from the occupational accidents and identiﬁed
the maintenance-related major accidents among the overall
major accidents. The WAP scheme has deﬁned accident cau-
sation categories. Each accident report has been revised and
relevant causation categories were identiﬁed. Based on  this,
we could identify which causes and combination of causes
occurred most. The study  is also applied in relation to the cho-
sen deﬁnition of a major accident. The usability and suitability
of WAP  had been veriﬁed in the previous paper (Okoh and
Haugen, 2013a), being comprehensive,  complete and ﬁnely
categorized to address the peculiar challenges of industries
(Okoh and  Haugen, 2013a). Besides, the accident investigation
reports which are the source of this study, are detailed and
comprehensive.
Several signiﬁcant contributions from researches related to
major accidents have been recorded in the chemical process
industry. These include the works  of Kidam and Hurme (2013),
Cheng et al. (2013) and Fabiano and Currò (2012).
2.  Various  views  on major  accident  in
relation  to the  process  industry
There  is  no conventionally accepted deﬁnition of the term
“major accident” across authorities linked to  the process
industry. The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA)
(PSA, 2010), the European Commission (in  relation to Seveso II
directive) (EC, 2005) and the UK government (in relation to the
Control of Major Accident Hazards regulations) (UK, 1999) have
quite similar deﬁnitions for a major accident, which can be
summarized as  follows: an acute/adverse event such  as emis-
sion/discharge/release, ﬁre or explosion resulting in a serious
loss with regards to human life/health, the environment and
material assets.
The International Association of Oil and Gas Produc-
ers – OGP (OGP, 2008) and the Commonwealth of Australia
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) also have similar deﬁ-
nitions for  a major accident, which can be summarized as
follows: events connected with an installation having the
potential to cause multiple fatality/serious damage inside or
away from the facility.
The deﬁnitions of a major accident by  the UK’s Health and
Safety Executive (HSE) (HSE, 1992) and the US Occupational
Safety and  Health Administration (OSHA)/US Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (USEPA) (USEPA-OSHA, 1996) also have
expressions that imply the potential for serious loss and that
the effects may be felt inside or  outside the facility. Similarly,
the US Department of Energy (DOE) [6] deﬁnes an incident as
“an unplanned event that  may or may not result in injuries
and/or loss” and an accident/accident event sequence as “an
unplanned event or  sequence of events that has an undesir-
able consequence.”
We  have chosen to include also events with the potential
to cause large consequences in our deﬁnition. The beneﬁt is
that the database is  extended signiﬁcantly.  This introduces
some uncertainty since there may be differences in causes of
events involving losses and events that could have involved
losses, but this  is  considered to  be a limited problem. The con-
sequences are usually deﬁned by more  or  less arbitrary factors
not connected to  the causes at all, such as whether an igni-
tion source  is  present at the time of a combustible gas release.
Hence, a major accident as  applied in this  paper is “an unex-
pected event that causes or  has the potential to cause serious
consequences such as several serious casualties, extensive
environmental or  asset damage, with immediate or delayed
effects experienced, within or  outside the incident facility”
(Okoh and Haugen, 2013a).
The term “process accident” is  also often used with more
or less  the same meaning as the term “major accident” in
the process industries. Accidents related to modiﬁcation and
maintenance are  some of the types of process accidents that
occur. Modiﬁcation-related accidents are connected with the
changing of the required function of an item to  a new required
function, whereas maintenance-related accidents are  con-
nected with an item being retained in or restored to a state in
which it can perform it’s original required function (EN 13306,
2010).
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Table 1 – Geographical locations of  maintenance-related major accidents.
Year USA Moving average Europe Moving average USA &Europe Moving average
2000 0  7  7
2001 3  3  6
2002 4  2.3 5  5.0 9 7.3
2003 6  4.3 6  4.7 12 9.0
2004 4  4.7 5  5.3 9 10.0
2005 2  4.0 6  5.7 8 9.7
2006 2  2.7 2  4.3 4 7.0
2007 2  2.0 2  3.3 4 5.3
2008 4  2.7 4  2.7 8 5.3
2009 1  2.3 3  3.0 4 5.3
2010 3  2.7 2  3.0 5 5.7
2011 3  2.3 1 2.0 4  4.3
Total 34 46  80
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Fig. 1 – Trends of  moving averages of maintenance-related
major accidents over time.
3.  Overall  statistics
According to the U.S.  Chemical Safety Board  (2013), from the
year 2000 to 2011 the US experienced 74 major accidents in the
process industry,  64 of which  investigations were completed at
the time of preparing this  paper. Out of the 64 major accidents,
34 (i.e.  53%) are maintenance-related (see Table 1).
Based on information from the Bureau for Analysis of
Industrial Risks and Pollution (2013), from the year 2000 to
2011, 120 major accidents occurred in Europe which were com-
pletely investigated. Out of  the 120 major accidents, 46 (i.e.
38%) are  maintenance related (see Table 1).
As regards trends, some useful conclusions can be drawn
from the charts in Figs. 1 and 2. Since investigations are  still
pending on  10 major accidents that occurred in the US in 2008
(2 accidents), 2009 (3 accidents) and 2010 (5 accidents), it will  be
incorrect to  draw a conclusion on the trends over the period
2002–2011. However, we  can conclude that  Fig. 1 shows that
there has  been a reduction of maintenance-related major acci-
dents over the period 2002–2007. Fig. 2 shows that of the overall
total, the US contributes about 40% and Europe about 60% to
the major accidents.
The aforementioned moving averages were  calculated
using the Microsoft’s  Excel  function, AVERAGE. We used
the moving average of 3 years (i.e.  2000–2002, 2001–2003,
2002–2004, etc.). The series of averages helps us to  understand
how the trend is  by smoothing out short-term ﬂuctuations.
Shorter length moving averages (e.g. order 3) are  more  sensi-
tive and identify new  trends  earlier than longer ones. Besides,
the smaller the interval, the closer the moving averages are  to
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Fig. 2 – Trends in the proportion of each of the major
accidents series over time.
the actual data points and this  limits the loss of information
unlike in higher order moving averages. However, using no
moving averages or  order 2 would obviously give less smooth
curves (for trending). The alternative to using moving averages
is trend lines or  the raw data. We have included the raw data
and it is  possible to plot them directly.  But we  have chosen to
use moving averages for the reasons given.
As shown  in Fig. 3, most of  the maintenance-related major
accidents occurred in chemical manufacturing plants (46%).
The chemical plant category includes petrochemical plants.
The “Others” category includes waste treatment, fossil-fuel
power and food processing plants. The second and third most
frequently involved plants are petroleum reﬁnery (15%) and
storage/terminals (14%) respectively.
Fig. 3 – Types of plants where  accidents occurred.
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Table 2 –  Type of maintenance-related major accidents.
Year Fire Explosion Emission/discharge Structural failure
or loss of stability
2000 1 3 5  0
2001 4 3 4  0
2002 2 5 5  0
2003 3 5 8  0
2004 4 3 7  0
2005 2 2 5  0
2006 4 3 1  0
2007 1 1 2  1
2008 2 2 6  1
2009 1 3 2  0
2010 0 3 2  0
2011 3 2 1  0
Total 27 35 48  2
In Fig. 4, it is seen that the frequencies of involvement of
hazardous substances are in the following order: toxic sub-
stances (26%), petrochemicals (22%) and crude oil/natural  gas
(18%) etc. The total number of substances involved in the
80 maintenance-related major accidents is  82 because two
of the accidents each involved two hazardous substances.
The fact  that toxic substances (e.g.  chlorine) are dangerous
when in contact with living species and may  tend to  be
corrosive to  containments (leading to release), explosive in
pressurized containments or support combustion is probably
a reason for their being most involved in the major acci-
dents. It  could also  be that toxic substances are  the most
common.
According to Table 2, out of the 80 maintenance-related
major accidents, “emission/discharge” is involved in the most
(60%). This is  followed by “explosion” (44%), “ﬁre” (34%) and
“structural failure/loss of stability” (3%). Some of the accidents
involved combinations of ﬁre and explosion, emission and ﬁre
or emission, ﬁre and  explosion etc. The structural  failure/loss
of stability recorded did not result from ﬁre or  explosion. The
fact that  emission/discharge may be toxic, ignitable or explo-
sive probably explains it’s most frequent involvement in major
accidents. The low number of “structural failure/loss of sta-
bility” (only 2) suggests that the structural integrity of the
installations have been  high enough to withstand the effects
of maintenance deﬁciencies for a long time. Virtually all the
cases associated with major damages to  structures  were as a
result of the impact of ﬁre and  explosion.
4.  Causes  of maintenance-related  major
accidents
In  the following  subsections, the causes of maintenance-
related major accidents will be reviewed based on the Work
and Accident Process (WAP)  classiﬁcation scheme (Okoh and
Haugen, 2013a). The scheme was developed based on some
essential criteria for classiﬁcation (Lortie and Rizzo, 1999;
Kjellen, 1984; Okoh and Haugen, 2013a). The classiﬁcation
scheme consists of both the accident process and main-
tenance work process parts. The accident process part is
related to both the active failure pathway which refers to
the direct/immediate route to the manifestation of a major
accident and the latent failure pathway which refers to the
indirect/dormant route to the manifestation of the major
accident (Reason, 1997). The maintenance work process part
reﬂects the various phases of the work  process in which
something can wrong and it shows what can go  wrong in each
phase (Hale et al., 1998; Malmén et al.,  2010).
4.1.  The  work  process
The maintenance work process may be deﬁcient in one or
more phases (Okoh and Haugen, 2013a): (1) deﬁcient plan-
ning/scheduling/fault diagnosis, (2) deﬁcient mobilization or
shutdown, (3)  deﬁcient preparation for maintenance, (4) deﬁ-
cient performance of maintenance work, (5) deﬁcient startup
and (6) deﬁcient normal operation. The work process aspect
identiﬁes the various phases of a  work process whose deﬁcien-
cies can lead to  an accident and in what order, for example,
deﬁcient planning being undetected during the performance
of the maintenance work renders the former deﬁcient and
manifests as  an accident during normal operation. The work
process aspect will enable more  speciﬁc and effective risk
management for a particular kind of phase-wise scenario
rather than relying on more  general operational information
or merely ignoring a  phase as  not  critical to the development
of an accident (Okoh and Haugen, 2013a). Analyzing the chain
of events from the originating phase through intermediate
phases (if applicable) to the manifestation phase gives a bet-
ter insight into  the underlying and contributing causes of the
accidents and hence promote prevention efforts (Lortie and
Rizzo, 1999).
4.2.  The  accident  process
The accident process encompasses the pathways by which
both active and  latent failures interact and develop into major
Fig. 4 –  Types of substances stored, handled or processed.
350  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 2  ( 2  0 1  4 ) 346–356
Table 3 – Occurrence of active failures.
Year Lack of barrier
maintenance
Maintenance
error directly
breaching barriers
Maintenance
induces new
hazards
Maintenance
being an initiating
event
2000 4  4 0  2
2001 1  0 3  4
2002 5  0 2  2
2003 3  2 1  6
2004 4  3 1  1
2005 6  4 0  1
2006 2  1 2  2
2007 4  0 0  0
2008 3  3 0  3
2009 1  0 1  3
2010 4  0 1  3
2011 3  0 1  0
Total 40  17 12 27
accidents. Major accidents manifest in active  failures and the
probability of their occurrence are inﬂuenced by the degree
of latent failures/conditions. The occurrence of these two
types of failures which are described further in the following,
give additional insights into the underlying and contributing
causes of the accidents.
4.2.1.  The  active failures
The active failure  pathway represents the direct/immediate
route to the occurrence of a major accident. There are  four
main active-failure scenarios associated with the causes
of maintenance-related major accidents, namely (Okoh and
Haugen, 2013a, 2013): (1) lack  of barrier maintenance –  lack of
barrier maintenance which allows barriers to be  breached by
failure mechanisms (e.g. unreadable pressure gauge due to
lack of cleaning), (2) barrier maintenance error –  maintenance
error directly  breaching safety barriers (e.g. bypassing safety
systems without applying suitable compensating measures
during critical phases of operation), (3) new hazard –  main-
tenance introduces new hazards, which may be triggered by
events (e.g. the use of hot tapping in line stopping), and (4)
initiating event -  maintenance being an initiating event for an
accident scenario (e.g. dangerous release due to the wrong
valve being operated as  part of preparation for pipeline pig-
ging). A maintenance related major accident will occur when
“lack of barrier maintenance” or “barrier maintenance error”
occurs in combination with “new hazard”, “initiating event”
or other non-maintenance related causes (Okoh and Haugen,
2013a).
4.2.2.  The  latent  failures
The latent failure pathway represents the indirect/dormant
route to the occurrence of the major accident (Reason,
1997) and  they have been  classiﬁed into the following
(Okoh and  Haugen, 2013a): (1)  deﬁcient regulatory oversight,
(2) deﬁcient risk assessment, (3) deﬁcient implementa-
tion of requirements, (4) deﬁcient management of change
(MOC), (5)  deﬁcient documentation, (6) deﬁcient design,
organization and  resource management, (7) unbalanced safety
and production goals, (8)  deﬁcient monitoring of performance,
(9) deﬁcient audit, and (10) deﬁcient learning.
4.3.  Occurrence  of  active  failures
According to  Table 3, out of the 80 maintenance-related major
accidents, “lack  of barrier maintenance” is the most frequent
active cause (50%). This is followed  by “maintenance being an
initiating event for an accident scenario” (34%), “maintenance
error directly  breaching barriers” (21%) and  “maintenance
introduces new hazards” (15%). Some of the accidents involved
the failure  of multiple barriers through several causes.
4.3.1.  Combinations  of active  failures
According to Table 4, the most frequent combination of active
failures is  “maintenance introduces new  hazards –  mainte-
nance being an initiating event” (42% of all the combinations).
This combination is  highly probable for safety-critical mainte-
nance work in plants with signiﬁcant amounts of hazardous
substances. The new hazards are those generated by main-
tenance e.g. through the application of new, unvalidated
procedures, processes, conditions and equipment or existing
undervalidated ones. These may become triggered by events
(e.g. certain maintenance interventions) that favor their devel-
opment to an accident. An example can be  seen in the
Partridge-Raleigh oilﬁeld explosion and ﬁre in the US in 2006,
in which “an open-ended piping left  unisolated after a pre-
vious maintenance session” (new hazard)  was in combination
with “the act of welding a piping connection to it on resump-
tion of maintenance work” (initiating event) (Chemical Safety
Board, 2013). The second most frequent combination is  “lack
of barrier maintenance – maintenance error directly  breach-
ing barriers” (32% of all the combinations). An example of
this can be seen in the Texas City reﬁnery explosion in the
US in 2005, in which “failure  to clean sight  glass” (lack  of bar-
rier maintenance)  was in combination with “failure to calibrate
level transmitter correctly” (barrier maintenance error).  This is
Table 4 – Combinations of active failures (number of occurrences).
Maintenance
error directly
breaching barriers
Maintenance
induces new
hazards
Maintenance
being an initiating
event
Lack of barrier maintenance 6  2  3
Maintenance introduces new hazards 8
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followed  by “lack  of barrier maintenance – maintenance being
an initiating event” (16% of all the combinations) and “lack  of
barrier maintenance –  maintenance introduces new hazards”
(11% of all the combinations). When “maintenance being an
initiating event for an accident scenario” occurs, the percent-
age of it  in combination with “maintenance introduces new
hazards” is  30%. When “maintenance being  an initiating event
for an accident scenario” occurs, the percentage of it in combi-
nation with “lack of barrier maintenance” is  11%. When “lack
of barrier maintenance” occurs, the percentage of it in combi-
nation with “maintenance errors directly  breaching barriers”
is 15%. When “lack  of barrier maintenance” occurs, the per-
centage of it in combination with “maintenance introduces
new hazards” is  5%.
4.4.  Occurrence  of latent  failures
According to  Table 5, out of the 80 maintenance related major
accidents, “deﬁcient design/organization/resource manage-
ment” is  the most frequent latent cause (85%). This is  followed
by “deﬁcient risk analysis” (70%), “deﬁcient documenta-
tion” (51%), “deﬁcient implementation of requirements”
(44%), “deﬁcient monitoring of performance” (23%), “deﬁcient
management of change” (21%), “deﬁcient learning” (19%),
“deﬁcient regulatory oversight” (16%), “deﬁcient audit” (11%)
and “unbalanced safety and production goals” (5%). Some of
the accidents involved several latent failures. Disregarding the
period between 2008 and  2011 for which some accident inves-
tigations have yet to  be completed, we  can see improvements
in “risk assessment”, “management of change”, “monitoring
of performance” and “learning” in at least a period of  4 years
leading to 2007. However, it can be seen that there  was no
improvement in “regulatory oversight” in a period of 3 years
leading to 2007.
4.4.1.  Combinations  of latent  failures
As shown in Table 6, the most frequent combination of
latent failures is  “deﬁcient risk assessment – deﬁcient design,
organization and resource management” (36% of all the com-
binations). These two  sets of elements are  such  that they can
inﬂuence each  other: deﬁcient risk assessment may  inﬂuence
deﬁcient design and on the other hand deﬁcient organization
and resource management may inﬂuence risk assessment.
An example can be seen in the DSM Chemical Plant Explo-
sion in the Netherlands in 2003  in which “deﬁcient risk
assessment” was in combination with “deﬁcient design, orga-
nization and resource management” (Bureau for  Analysis
of Industrial Risks and Pollution, 2013; Okoh and Haugen,
2013).
The second most frequent combination is “deﬁcient design,
organization and resource management –  deﬁcient imple-
mentation of requirements” (22% of all the combinations). It  is
obvious that deﬁcient organization and resource management
can hamper the implementation of requirements stipulated
by regulatory bodies, manufacturers, experts etc. An exam-
ple can be seen in the Texas City reﬁnery explosion in the US
in 2005, in which “deﬁcient design, organization and resource
management” was in combination with “deﬁcient implemen-
tation of requirements” (Chemical Safety Board, 2013).
The third most frequent combination is  “deﬁcient risk
assessment –  deﬁcient documentation” (21% of all the com-
binations). Deﬁcient risk assessment may  occur in a plant due
to lack of procedural risk management strategies in the form
of elements of safety  management systems being kept and
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Table 6 – Combinations of latent failures (number of occurrences).
Deﬁcient docu-
mentation
Deﬁcient design,
organisation or resource
management
Deﬁcient
monitoring of
performance
Deﬁcient risk assessment 28 48
Deﬁcient implementation of requirements 30 5
Deﬁcient management of change (MOC) 9
Deﬁcient monitoring of performance 14
disseminated through soft or print media. An example can be
seen in the explosion of a tank in TDI production unit in Italy
in 2002 in which “deﬁcient risk assessment” was in combina-
tion with “deﬁcient documentation” (Bureau for Analysis of
Industrial Risks and Pollution, 2013).
The fourth most frequent combination is “deﬁcient design,
organization and resource management – deﬁcient monitor-
ing of performance” (11% of all the combinations). Deﬁcient
monitoring of performance may be inﬂuenced by deﬁcient
organization (encompassing communication, coordination
etc.) and/or by deﬁcient resourcemanagement (encompassing
poor hiring, poor training, insufﬁcient manning, insufﬁcient
motivation etc). An example can be seen in the Texas City
reﬁnery explosion in theUS in 2005, inwhich “deﬁcient design,
organization and resource management” was in combination
with “deﬁcient monitoring of performance” (Chemical Safety
Board, 2013).
The ﬁfth most frequent combination is “deﬁcient man-
agement of change – deﬁcient documentation” (7% of all the
combinations). Deﬁcient management of change (MOC) will
most probably occur in the absence of documented MOC pro-
cedures necessary to guide the MOC process. An example
can be seen in the BP Amoco thermal decomposition inci-
dent in the US in 2001, in which “deﬁcient management of
change” was in combination with “deﬁcient documentation”
(Chemical Safety Board, 2013).
When “deﬁcient risk assessment” occurs, the percent-
age of it in combination with “deﬁcient design, organization
or resource management” is 86%. When “deﬁcient imple-
mentation of requirements” occurs, the percentage of it in
combination with “deﬁcient design, organization or resource
management” is 86%. When “deﬁcient monitoring of per-
formance” occurs, the percentage of it in combination with
“deﬁcient design, organization or resource management” is
78%. When “deﬁcient documentation” occurs, the percentage
of it in combinationwith “deﬁcient risk analysis” is 68%.When
“deﬁcient documentation” occurs, the percentage of it in com-
binationwith “deﬁcientmanagement of change” is 22%.When
“deﬁcient monitoring of performance” occurs, the percent-
age of it in combination with “deﬁcient implementation of
requirements” is 28%.
4.5. Occurrence of accidents in relation to the work
process
According to Table 7, out of the 80 maintenance-related
major accidents, “deﬁcient planning/scheduling/failure diag-
nosis” is the most frequent work-process-based cause (69%).
This is followed by “deﬁcient normal operation” (48%), “deﬁ-
cient performance of the maintenance work” (39%), “deﬁcient
startup” (13%), “deﬁcient preparation for maintenance” (11%)
and the least is “deﬁcient mobilization/shutdown” (9%). Some
of the accidents involved several phases of the work pro-
cess.
4.5.1. Combinations of work phases
In Table 8, it is shown that the most frequent com-
bination of causes in relation to the work process is
“deﬁcient Planning/scheduling/fault diagnosis – deﬁcient nor-
mal operation” (33% of all the combinations). Deﬁcient
planning/scheduling/fault diagnosis can lead to an acci-
dent directly in the normal operation phase. An example
can be seen in the Imperial sugar reﬁnery explosion in
the US in 2008, in which “the failure to plan the main-
tenance of sugar and cornstarch conveying equipment to
minimize the release of sugar dust into the work area” (deﬁ-
cient planning/scheduling/fault diagnosis) was in combination
with “operating in the presence of signiﬁcant accumulation of
sugar dust” (deﬁcient normal operation) (Chemical Safety Board,
2013). The second most frequent combination is “deﬁcient
planning/scheduling/fault diagnosis – deﬁcient performance
of maintenance work” (25% of all the combinations). Situa-
tions abound where erroneous plans result in accidents when
undetectedduring the actual performanceof themaintenance
work in safety-critical operations. An example can be seen in
the Partridge-Raleigh oilﬁeld explosion and ﬁre in the US in
2006, inwhich “deﬁcient planning/scheduling/fault diagnosis”
was in combination with “the welding of a piping connection,
leading to the accident” (Chemical Safety Board, 2013). The
third most frequent combination is “deﬁcient performance
of maintenance work – deﬁcient normal operation” (12% of
all the combinations). It is also possible to have a work per-
formance phase with failures induced by personnel therein
and leading to an accident in the normal operation phase.
An example can be seen in the Goodyear heat exchanger and
ammonia release incident in the US in 2008, in which “the
failure of maintenance workers to reopen an isolation valve”
was in combination with “increasing ammonia pressure
during process piping cleaning being performed by the oper-
ators” (Chemical Safety Board, 2013). Further more, deﬁcient
plan may introduce failures in the work performance phase
that will manifest during normal operation as an accident.
When “deﬁcient planning/scheduling/fault diagnosis” occurs,
the percentage of it in combination with “deﬁcient normal
operation” is 49%. When “deﬁcient planning/scheduling/fault
diagnosis” occurs, the percentage of it in combination with
“deﬁcient performance of maintenance work” is 36%. When
“deﬁcient planning/scheduling/fault diagnosis” occurs, the
percentage of it in combination with “deﬁcient startup” is
13%. When “deﬁcient planning/scheduling/fault diagnosis”
occurs, the percentage of it in combination with “deﬁcient
preparation for maintenance” is 7%. When “deﬁcient plan-
ning/scheduling/fault diagnosis” occurs, the percentage of it
in combination with “deﬁcient mobilization/shutdown” is 7%.
When “deﬁcient performance of maintenance work” occurs,
the percentage of it in combination with “deﬁcient normal
operation” is 32%. When “deﬁcient preparation for main-
tenance” occurs, the percentage of it in combination with
“deﬁcient normal operation” is 11%.
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Table 7 –  Occurrence of accidents in relation to the  work process.
Year Deﬁcient plan-
ning/scheduling/fault
diagnosis
Deﬁcient
mobiliza-
tion/shutdown
Deﬁcient
preparation  for
maintenance
Deﬁcient
performance
of
maintenance
work
Deﬁcient
start-up
Deﬁcient
normal
operation
2000 3 2 1 4  0  3
2001 5 0 0 4  0  1
2002 5 0 1 1  0  7
2003 9 2 1 4  3  5
2004 4 0 3 3  0  5
2005 6 2 0 2  2  4
2006 4 0 0 3  0  2
2007 3 0 0 1  0  3
2008 6 0 0 4  1  5
2009 4 0 0 1  2  1
2010 4 1 2 2  1  1
2011 2 0 1 2  1  1
Total 55 7 9 31 10 38
5.  Discussion  and  recommendations
The main intention in this paper is to  identify the most
challenging causes of maintenance-related major accidents
in the process industries in order to  motivate intervention
with the most preventive effort. However, potential areas for
more usefulness can still be suggested. One  of the possible
ways in which the outcome of this research may be applied
to maintenance management is  by adapting it to a process
FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis). A  process FMEA is
a systematic method that can be used in advance to iden-
tify, analyze  and eliminate or  reduce potential failures from
a process (e.g. a maintenance process). It deals  with problems
emanating from how an item is  manufactured, maintained
or operated (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). The style of the
suggested FMEA is inspired by an application from the health-
care industry (ISMP, 2005; Cohen et al.,  1994;  Williams and
Talley, 1994) where the FMEA is used to investigate medical
processes for  potential failures and to prevent the failures by
correcting the defective processes proactively. We may iden-
tify the suggested FMEA as WAP-FMEA (Work and Accident
Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis), i.e. a FMEA which
integrates the maintenance work process with the accident
process for the purpose of prevention of maintenance related
major accidents. Sample worksheets of the suggested WAP-
FMEA are  illustrated in Table 9.
The illustration of the WAP-FMEA (in Table 9), gener-
ally presents a range of possible modes, causes and effects
of failure as well as  preventive actions in e.g. the main-
tenance process of an offshore  riser system. The list of
potential latent causes and work-process related deﬁcien-
cies were obtained from the observations where they have
been linked to different types of active failures. Practically,
it is expected that a single failure mode will  be treated
at a time. The tabulated results in the earlier sections
can inform about the probability of failure  modes men-
tioned in Table 9. As regards ranking in order to  prioritize
preventive efforts, the illustrations in Table 9 indicate a
range from highest risk score  (corresponding to highest
priority) to lowest risk score  (corresponding to lowest prior-
ity).
Furthermore, the research ﬁndings may  also ﬁnd use-
fulness in maintenance-related, major accident risk mod-
eling applications in the process industries. A  typical
situation is  expressing the likelihood of a particular
maintenance-related major accident occurring within a given
period. This can be  done by using the failure  frequency
databases of previous similar accidents to establish an
annual probability of occurrence (i.e. the statistical prob-
ability that the accident will occur during a one-year
period) using suitable formulas (Rausand and Høyland,
2004).
Table 8 –  Combinations of work phases (number of occurrences).
Deﬁcient
mobiliza-
tion/shutdown
Deﬁcient
preparation for
maintenance
Deﬁcient
performance
of
maintenance
work
Deﬁcient
start-up
Deﬁcient
normal
operation
Deﬁcient plan-
ning/scheduling/fault
diagnosis
4 4  20  7 27
Deﬁcient mobiliza-
tion/shutdown
1  1
Deﬁcient
preparation for
maintenance
4  1
Deﬁcient
performance of
maintenance work
2  10
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Table 9 – An illustration of maintenance WAP-FMEA for  the prevention of maintenance-related major accidents in  an offshore riser system.
Process Potential
failure modes
Potential
failure causes
Failure effects
that can  lead
to  major
accidents
Probability of
failurea
Severity of
failure effectsa
Risk  scorea Actions for the
elimination or
reduction of
failure modes
Accident-
process
related
Work-process
related
Active causes Latent causes
Maintenance
process, e.g.
Maintenance
processes of  an
offshore riser system
– various preventive,
repair, replacement
and
precommissioning
processes
Failure  to repair,
hydrotest, pig or
inspect etc.
Lack of  barrier
maintenance:
absence or
insufﬁciency in
update of status
of maintenance
program and
administrative
tools
Deﬁcient
regulatory
oversight,
deﬁcient risk
assessment,
deﬁcient
implementation
of requirements,
deﬁcient
documentation,
deﬁcient  design,
organization or
resource
management,
deﬁcient
monitoring of
performance,
deﬁcient
learning
Deﬁciencies in
plan-
ning/scheduling/fault
diagnosis
(originating
phase of
accident),
mobiliza-
tion/shutdown,
preparation for
maintenance,
performance of
maintenance
work, startup or
normal operation
(manifestation
phase of
accident)
Overload,
corrosion,
material
degradation,
leak, rupture
0.0249  4 fatalities 0.0996  Review of
management
policy, audit,  etc.
Review of  the
management of
resources,
information,
change etc.
Review of
maintenance
plan/program
Welding error,
parts mismatch,
omission of
components and
incorrect
installation,
repair or
isolation etc.
Barrier
maintenance
error:
procedures, parts
or  techniques are
inappropriate or
applied wrongly
to  barriers
Deﬁcient
implementation
of  requirements,
deﬁcient
management of
change (MOC),
deﬁcient
documentation,
deﬁcient design,
organization or
resource
management,
deﬁcient
learning
Deﬁciencies in
plan-
ning/scheduling/fault
diagnosis
(originating
phase of
accident),
mobiliza-
tion/shutdown,
preparation for
maintenance,
performance of
maintenance
work, startup or
normal operation
(originating or
manifestation
phase of
accident)
Leak from weld,
ﬂange or  valve
etc.
0.0232 3 fatalities 0.0696 Review of
welding
procedure
speciﬁcation
(WPS), work
execution
procedure,
evaluation of
work
performance and
personnel
qualiﬁcation
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Table 9
Accumulated
ratcheting of
bolts in live
hydrocarbon
piping, presence
of maintenance
intervention
with  ignition
sources but no
ﬂame arrestor
New  hazard: the
resource being
used  for
maintenance
introduces
hazards which
interact with
existing hazards
or  are triggered
by events
Deﬁcient
regulatory
oversight,
deﬁcient risk
assessment,
deﬁcient
implementation
of requirements,
deﬁcient
documentation,
deﬁcient design,
organization or
resource
management,
deﬁcient
monitoring of
performance,
unbalanced
safety
&production
goals, deﬁcient
learning
deﬁciencies in
plan-
ning/scheduling/fault
diagnosis
(originating
phase of
accident),
preparation for
maintenance,
performance of
maintenance
work, startup or
normal operation
(originating or
manifestation
phase of
accident)
Leak  from ﬂange
or  valve and
ignition of
ﬂammable
substances
0.0162 3 fatalities 0.0486 Review of  safe
operating
procedure (SOP),
evaluation of
work
performance,
personnel
qualiﬁcation,
simultaneous
operations
(SIMOPS), work
permit system
Loss of
containment due
to a  wrong valve
being  operated
as  part  of
preparations,
ﬁre/explosion
from
maintenance in
process area
adjacent to riser
maintenance
area, collision of
work-class ROV
with  riser system
Initiating event:
an  accidental
maintenance
related event
disrupts a
planned
maintenance,
initiating an
accident scenario
Deﬁcient
regulatory
oversight,
deﬁcient risk
assessment,
deﬁcient
implementation
of requirements,
deﬁcient
management of
change (MOC),
deﬁcient
documentation,
deﬁcient design,
organization or
resource
management,
deﬁcient audit
Deﬁciencies in
plan-
ning/scheduling/fault
diagnosis
(originating
phase of
accident),
mobiliza-
tion/shutdown,
preparation for
maintenance,
performance of
maintenance
work, startup or
normal operation
(originating or
manifestation
phase of
accident)
Leak,  rupture 0.0238  4 fatalities 0.0952 Review of  safe
operating
procedure (SOP),
Simultaneous
operations
(SIMOPS), work
permit system or
emergency
response system
a The ﬁgures in  the  columns are arbitrary values for  demonstration purpose only. The probability may be determined from the failure frequency, the severity may be deﬁned in  terms of the expected damage and
the risk score  may be deﬁned as the product of  the  probability and severity ((ISMP, 2005)). The ranking is discussed afterwards.
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6.  Conclusion
In  this paper, 183 major accidents in the hydrocarbon and
chemical process industries in the period from 2000 to 2011
have been studied in relation to  the Work and Accident Pro-
cess (WAP) classiﬁcation scheme (Okoh and Haugen, 2013a).
The overall objective has  been to look at how maintenance
inﬂuences major accidents, the trend and the degree and dis-
tribution of the causes.
It  has  been found  that  out of 183 accidents, 80 (44%)
are maintenance-related. Most of the maintenance-related
major accidents occurred  in chemical manufacturing plants
(46%). The most frequently involved hazardous substances
are toxic substances (26%) and the most frequent type of
accident is “emission/discharge” (60%). “lack of barrier main-
tenance” (50%), “deﬁcient design, organization and resource
management” (85%) and “deﬁcient planning/scheduling/fault
diagnosis” (69%) are  the most frequent causes in terms
of the active  accident process, the latent accident process
and the work  process respectively. As regards combina-
tion of causes, “maintenance introduces new hazards –
maintenance being an initiating event” (42% of all the
active-failure combinations), “deﬁcient risk assessment –  deﬁ-
cient design, organization and resource management” (36%
of all the latent-failure combinations) and “deﬁcient plan-
ning/scheduling/fault diagnosis – deﬁcient normal operation”
(33% of all  the deﬁcient work-phase combinations) are the
most frequent.
The results also show  a decreasing trend in maintenance-
related major accidents in the period from 2002 to  2007
and that  the contributions of the US and Europe to the 80
maintenance-related major accidents are  about 40% and  60%
respectively.
As regards the applicability of the statistical ﬁndings, the
frequencies can be used to determine probabilities which in
turn will be useful in maintenance-related, major accident risk
modeling and  in the suggested WAP-FMEA (Work and Acci-
dent Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis), i.e.  a FMEA
which integrates the maintenance work process with the acci-
dent process for the purpose of prevention of maintenance
related major accidents. The validity of the statistics, how-
ever, is  constrained by the uncertainty associated with the
assumption that future failures will occur at the same rate
being established currently based on  previous experience.
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Abstract - Societies worldwide have been surprised and 
saddened by the occurrence of certain major unwanted 
events after having made considerable efforts to control the 
dynamics of whatever organization or systems they manage. 
Texas City Refinery Explosion (2005) and the Piper Alpha 
Disaster (1988) are two examples of maintenance-related 
major accidents with highly devastating consequences.  
Major accidents may be viewed from the following 
perspectives: Energy-Barrier, Normal Accident, High 
Reliability Organization (HRO), Man-made Disaster, 
Conflicting Objectives, and Resilience Engineering. In 
reality, few of these perspectives are actually used in 
practical risk management – it is the energy-barrier 
principle which is dominating completely. 
The objectives of this paper are: (1) To find out how 
maintenance fits into the aforementioned perspectives on 
major accidents, and (2) To discuss how the perspectives can 
influence maintenance. 
 
Keywords - Maintenance, Major accident, Organization, 
Risk 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Countries and companies have expressed surprises 
and sadness at the occurrence of major unwanted events 
that have defied existing controls of organizational and 
systemic dynamics. In many cases, maintenance has been 
identified as playing a role in the accidents, directly or 
indirectly. The Texas City Refinery Explosion (2005) and 
the Piper Alpha disaster (1988) are just two examples of 
maintenance-related major accidents with highly 
devastating consequences. With increasing complexity 
and increasing dependency on technical systems, the 
needs for and the importance of maintenance also 
increases. At the same time, maintenance may also 
represent a risk, because accidents may be initiated by 
maintenance itself [1, 2]. A better understanding of how 
maintenance influences major accident risk is therefore 
considered to be necessary, to be able to reduce risk.  
 For this purpose, the term “major accidents” is not 
defined explicitly but covers accidents which cause severe 
losses, in terms of loss of life, environmental loss and/or 
economic losses. The focus of the paper is on major 
accidents in technological organizations and systems. 
 Over the years, a number of different views or 
perspectives have been proposed to explain the 
phenomenon of major accidents. An overview of different 
perspectives is provided by Rosness et al. [3]. The 
perspectives that are discussed are the Energy-Barrier 
model, Normal Accident Theory (NAT), High Reliability 
Organizations (HRO), the Man-made Disaster (MMD) 
theory, Conflicting Objectives and Resilience 
Engineering. The different perspectives may be regarded 
as “competing,” in the sense that they give different 
explanations of how and why accidents occur. An 
alternative view is to regard the different perspectives 
more as supplementary pictures of major accidents, which 
together may give a more comprehensive understanding 
of this phenomenon than any single perspective will give. 
This is also a background for this paper, where we discuss 
that the choice of perspective may have important 
implications for how the management of major accident 
risk is approached. It may therefore also influence our 
view on maintenance, both as a means to reduce risk and 
as a cause of accident. It is noted however, that few of 
these perspectives have had significant influence on 
practical risk management. The energy-barrier principle 
dominates completely, although aspects of HRO and 
resilience are being used in some contexts. 
 In this paper, we will give a brief overview of the 
different perspectives, one by one, and provide some 
comments on how maintenance will be viewed within the 
different perspectives.  
  
 
II.  ENERGY-BARRIER PERSPECTIVE  
 
A.  Energy-barrier perspective 
 
 The energy-barrier perspective, which is based on the 
hazard-barrier-target model of Gibson [4], depicts a linear 
progression of events from the release of energy (hazard) 
through supposedly interposed barriers to the interaction 
between the energy (hazard) and the target (victim). The 
model is hinged on the concepts of linearity and 
monocausality, i.e., the transfer of a given energy from 
the source to the target. This model also forms the basis 
for Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model [1] and the “defence in 
depth” principle. An example of how this has been 
institutionalized in risk management can be found in the 
Norwegian regulations for offshore installations, where a 
separate section in the Management Regulations is 
dedicated to barriers [5]. 
 The model basically has three main risk control 
strategies: (1) Control of the hazard, (2) Control of the 
barrier, and (3) Control of the target’s situation/condition.  
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B.  The effect of maintenance 
 
 The energy-barrier perspective is about establishing 
barriers (often technical) and ensuring that these barriers 
remain intact and effective for as long as they are needed. 
Maintenance will be an important contributor to 
maintaining the integrity of the barriers. With this 
realization, focus on maintenance also increases and 
maintenance will in itself be a key element in managing 
risk. In the Norwegian offshore industry, it is quite 
common to have various safety indicators related to 
maintenance, in particular maintenance on safety critical 
equipment. An example is “Hours of backlog on 
maintenance.” Maintenance is also often regarded as a 
barrier in itself.  This perspective will therefore clearly 
bring out the importance of sufficient and correct 
maintenance. 
 
 
III.  NORMAL ACCIDENT PERSPECTIVE  
 
A.  Normal Accident Theory 
 
 The normal accident theory (NAT), proposed by 
Perrow, expresses the concept of accident proneness (i.e 
natural tendency towards accidents) owing to the inter-
active complexities (technological and organizational) and 
tight couplings that evolve as our world of technologies 
continue to expand [6]. The Normal accident perspective 
is hinged on complexity and multicausality. Perrow 
believes that the multiple barriers and redundancies that 
characterize such high-risk technologies (which are being 
managed on the premise of the energy-barrier model) 
could offer some level of safety, but will subsequently 
increase the system’s degree of complexity and tightness 
of couplings. Complexity and coupling are not very 
precise terms [7], but being able to delay processing time 
is an example of loose coupling, while the opposite is a 
tight coupling [6]. According to [8], “as the list of 
regularities characterizing a given system’s operation 
increases, that system becomes more complex.” It can be 
inferred that the simpler we keep our technologies, the 
safer we are bound to be, and this is the basis for Perrow’s 
conclusion that certain technologies should be scrapped in 
their current composition because we cannot think of any 
organization that has the capacity to sufficiently control 
them.  The reason for this is that Perrow claims that a 
system of interactive complexity can be effectively 
controlled only by a decentralized organization and a 
system of tight couplings can be effectively controlled 
only by a centralized organization, thus making it 
impossible to devise an organization that can control the 
system effectively. The policy reversal in Germany 
(driven by the Fukushima disaster in Japan) that will see 
all her nuclear power plants abandoned by 2022 [9] may 
be seen as a logical and necessary result of NAT.  
 NAT is not a general theory of major accidents since 
it is limited to specific technologies, those with high 
complexity and tight couplings. Further, accidents within 
such systems need not necessarily be classified as normal 
accidents either. Perrow himself presents numerous 
examples of this in his book [6]. Criticism of the theory 
has been raised [7] and HRO theory (see next section) 
argues that systems indeed can be both complex and 
tightly coupled, still having an excellent safety record. 
 
B.  The effect of maintenance 
 
 Perrow believes that some accidents are preventable 
through certain improved factors, including better 
equipment or the effects of accidents may be possible to 
minimize or limit to local effects through safety systems. 
In both of these cases, maintenance will play a role in 
ensuring that the equipment and safety systems are kept in 
operating order and with high reliability. However, since 
accidents are associated with complexity and tight 
coupling, the focus of risk management will be on 
reducing complexity and also loosening coupling within 
the system being considered. This has a least two 
implications.   
 First of all, regardless of the frequency and quality 
with which maintenance is performed, it can only 
contribute to preserve a certain level of safety. Further 
improvement will not be possible as long as the system 
has the undesirable properties that Perrow pointed out. 
Maintenance can therefore serve only as a safeguard for 
the individual parts of high-risk systems, but not ensure 
the safety of the whole system. NAT has an 
organizational perspective and maintenance is therefore 
not central in the same way as for Energy-Barrier 
perspective.  
 Secondly, it may be argued that maintenance can be 
regarded as adding complexity to a system because it 
implies more activities that need to be performed safely, 
coordinated with other activities and monitored in a 
suitable manner. Maintenance optimization may also add 
tight couplings. 
 
  
IV.  HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATION (HRO) 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
A.  HRO Theory 
 
 The High-Reliability Organization (HRO) Theory has 
been developed from studies of organizations which, 
according to Normal Accident Theory, should experience 
major accidents, but which still have excellent safety 
records [10]. The foremost example used to illustrate this 
is aircraft carriers, but other organizations, like hospital 
emergency rooms, have also been studied. A number of 
technologies we have today have great productive 
potential and at the same time great destructive potential, 
such that the avoidance of a significant failure is 
imperative [10]. These technologies include the high-risk 
technologies referred to by Perrow [6] as having 
interactive complexities and tight couplings, although the 
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 HRO perspective expresses the possibility of managing 
such technologies unlike Perrow’s pessimistic position [3, 
11]. An objection to Perrow’s pessimism is provided by 
the HRO perspective in the possibility of switching from 
centralization during normal operations to 
decentralization in hazardous situations and consulting 
expert judgment [11]. According to Sagan [12], HRO 
organizations inherently possess the best safety records of 
all high-risk technologies. The characteristics of HROs as 
identified by several theorists may be summed up in the 
following: (i) Diligence in failure analysis and 
organizational learning, (ii) Mutual agreement on 
production and safety as being concurrent organizational 
objectives, (iii) Decentralization and centralization of 
authorities, and (iv) Personnel and technical redundancy 
[11]. HRO theorists believe that through management 
commitment to safety, the establishment of safety culture, 
the maintenance of relatively closed systems, functional 
decentralization supported by constant training, technical 
and organizational redundancies, and organizational 
learning supplemented by anticipation and simulation 
(trial-and-error process), organizations could achieve the 
consistency and stability required to support failure-free 
operations [13, 10, 12, 11]. 
 
B.  The effect of maintenance 
 
 HRO is a theory about organizational aspects that 
covers all levels of the organization, from top level 
management (the “blunt end”) to the operators performing 
the work in the field (the “sharp end”). The focus tends to 
be on high risk operations which require vigilance and 
correct performance (aircraft carriers, emergency rooms).  
One may speculate that there is a potential for developing 
a culture where the “heroes” are those which run the 
operations, and where maintenance is seen as a routine 
activity with less importance. On the other hand, at least 
two of the characteristics listed above – (i) Diligence in 
failure analysis and organizational learning and (iv) 
Personnel and technical redundancy – will also be 
contributing to put focus on maintenance. HRO 
organizations are proactive in avoiding failures and this 
should also extend to ensuring good maintenance, to 
avoid technical failures.  
 
 
V.  MAN-MADE DISASTER PERSPECTIVE 
 
A.  Man-made disaster perspective 
 
 The man-made disaster (MMD) theory considers 
accidents to be the result of accumulated flaws in 
information processing between various organizational 
units, including the administrative, managerial and 
operational units [14]. Turner, the initiator of the theory, 
calls the period of accumulation an incubation period (i.e. 
a period of maturity). At the end of the incubation period, 
the perceived organizational quality is unable to co-exist 
with the accumulated organizational deviations, thus 
leading to an accident. A key point in this theory is that 
there exist warning signs within the organization that 
could have been used to prevent accidents, if it had been 
accumulated and communicated in the right way and to 
the right people. This perspective is hinged on 
multicausality, for according to Turner [14], “accidents 
are neither chance events, nor acts of God, nor triggered 
by a few events and unsafe human acts immediately 
before they occur.” The concept behind the theory is 
sociological; it holds that accidents are not just a 
technological phenomenon [13]. 
 
B.  The effect of maintenance 
 
 This perspective focuses on lack of information flow 
as the cause of accidents. The status of technical systems, 
including their maintenance status would be an example 
of the type of information that is relevant in this context. 
This perspective will therefore contribute to emphasize 
the importance of ensuring that this type of information is 
available. The Piper Alpha disaster [15] is an example of 
an accident where information about maintenance was not 
brought to the attention of all who needed to know. 
However, maintenance performance as such, and in 
particular the importance of correct performance of 
maintenance will not be at the centre of attention in this 
perspective.  
 
 
VI.  CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES, ADAPTATION 
AND DRIFT PERSPECTIVE  
 
A.  Conflicting objectives perspective 
 
 The conflicting objectives/goals (or decision-making) 
perspective was proposed by Rasmussen [16] and 
considers major accidents to be the result of 
organizational objectives clashing with each other. The 
result of this conflict is an organization in a state of 
dilemma that may drift over time due to lack of 
information or inability to balance the objectives 
correctly. Examples of organizational objectives that may 
come into conflict include production objectives, safety 
objectives etc. The basic resource used to drive the 
realization of these objectives is money and the 
application of this resource must create a balance between 
objectives to guarantee the survival of the organization. 
The balance between production (economic objective) 
and protection (safety objective) was also discussed by 
Reason [1]. The concept of adaptation involves tradeoff, 
i.e. sacrificing one quality or aspect of something in return 
for gaining another quality or aspect. 
 
B.  The effect of maintenance 
 
 Maintenance is a clear example of an area where 
there will be conflicting objectives: The saved cost of not 
doing it versus the (indirect) risk reduction achieved when 
doing it. Maintenance objectives are a means of achieving 
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 production and safety objectives, but sometimes the 
sharing of maintenance resources between production and 
safety systems may be disproportional, or the allocation of 
maintenance resources to both may be inadequate. 
Reducing maintenance is a typical example of a cost that 
is reduced as much as possible due to pressures to operate 
as cheaply as possible. Although this may have a positive 
impact on at least production in terms of profit in the short 
term, it may tend to have a negative impact on both 
production and safety in the medium or long term. 
Optimizing maintenance is crucial to optimizing 
production without compromising safety. This perspective 
helps to highlight potential pressures that may exist to 
reduce maintenance. 
 
 
VII.  RESILIENCE ENGINEERING PERSPECTIVE  
 
A.  Resilience engineering perspective 
 
 The word “Resilience” is derived from the Latin word 
“resilire” (to leap back), and according to [17], denotes a 
system’s “ability to recover from challenges or disrupting 
events.” In [11], the term “recoverability” is considered as 
a synonym for resilience. In [18], resilience is defined as 
“the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning 
prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so 
that it can sustain required operations under both expected 
and unexpected conditions.” 
Resilience engineering describes the ability of 
organizations to achieve ultra-high levels of safety and 
response to the dynamics of other organizational values 
(e.g. production, operations, economy etc.) despite 
complexities, high risks, major accidents, disturbances, 
disruptions, continuous pressure and change [17, 3]. 
Accidents, according to this perspective, are not the 
product of normal system malfunction or breakdown, but 
rather a breakdown in the adaptive capacity necessary to 
cope with the real world of complexity [13]. According to 
[8], the ratio between order and chaos is the critical factor 
in determining the capacity of a system to adapt 
successfully to systemic surprises. Adaptive capacity (or 
adaptability) refers to the ability of individuals and 
organizations to adjust their performance to the current 
condition [19]. The resilience engineering perspective 
encompasses core topics from the five perspectives 
described earlier; it is a synthesis of ideas bordering on 
barriers, complexity, conflicting goals and HRO [3, 13]. 
The abilities that constitute resilience can be 
summarized as follows [20]:  
(1) Anticipation – Addressing the potential: Foreseeing 
the changing shape of risk, before failure and harm 
results,  
(2) Monitoring – Observing the critical: Recognizing 
how close the organization is to the safety boundary,  
(3) Responding – Coping with the actual: Adapting or 
being flexible to changes, disruptions and opportunities, 
and  
(4) Learning – Updating with the factual: Review of 
performance based on new knowledge. 
 
B.  The effect of maintenance 
 
 Since this perspective draws on elements from the 
earlier perspectives, the conclusions with regard to how 
maintenance is viewed will also tend to coincide with 
elements from the earlier discussions, in particular the 
discussion about HRO Theory. Anticipation and Learning 
can both be pointed out as abilities that will rely among 
others on maintenance and maintenance records as a basis 
for achieving this. Barrier maintenance is part of this, but 
not any different from the Energy-Barrier perspective. 
Monitoring is a question of detecting early warnings and 
weak signals, of which lack of maintenance may be one of 
such signals. 
 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The purpose of this paper has been to look at how the 
different perspectives on major accidents that have been 
proposed over the years will give us different views, and 
thereby also different insight, into how maintenance 
influences such accidents. The energy-barrier perspective 
places focus very clearly on the importance of 
maintenance as a means of ensuring continued operation 
and reliability of barriers to prevent accidents, while other 
perspectives will highlight other aspects. The man-made 
disaster perspective by Turner shows that performing 
maintenance is not enough, making sure that the right 
people have access to information is also important while 
the conflicting objectives perspective of Rasmussen 
shows that there will be forces that will tend to reduce 
maintenance to cut costs (or achieve other objectives).  
The focus here has been on maintenance, but a general 
lesson that can be drawn from this exercise is that none of 
these perspectives can be regarded as “right” or “wrong.” 
They focus on different aspects of how we manage risk 
and avoid accidents, and thereby they should all help us, 
to a smaller or greater degree, to reduce future losses 
associated with major accidents. Subscribing to just one 
of them and discarding the others as incomplete, useless, 
or obsolete will limit our view of the problem area. 
The paper is one in a planned series of publications 
dedicated to a research project titled “Maintenance 
Strategies for Major Accidents Prevention.” Further work 
related to the paper is planned to involve reanalysis of 
selected major accidents, with the objective of 
demonstrating if and how the aforementioned 
perspectives relate such accidents to the effects of 
maintenance. Additionally, the extent to which 
maintenance has been a cause of major accidents could be 
investigated. Besides, it would be pertinent to analyze 
how maintenance can contribute to more robust systems 
and organizations. In addition, it would be interesting to 
investigate how future operating philosophies may 
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 influence the present state and whether they may create 
new challenges. Furthermore, there is the need to analyze 
how maintenance should be optimized to manage the 
major accident risk.  
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Industries with major accident potential, e.g.  the process industries, are usually characterized by high degree of
technological and organizational complexity, and hence are fortiﬁed with layers of  protection (barriers). The energy-
barrier risk control model is dominant and tends to be applied by such industries over time, sometimes without
paying attention to the vulnerability of the complex organizational setting encompassing production, maintenance,
support and the environment. In the same vein, process industries may prioritize production at  the expense of
safety  systems and the organizational network. Maintenance is known to be  a key means of keeping safety systems
functional, yet, in  this paper we wish to explore how its values can be further uncovered to improve the robustness
and  resilience of the socio-technical system as a whole.
This paper intends to investigate what robustness and resilience properties exist in maintenance and how these
can be  improved in relation to maintenance interaction with other areas such as production and support and in turn
improve the robustness and resilience of the process industries organization. The objective is  to improve the robust-
ness and resilience of the organization as a whole. This is realized on the basis of the perspectives of organizational
accidents: energy-barrier model, normal accident theory (NAT), high reliability organizations (HRO) theory, man-
made disaster (MMD) theory, conﬂicting objectives, adaptation and drift (COAD) theory and resilience engineering.
Based  on this, recommendations for  improving the maintenance robustness and resilience were proposed.
©  2014 The Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1.  Introduction
The purpose of maintenance is to retain systems in or to
restore them to  a functioning state. Maintenance also con-
tributes to improved system knowledge and  inter-discipline
coordination that may beneﬁt the entire organization. This
may indicate that maintenance may be  a contributor to robust
and resilient organizations and systems whose ability to  pre-
vent or limit unexpected events is  improved. It  is  therefore  of
interest to investigate how maintenance can be performed to
gain this “added” value of increased organizational robustness
and resilience.
Industries with major accident potential, e.g. the hydro-
carbon and chemical process industries, are usually  charac-
terized by high degree of technological and  organizational
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +47 40309367.
E-mail addresses: peter.okoh@ntnu.no, okohpee@yahoo.com (P. Okoh).
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complexity (Okoh and Haugen, 2013a,b). It  is  common practice
in such industries to install layers of independent safety barri-
ers that are capable of preventing the occurrence or  mitigating
the consequences of unexpected events in accordance with
the energy-barrier principle (Gibson, 1961).
The energy-barrier principle is dominant among the orga-
nizational accident perspectives (Rosness et al., 2010; Okoh
and Haugen, 2012) and tends to be  applied by high-risk
industries over time.  Focus is  often on technical issues,
sometimes without paying attention to the vulnerability of
the complex organizational setting encompassing production,
maintenance, support and the environment. In the same vein,
process industries may prioritize production at the expense of
safety systems and the organizational network. This was the
case in the Texas City reﬁnery explosion (CSB, 2007; Okoh and
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2014.06.014
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Haugen, 2014c) and the Macondo blowout (SINTEF, 2011). The
safety and production objectives of industries cannot be real-
ized to  the fullest without the personnel relating appropriately
and adequately with each other, the environment and the sys-
tems. The application of a suitable combination (a mix  of both
the technologically and  organizationally biased) of the acci-
dent perspectives can improve safety signiﬁcantly (Pitblado,
2011; Rosness et al., 2010; Okoh and Haugen, 2012).
Several authors have highlighted the importance of main-
tenance to  physical asset management and  suggested ways to
improve maintenance in relation to improved dependability of
the assets (Okoh, 2010; Øien et al., 2010; Wilson, 2002). How-
ever, the potential of maintenance to improve the robustness
and resilience of  the organization itself has yet to be uncov-
ered. The hypothesis is,  by virtue of its  interaction with the
other departments and  the environment, maintenance could
also improve the robustness and resilience of the organization,
not only systems.
Some studies have been  done on  robustness (Anderies
et al., 2004; Nielsen and Holmefjord, 2004; Boissieres and
Marsden, 2005; Pavard et al., 2007).  Few of them have ana-
lyzed organizational robustness in relation to organizational
accident (Nielsen and Holmefjord,  2004) or  maintenance
(Boissieres  and Marsden, 2005). The latter focused on  the
telecommunications industry,  whereas the former focused on
a hydrocarbon industry’s emergency preparedness organiza-
tion –  a subset of the entire  industrial organization. However,
this paper will explore the process industry organization
from a broader perspective. Various industrial sectors are
characterized by different conﬁgurations of independent and
coordinated units aimed at realizing the set of organizational
goals. It is important to address this  situation speciﬁcally to
achieve a better solution for a given industry.
In this paper, we  intend to  investigate what robustness and
resilience properties exist in maintenance and  how these can
be improved in relation to maintenance interaction with other
areas such as  production and support and in turn improve
the robustness and resilience of the process industries orga-
nization. The methodology is  based on the application of the
six perspectives of organizational accidents, i.e.  energy-barrier
model, normal accident theory  (NAT), high reliability organi-
zations (HRO), man-made disaster (MMD)  theory, conﬂicting
objectives, adaptation and drift (COAD) theory and resilience
engineering (Rosness et al., 2010). Several of the perspectives
focus on  how  accidents are not caused only by technical fail-
ures of physical systems, but in some cases by human and
organizational factors or a combination of these. Hence,  it
is pertinent to  investigate the maintenance-related contribu-
tion to organizational robustness and resilience in light of
these factors. The contribution of maintenance to the organi-
zational robustness and resilience will be  derived by mapping
the factors that inﬂuence robustness and resilience (accord-
ing to  each  of the organizational accident perspectives) to the
links between maintenance and production, maintenance and
support, and maintenance and the environment. The paper
will focus on the hydrocarbon and chemical process indus-
tries.
The rest of the paper is  structured  as  follows:  Section 2 will
deﬁne robustness and  resilience and present various views
about organizational robustness and resilience from different
authors, Section 3 will  analyze the structure of the industry
and the associated dependencies, Section 4 will describe a
maintenance work process applicable to the hydrocarbon and
chemical process industries, Section 5 will ascertain whether
and  what robustness and resilience properties are obtain-
able from maintenance, Section 6 will investigate how the
robustness and resilience of maintenance and the organiza-
tion can be improved in relation to maintenance interaction
with production, support and the environment, and Section 7
will  present a summary  of the ﬁndings.
2.  The  concept  of robustness  and  resilience
Robustness is  the noun form of  the English adjective  “robust”
which originates from the Latin “robustus” –  it simply means
ﬁrm, hard, strong. However, in scientiﬁc use there are differ-
ent deﬁnitions of robustness (Jen, 2005), and as  yet, there is  no
universally accepted deﬁnition. There  may never be  a uniﬁed
deﬁnition, because different disciplines may  choose to use the
term differently, so we have to be  careful about choosing deﬁ-
nitions from very different applications. Besides, robustness
tends to  be misconstrued for resilience sometimes (Pavard
et al., 2007).
Robust systems, according to  Asbjørnslett and Rausand
(1999), are characterized by (i) resistance to accidental events,
(ii) restoration of functionality and (iii)  retention of original
stability (Asbjørnslett and  Rausand, 1999). This view is  con-
sistent with that of Ferdows (1997) –  “The ability to cope with
changes in the competitive environment without resorting to
changes in the structure” (Ferdows, 1997) and that of Chandra
and Grabis (2007) –  “The ability to withstand external and
internal shocks” (Chandra and  Grabis, 2007). As viewed by
Agarwal  et al. (2007), a system is  robust if it does not yield
to any  damage characterized by signiﬁcant loss of form and
function, and even a single mode of vulnerability renders a
system unrobust no matter whether the system is acceptable
under other  kinds of demand (Agarwal et al., 2007).  Further-
more, robustness as seen by  Pavard et al.  (2007) is  the ability
of a system “to adapt its behavior to unforeseen situations,
such as perturbation in the environment, or  to internal dys-
functions in the organization of the system” (Pavard et al.,
2007).
Resilience as deﬁned by  Foster (1993) is “the ability to
accommodate change without catastrophic failure, or the
capacity to  absorb shocks gracefully” (Foster, 1993). According
to Asbjørnslett and Rausand (1999), it is  characterized by tran-
sition to a new stable situation after the unexpected events,
and this is  consistent with that  of Woods (2006a) –  a  qual-
ity encompassing “monitoring the boundary  conditions of the
current model for competence (how strategies are  matched to
demands) and adjusting or expanding that model to better
accommodate changing demands” (Woods, 2006a). Further-
more, resilience is also seen by several other authors in the
following ways:
According to  Hollnagel (2011): Resilience is “the intrinsic
ability of a system to  adjust its functioning prior to, during,
or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain
required operations under both expected and unexpected con-
ditions”. He points out that the engineering of resilience is
dependent on the application and management of  “the abil-
ity to  respond to events, to monitor ongoing developments, to
anticipate future threats and opportunities, and to  learn from
past failures and successes alike”.
As stated by  Hollnagel and Sundström (2006): “A resilient
system, or, organization is able to  withstand the effects of
stress and strain and to  recover from adverse conditions over
long time periods”.
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In  the opinion of Paries (2011): Resilience is  “a combi-
nation of readiness and creativity, and of anticipation and
serendipity”, implying being  prepared both for the expected
and the unexpected. He also classiﬁes resilience into two:
(1) resilience features  designed into a system as a whole
and (2)  resilience features  of the elements or  the agents (e.g.
human agents) that interact with the system. He views the
systemic resilience as  emerging from the interaction of indi-
vidual agents’ behavior, and the resilience of the individual
agents themselves as being partially inﬂuenced by the sys-
temic resilience, emphasizing that the best strategy is a waste
if it cannot be implemented by the skillful operators at the
“sharp end” of the system. Besides, Paries (2011) suggests a
hierarchical “defence in depth” strategy as a means of achiev-
ing the combination of anticipation and serendipity, such  that
a failure in a line of defence activates “a tactical retreat behind
the next one,  with operating procedures shifting from detailed
protocols for normal situations, to a generic action framework
for emergency situations.”
As indicated by Woods (2011): A  resilient system can be
seen as  a system with the quality of ascertaining whether the
current adaptive capacity is  enough to  meet future demands,
implying that an insufﬁciency of this quality makes the sys-
tem vulnerable to sudden collapse and failures. He suggests
the following as patterns of anticipation: (1)  Being “able to
recognize that adaptive capacity is  falling”, (2) being able
to identify “the threat of existing buffers and  reserves”, (3)
being “able to  recognize when to  shift priorities across goal
tradeoffs”, and (4) being “able to make perspective shifts and
contrast diverse perspectives that go beyond their nominal
system condition”.
In  the view of Leveson et al.  (2006): Leveson et al. classify
resilience into reactive resilience and preventive resilience.
According to them, the former involves “the ability to con-
tinue operations or recover a stable state after a major mishap
or event”, whereas the latter involves the “ability of  systems to
prevent or adapt  to changing conditions in order to maintain
(control over) a system property”.
Quoting from McDonald (2006): “Resilience represents the
capacity (of an organizational system) to anticipate and man-
age risk effectively, through appropriate adaptation of its
actions, systems and processes, so as  to ensure that its core
functions are carried out in a stable and effective  relationship
with the environment”.
On  the authority of  Wreathall (2006): “Resilience is  the abil-
ity of an organization (system) to  keep, or recover quickly to,
a stable state, allowing it  to continue operations during and
after a major mishap or  in the presence of  continuous signif-
icant stresses”. He suggests that ﬁnancial or  other important
goals should also  be  considered in addition to safety which is
often focused on.
The African elephant and the hydra can serve  the purpose
of analogies for robustness and resilience, respectively. The
elephant is  sturdy enough to  bulldoze its way through trees
without succumbing to  deliberate and accidental impacts –
this demonstrates robustness. In the case of a hydra, if  the
body is bisected horizontally,  the upper half  will develop a
new foot  and the lower half will  develop a new head (Galliot
and Chera, 2010). Being bisected can be  seen as  an acciden-
tal event to the hydra, the bisected state can be seen as  an
unstable state of the hydra, and the regenerated state  con-
sisting of two  new hydras can be  seen as  a new stable state;
this is demonstrative  of resilience. A hydra with the head and
foot both severed will also grow a  new  head and new foot
(Galliot and Chera, 2010), showing a transition from a stable
state with a head and a  foot both intact, through the interac-
tion with the accidental event (the instance of  being cut off),
through an unstable state with no head and foot, to a new
stable state characterized by regenerated structure –  this also
demonstrates resilience.
Vulnerability is  a key term that is sometimes taken to mean
the opposite of robustness or resilience. Hence, it is relevant to
delineate vulnerability as well. Vulnerability, in the context of
Agarwal et al. (2007),  indicates a potential to experience con-
sequence which is  disproportionately large compared  to  the
amount of damage or  perturbation causing it. However, vul-
nerability according to  Asbjørnslett and Rausand (1999), refers
to “the properties of .  . .a system that may  weaken or limit its
ability to endure threats and survive  accidental events that
originate both within and outside the system boundaries.”
Similarly, NS 5814:2008 deﬁnes vulnerability as “the inabil-
ity of an object to resist the impacts of an unwanted event
and to restore it to its  original state or  function following the
event” (NS5814, 2008). Furthermore, ISO Guide 73:2009 deﬁnes
vulnerability as  “intrinsic properties of something resulting in
susceptibility to  a risk source  that can lead to an event with a
consequence” (ISO, 2009).
Robustness, as applied in this paper, is  the ability to resist
or counteract accidental events. Furthermore, resilience, as
applied in this paper, is about being  able to adapt to or  recover
from accidental events, while stability is acquired in a new
state.
In light of the potential for accidental events in the process
industries and how the effects can be resisted or  counter-
acted by  an organization or  how an organization can adapt
itself to or  recover from them, we can, as will be  demonstrated
later, investigate maintenance contribution to  organizational
robustness and resilience by using the various perspectives of
organizational or major accidents.
In  order to  analyze how the robustness and  resilience prop-
erties of maintenance can be  improved in relation to other
departments within the process industries, it  is necessary to
deﬁne typical organizational components, their boundaries
and how they interact with each other (internal) and with the
environment (external). This will be  covered in the following
section.
3.  Organizational  composition  of the
process industries
We may consider the hydrocarbon or chemical process indus-
try as  an organization or  socio-technical system characterized
by “interaction between the technical structure of the sys-
tem and the social and organizational structure of the
operators who  run the system” (Boissieres and Marsden,
2005).
The organization can be  seen as a system consisting of
three elements, i.e.  production, maintenance and support
Wilson (2002). Fig.  1 depicts the relationships between the
various elements of this system and the environment.
According to Fig. 1, the opportunities for maintenance to
realize improved robustness and resilience properties within
the process industries are  shown in the following links:
(1) the link between maintenance and production, (2) the
link between maintenance and support and (3) the link
between maintenance and external forces. The links represent
means by which  maintenance can interact in harmony  with
other elements. These relationships at the elemental level
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Fig. 1 –  A conceptual model of an industrial organization.
will contribute to realizing the organization’s goals (Rescher,
2005).
3.1.  The  link between  maintenance  and production
Maintenance and production are functions whose relation-
ship with each other are  critical to the success of a producer
organization (Swanson, 1997; Duffuaa, 1995; Jonsson, 1997). A
weak link  between them can lead to economic loss in repairs
and downtime or increased risk to personnel and the environ-
ment (Okoh, 2010). Some examples of likely  sources of failure
include: (i) production staff overusing machines, thus affect-
ing maintainability, (ii) maintenance team not getting data
(such as  equipment runtime) requested from the production
team, (iii)  production being in charge of maintenance,  and (iv)
maintenance staff blaming its  ineffectiveness on  production
not providing adequate budget, accessibility and coopera-
tion.
There is the need for both production and  maintenance
departments to strive for a common goal –  plant proﬁtabil-
ity. This goal is  the basis for continuous existence of both.
Maintenance cannot survive in isolation without budget from
production and  production cannot generate substantial rev-
enue from the customer/market without the guarantee of
uptime by maintenance (Duffuaa, 1995). To achieve the pro-
duction objectives, the maintenance strategy should not
necessarily be ﬁxed but depend on the dynamics of the
business climate.  In order to reduce production cost due to
equipment failure, a company may  choose to do maintenance
optimization or go for renewal. In  the same vein, to  reduce pro-
duction cost for other reasons, a  company may  consider Total
Productive Maintenance (TPM), maintainability improvement,
etc., which requires cooperation between maintenance, pro-
duction and/or support (Swanson, 1997). In  the case of TPM,
there is substantial evidence that it is  being applied to  a large
extent by  reﬁneries in Japan and Saudi Arabia (JCCP, 2009a,b,
2012), although the original focus of the method was the man-
ufacturing industry.
In addition, the production and maintenance staff have
to cooperate to achieve the organization’s safety objective
which contributes to  the overall business objective. There is
the need for the production staff to make adequate prepa-
rations for maintenance (Okoh  and Haugen, 2014a), e.g. by
ensuring that residual hazardous materials are evacuated
from equipment to  be maintained and by selecting and secur-
ing isolation points, and so on (Wallace and Merritt, 2003).
Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS) and
Permit To Work (PTW) systems are some tools that can facili-
tate coordination and communication between maintenance
and production.
3.2.  The  link between  maintenance  and  support
Support for maintenance is critical to the performance of
maintenance activities and it  constitutes a parameter for mea-
suring the effectiveness of maintenance.  It is important for
maintenance personnel to be supported also by  personnel
other than production personnel when called upon, e.g. by
Information Technology (IT) personnel. According to  EN 13306
(2010), maintenance supportability is “the ability of a mainte-
nance organization to have the correct maintenance support
at the necessary place to perform the required maintenance
activity when required”.
A maintenance support system may consist of (i) sen-
sors on production equipment which help to  prevent
unplanned downtime by alerting maintenance personnel on
time about equipment failure modes, (ii) a computerized
maintenance management system (CMMS) which enables
maintenance personnel to organize maintenance activities
efﬁciently, (iii) radio frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) devices
which enable ease of identiﬁcation of  spare parts in a
store, (iv) electronic  permit to work systems (e-PTW) which
promotes safety management, and (v) emergency response
team for crisis management, and so on. These systems
require information technology  support to be  regularly func-
tional. Supply and logistics are  other forms of support for
maintenance.
3.3.  External  forces  on  maintenance
Maintenance performance can be hindered  by external
forces such as concurrent activities in neighboring sites
and severe weather conditions (e.g.  winter or  arctic condi-
tions), and the negative impact will translate to production
and safety limitations. The arctic environment, for e.g.
can increase equipment failure  rates, failure modes and
failure mechanisms, thus necessitating increased diversity
and frequency of preventive maintenance in addition to
increased frequency of corrective maintenance (Homlong,
2010). Exposure to cold is another factor that is  unfavor-
able to the maintenance crew with its  attendant effects on
work performance,  occupational health and quality (ORIOH,
2001).
Other forms of external forces such as regulatory over-
sight (e.g. deﬁciencies in standard/safe operating procedures
for maintenance), legislation (e.g. phasing out a given repair
technology), disputes (e.g. with environmental activists,
host communities, trade unions, etc.), government policies
(e.g. exorbitant duties on tools, materials or spare parts),
market dynamics (e.g.  price ﬂuctuation of tools, materi-
als or  spare  parts) and technological advancement (e.g.
leading to  obsolescence of spare  parts) can also  inﬂuence
maintenance.
3.4.  Final  comment
In  addition to the knowledge of the kind of interactions that
exist between maintenance and the other aforementioned
units within a process industry organization, it is important
to understand the maintenance work process itself since such
interactions will actually take  place in relation to the various
phases of the maintenance work process. Hence, the follow-
ing section will be used to describe a typical maintenance work
process in the process industries.
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4.  A  typical  maintenance  work  process
The maintenance work process in the process industries may
vary depending on the situation of the plant, whether the deci-
sion to maintain a part of or  the whole plant is  being taken at
the time the item is in service or  out of service.
If an item in service requires maintenance, it can be shut
down before maintenance or  maintenance can be  carried out
while it is  still in service. If an item requires shutdown for
maintenance, the organization may follow  a maintenance
work process as  shown in Table 1. If an item is already inop-
erative, the same process applies except for  shutdown.
The phases of the maintenance work process presented
in this section can be seen as  the various aspects of main-
tenance that  can be inﬂuenced by the other organizational
units (i.e.  production and support) and they will be  used as  a
basis for investigating the improvement of the robustness and
resilience properties of maintenance in relation to production
and support as  will be  seen later.
5.  Investigating  robustness  and  resilience
properties in  maintenance
In  this section, the intention is  to  investigate, based on the
organizational accident perspectives, what robustness and
resilient properties are obtainable from maintenance. The
organizational accident perspectives present bases for organi-
zational accident causation. Besides, maintenance is known
to be  a key contributor to organizational accident preven-
tion. Hence,  it is possible  for maintenance to possess certain
qualities implied in the perspectives by which organizational
accidents may  be prevented. This is  a hypothesis that will
be tested in the following. We  will ﬁrst describe the organi-
zational accidents perspectives, analyze their signiﬁcance to
maintenance and then identify the robustness and resilience
properties in maintenance.
5.1.  Description  of  the  organizational  accident
perspectives
5.1.1.  The  energy-barrier  perspective
The energy-barrier perspective, which is  based on the
hazard-barrier-target model of Gibson (1961), depicts a lin-
ear progression of events from the release of energy (hazard)
through supposedly interposed barriers to the interaction
between the energy (hazard) and the target (victim). The model
is hinged on the concepts of linearity and monocausality, i.e.
the transfer of a given energy from the source  to the target.
This model also forms the basis for Reason’s  Swiss Cheese
Model (Reason, 1997) and  the “defence in depth” principle.
An example of how this has been institutionalized in risk
management can be found in the Norwegian regulations for
offshore installations, where a separate section in the Man-
agement Regulations is  dedicated to barriers (PSA, 2010). The
model basically has three main risk control strategies: (1) con-
trol of the hazard, (2) control of the barrier, and (3) control of
the target’s situation/condition.
5.1.2.  The  normal  accident  theory (NAT)
The normal accident theory (NAT), proposed by Perrow (1984),
expresses the concept of accident proneness (i.e.  natural
tendency toward accidents) owing to the interactive complex-
ities (technological and organizational) and  tight couplings
that  evolve as  our  world of technologies continue  to  expand
(Perrow, 1984). The Normal accident perspective  is hinged on
complexity and multicausality. Perrow (1984) believes that the
multiple barriers and redundancies that characterize such
high-risk technologies (which  are  being managed on the
premise of the energy-barrier model) could offer some level
of safety, but will subsequently increase the system’s degree
of complexity and tightness of couplings. Complexity and cou-
pling are  not very precise terms (Hopkins, 1999), but being
able to  delay  processing time is  an example of loose coupling,
while the opposite is a tight coupling (Perrow, 1984). According
to Gell-Mann (1994), “as the list  of regularities characterizing
a given system’s  operation increases, that  system becomes
more complex.” It can be inferred that the simpler we  keep
our technologies, the safer we are  bound to be, and this is the
basis for Perrow’s conclusion that certain technologies should
be scrapped in their current composition because we  cannot
think of any organization that has  the capacity to sufﬁciently
control them. The reason for this is that Perrow (1984) claims
that a system of interactive complexity can be effectively con-
trolled only  by a decentralized organization and a system of
tight couplings can be  effectively controlled only by a cen-
tralized organization, thus making it impossible  to  devise an
organization that can control the system effectively. The pol-
icy reversal in Germany (driven by the Fukushima disaster in
Japan) that will see all her nuclear power plants abandoned
by 2022  (BBC, 2011) may  be  seen as  a logical and necessary
result of NAT. NAT is  not a general theory of major accidents
since it is  limited to speciﬁc technologies, those with high
complexity and tight couplings. Further,  accidents within such
systems need not necessarily be classiﬁed as  normal accidents
either. Perrow himself presents numerous examples of this
in his book (Perrow, 1984). Criticism of the theory has been
raised (Hopkins, 1999) and HRO theorists argue that systems
indeed can be both complex and tightly  coupled, still having
an excellent safety record.
5.1.3.  High  reliability  organization  (HRO)  perspective
The HRO theory has been developed from studies of organi-
zations which, according to  normal accident theory, should
experience major accidents, but which still have excellent
safety records (LaPorte and  Consolini, 1991). The foremost
example used to illustrate this is  aircraft carriers, but other
organizations, like hospital emergency rooms, have also been
studied. A  number of technologies we have today have great
productive potential and at the same time great destruc-
tive potential, such that the avoidance of a signiﬁcant failure
is imperative (LaPorte and  Consolini, 1991). These technolo-
gies include the high-risk technologies referred to by Perrow
(1984) as  having interactive complexities and tight couplings,
although the HRO perspective expresses the possibility of
managing such technologies unlike Perrow’s pessimistic posi-
tion (Rosness et al., 2010; Saleh et al., 2010). An objection to
Perrow’s pessimism is  provided by the HRO perspective in
the possibility of switching from centralization during nor-
mal operations to decentralization in hazardous situations
and consulting expert judgment (Saleh et al.,  2010). Accord-
ing to Sagan (1993), HRO organizations inherently possess the
best safety records of  all high-risk technologies. The char-
acteristics of HROs as  identiﬁed by several theorists may  be
summed up in the following: (i) diligence in failure analysis
and organizational learning, (ii) mutual agreement on  produc-
tion and safety as  being concurrent organizational objectives,
(iii) decentralization and centralization of authorities, and
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Table 1 –  Deﬁnition of the maintenance work process elements.
Maintenance work
process elements
Deﬁnition
Planning/scheduling/failure
diagnosis
Planning is the organization and documentation of a set  of tasks that include the activities, procedures,
resources and time scale required to  carry out maintenance, whereas  scheduling is  the predetermined
detailing of when a  speciﬁc maintenance task  should be carried out and by who (EN 13306, 2010). Failure
diagnosis refers to  actions taken for fault detection, fault localization and  identiﬁcation of causes (EN
13306, 2010)
Mobilization/shutdown Mobilization is the supply, movement and  deployment of resources. Shutdown is outage implemented in
advance for maintenance, or other purposes (EN 13306, 2010)
Preparation for
maintenance work
Provision of required information and applying the requirements (e.g. Permit to  work-PTW,
Lockout/Tagout-LOTO procedure, hazardous material evacuation, securing of isolation points, etc.) that
will enable maintenance to  be  performed effectively and safely
Performance of the
maintenance work
Hands-on actions taken to  retain an  item in or restore it to  a state in which it can perform  its  required
functions
Startup A state in which a  maintained item is being made “live”, i.e.  the item is  being activated or actuated
Normal operation A state in which an  item is  in service
(iv) personnel and technical redundancy (Saleh et al.,  2010).
HRO theorists believe that through management commitment
to safety, the establishment of safety culture,  the mainte-
nance of relatively closed systems, functional decentralization
supported by constant training, technical and organizational
redundancies, and organizational learning supplemented by
anticipation and simulation (trial-and-error  process), organi-
zations could achieve the consistency and stability required to
support failure-free operations (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991;
Saleh et al., 2010; Sagan, 1993; Dekker et al., 2008).
5.1.4.  Man-made  disaster  perspective (MMD)
The man-made disaster (MMD)  theory considers accidents to
be the result of accumulated ﬂaws  in information processing
between various organizational units, including the admin-
istrative, managerial and operational units (Turner, 1978).
Turner (1978), the initiator of  the theory, calls the period of
accumulation an incubation period (i.e.  a period of maturity).
At the end of the incubation period, the perceived organi-
zational quality is  unable to co-exist with the accumulated
organizational deviations, thus leading to an accident. A key
point in this theory  is  that  there exist warning signs within the
organization that could have been used to prevent accidents, if
it had been accumulated and communicated in the right way
and to the right people. This  perspective is hinged on multi-
causality, for according to Turner (1978), “accidents are  neither
chance events, nor acts of God, nor triggered by a few events
and unsafe human acts immediately  before they occur.”  The
concept behind the theory  is sociological; it holds that acci-
dents are not just a technological phenomenon (Dekker et al.,
2008).
5.1.5.  Conﬂicting  objectives,  adaptation  and  drift
perspective
The conﬂicting objectives/goals (or decision-making) perspec-
tive was  proposed by Rasmussen (1997) and considers major
accidents to  be  the result of  organizational objectives clashing
with each other. The result of this conﬂict is  an organization
in a state of dilemma that may  drift over time due to  lack
of information or inability to balance the objectives correctly.
Examples of organizational objectives that  may  come into  con-
ﬂict include production objectives, safety objectives, etc. The
basic resource used to drive the realization of these objectives
is money and the application of this resource must create
a balance between objectives to  guarantee the survival of
the organization. The balance between production (economic
objective) and protection (safety objective) was  also  discussed
by Reason (1997). The concept of adaptation involves tradeoff,
i.e. sacriﬁcing one quality or  aspect of something in return for
gaining another quality or  aspect.
5.1.6.  Resilience  engineering  perspective
Resilience engineering describes the ability of organizations
to apply the principles of responding, monitoring, anticipat-
ing and learning to  adapt to or recover from accidental events,
while stability is  acquired in a new state. The word  “resilience”
is derived from the Latin word “resilire” (to leap back), and
according to Woods (2006b), denotes a system’s “ability to
recover from challenges or disrupting events.” In  (Saleh et al.,
2010), the term “recoverability” is  considered  as  a synonym
for resilience. In Hollnagel (2011),  resilience is  deﬁned as “the
intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its  functioning prior
to, during, or  following changes and disturbances, so that
it can sustain required operations under both expected and
unexpected conditions.” Resilience engineering describes the
ability of organizations to achieve ultra-high levels of safety
and response to the dynamics of other organizational values
(e.g. production, operations, economy,  etc.) despite complex-
ities, high risks, major accidents, disturbances, disruptions,
continuous pressure and change (Rosness et al., 2010;  Woods,
2006b). Accidents, according to this perspective, are not the
product of normal system malfunction or  breakdown, but
rather a breakdown in the adaptive  capacity necessary to cope
with the real world of complexity (Dekker et al., 2008). Accord-
ing to  Gell-Mann (1994), the ratio between  order and chaos
is the critical factor in determining the capacity of a system
to adapt successfully to systemic surprises. Adaptive capacity
(or adaptability) refers to the ability of individuals and organi-
zations to adjust their performance to  the current condition.
The resilience engineering perspective  encompasses core top-
ics from the ﬁve perspectives described earlier; it is a synthesis
of ideas bordering on  barriers, complexity, conﬂicting goals
and HRO (Rosness et al., 2010; Dekker et al., 2008). The abili-
ties that constitute resilience can be  summarized as  follows
(Hollnagel, 2009, 2011): (1)  anticipation –  addressing the poten-
tial: foreseeing the changing shape of risk, before failure and
harm results, (2) monitoring – observing the critical: recogniz-
ing how close the organization is to the safety boundary, (3)
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Table 2 – Robustness and resilience properties.
Properties Meanings Perspectives
Proactivity Foreseeing what  can go wrong and deploying barriers in  advance Energy-barrier, HRO  and resilience
engineering
Redundancy Deploying more  than one means to  a required function Energy-barrier and HRO
Simplicity Making the design of organizational interactions simple Normal accident
Loose couplings Allowing slacks, variant sequences, alternative means and
independent events in organizations
Normal accident
Learning Reviewing incidents and  nearmisses, sharing/updating situation or
industry knowledge
HRO  and resilience engineering
Decisiveness Successfully balancing goals, e.g. production-safety goals Conﬂicting objectives, adaptation
and drift
Communication and
coordination
Exchanging information and acting  on  it harmoniously Man-made disaster
Emergency response The quality to readily intervene in accidental events Resilience engineering
Management of  change Management of organizational-related, operational and
environmental changes
Resilience engineering
responding –  coping with the actual: adapting or  being ﬂexi-
ble to  changes, disruptions and  opportunities, and (4) learning
– updating with the factual: review of performance based on
new knowledge.
5.2.  The  signiﬁcance  of  the  organizational  accident
perspectives  in  relation  to maintenance
5.2.1.  Energy-barrier  in  relation  to  maintenance
The energy-barrier perspective is about establishing barri-
ers (often technical) and  ensuring that these barriers remain
intact and effective for as long as  they are needed. Mainte-
nance will be  an important contributor to  maintaining the
integrity of the barriers. With  this  realization, focus on  main-
tenance also  increases and maintenance will in itself be a key
element in managing risk. In  the Norwegian offshore  indus-
try, it is  quite common to  have various safety indicators related
to maintenance, in particular maintenance on safety critical
equipment. An example is “Hours of backlog  on maintenance.”
Maintenance is also often regarded as  a barrier in itself. This
perspective will therefore clearly  bring out the importance of
sufﬁcient and correct maintenance.
5.2.2.  NAT  in  relation  to maintenance
Perrow (1984) believes that some accidents are preventable
through certain improved factors, including better equipment
or the effects of accidents may  be  possible to minimize or limit
to local effects through safety systems. In both of these cases,
maintenance will play a role in ensuring that the equipment
and safety systems are kept in operating order and with high
reliability. However, since accidents are associated with com-
plexity and  tight coupling, the focus of risk management will
be on reducing complexity and  also  loosening coupling within
the system being considered. This has at least two  implica-
tions. First of all, regardless of the frequency and quality with
which maintenance is  performed, it can only  contribute to  pre-
serve a certain level of safety. Further improvement will  not
be possible as  long as the system has the undesirable proper-
ties that  Perrow (1984) pointed out. Maintenance can therefore
serve only  as  a safeguard for the individual parts of high-risk
systems, but will not ensure the safety of  the whole system.
NAT has an organizational perspective and maintenance is
therefore not central  in the same way  as  for energy-barrier
perspective. Secondly,  it may be argued that maintenance
can be regarded as adding complexity  to a system because
it implies more  activities that need to  be performed safely,
coordinated with other activities and monitored in a suit-
able manner. Maintenance optimization may also add tight
couplings.
5.2.3.  HRO  in  relation  to maintenance
HRO is  a theory about organizational aspects that covers all
levels of the organization, from top level management (the
“blunt end”) to  the operators performing the work  in the ﬁeld
(the “sharp end”). The focus tends to be on high risk operations
which require vigilance and correct performance (aircraft car-
riers, emergency rooms). One  may speculate that there is a
potential for developing a culture where the “heroes” are  those
which run  the operations, and  where maintenance is seen as
a routine activity with less importance. On the other hand, at
least two of the characteristics listed above –  (i) diligence in
failure analysis and organizational learning and (iv) person-
nel and technical redundancy –  will also be  contributing to
put focus on maintenance. HRO organizations are proactive
in avoiding failures and this should also extend to ensuring
good maintenance, to  avoid technical failures.
5.2.4.  MMD  in  relation  to  maintenance
This perspective focuses on lack of information ﬂow as the
cause of accidents. The status of technical systems, includ-
ing their maintenance status would be  an example of the type
of information that is  relevant in this  context. This perspec-
tive will therefore contribute to emphasize the importance of
ensuring that this type of information is available. The Piper
Alpha disaster (Cullen, 1990) is  an example of an accident
where information about maintenance was not brought to the
attention of all who needed to know. However, maintenance
performance as  such, and in particular the importance of cor-
rect performance of maintenance will not be at the center of
attention in this perspective.
5.2.5.  Conﬂicting  objectives,  adaptation  and  drift  in
relation  to  maintenance
Maintenance is  a clear example of an area where  there
will be conﬂicting objectives: The saved cost of not doing it
versus the (indirect) risk reduction achieved when doing it.
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Table 3 –  Maintenance contribution to  organizational robustness.
Maintenance-
related
work
process
Links  Proactivity Decisiveness Learning Communication
and coordi-
nation
Simplicity Loose
couplings
Redundancy Management
of change
(MOC)
Emergency
response
Planning/
scheduling/
failure
diagnosis
Between
maintenance
and
production
Joint  Job
Safety
Analysis (JSA)
or toolbox
meetings
prior to inter-
departmental
related work
Advising on  a
joint site visit
to avoid dis-
crepancies.
Joint
agreement on
guidelines for
potential
trade-offs
that will not
create
imbalance
between
business and
safety
objectives
Joint
planning  of
HSE  review
meetings,
participation
in  HSE
workshops
and other
related
forums
Cooperation
on  PTW,
CMMS,
HAZID, safety
planning and
mainte-
nance/production
interface lead
Simpliﬁcation
of
production–maintenance
interfaces
and
elimination
of
bureaucracies
in  the
network
between
production–
maintenance
Putting joint
alternative
operational
plans in  place
and being
tolerant of
delays, errors
and failures
in  mutual
interaction
Joint
agreement on
training and
keeping
standby
personnel
who are
multi-skilled
in  both
production
and
maintenance
regardless of
any existing
outsourcing
policy
Collaboration
on  any
required reor-
ganization
process
related to
operational
staff. Joint
development
of MOC
procedure
relevant to
maintenance–
production
relations
Joint
emergency
exer-
cises/drills
planning,
emergency
maintenance
planning for
deﬁcient
safety critical
equipment,
etc.
Between
maintenance
and support
Anticipating
the
obsolescence
of  critical
items  and
hence doing
timely
upgrade
Decisiveness
on  whom
between the
user and
manufacturer
is responsible
for deciding
on and
conﬁrming
parts
replacement
Training of
maintenance
staff for the
ability to
verify critical
parts before
and after
supply
Cooperation
on
availability of
critical
maintenance
related
resources and
on  e-PTW
and CMMS
software
support
Agreeing on
redesign for
dependability
improvement
Decentralizing
the  supply of
critical
resources
related to
maintenance
and allowing
some delay in
delivery
Keeping
redundant
suppliers of
critical
maintenance
related
resources on
vendors list
Development
of MOC
procedure
relevant to
maintenance-
support
relations
Joint
emergency
exer-
cises/drills
planning,
emergency
maintenance
planning for
deﬁcient
emergency
response
equipment,
etc.
Between
maintenance
and the
environment
Optimizing
maintenance
to  mitigate
the  effects of
adverse envi-
ronmental
conditions
Adaptability
of
maintenance
to
installations’
host
communities
Training of
maintenance
staff for
contingency
management
Maintenance
of communi-
cation
channels
with the
environment
and exchange
of
information
Reduce
complexity in
maintenance
in  relation to
concurrent
activities in
neighboring
sites
Decentralizing
maintenance
for speedy
response to
effects from
external
forces so as
to mitigate
losses
Development
of  MOC
procedure
relevant to
maintenance-
related
environmen-
tal
changes
Emergency
maintenance
planning to
prevent or
mitigate  the
effects of
unsafe envi-
ronmental
conditions
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Table 3 (Continued)
Maintenance-
related
work
process
Links  Proactivity Decisiveness Learning Communication
and coordi-
nation
Simplicity Loose
couplings
Redundancy Management
of  change
(MOC)
Emergency
response
Mobilization/
shutdown
Between
maintenance
and
production
Pre-
mobilization
inspection
and
awareness on
likelihood of
residual
process
chemicals
Joint
agreement on
partial or
total
shutdown
Ensure
real-time
supervision
for hazardous
on-the-job
training
Cooperation
on  hazard
control  at
shutdown.
Use of PTW,
HAZID,
checklist, etc.
If  bypassing
redundant
safety
systems,
apply suitable
safety
alternative
Applying
changes
speciﬁed by
MOC
procedure
Agreeing on
shutting
down to limit
state of
emergency,
etc.
Between
maintenance
and support
Applying
changes
speciﬁed  by
MOC
procedure
Between
maintenance
and the
environment
Warning
third parties
off hazardous
activities and
work areas
Cooperation
with  host
community
by paying
attention to
culture-
sensitive
issues being
raised
Applying
changes
speciﬁed  by
MOC
procedure
Performing
emergency
maintenance
to prevent  or
mitigate the
effects of
unsafe envi-
ronmental
conditions
Preparation
for mainte-
nance
work
Between
maintenance
and
production
Identifying
and  securing
isolation
points, and
evacuation of
hazardous
materials
Joint
agreement on
optimal
isolation and
advising
against
unmanning
of control
rooms
Ensure
real-time
supervision
for hazardous
on-the-job
training
Cooperation
on  use of
PTW,
checklists,
HAZID tools,
etc.
If  bypassing
redundant
safety
system, apply
suitable
safety
alternative
Applying
changes
speciﬁed by
MOC
procedure
Between
maintenance
and support
Applying
changes
speciﬁed  by
MOC
procedure
Joint
emergency
exercise/drill
execution
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Maintenance objectives are  a means of achieving production
and safety objectives, but sometimes the sharing of mainte-
nance resources between production and safety systems may
be disproportional, or the allocation of maintenance resources
to both may be inadequate. Reducing maintenance is a typi-
cal example of a cost that  is  reduced as much as possible due
to pressures to operate as  cheaply as  possible. Although this
may have a positive impact on at least production in terms
of proﬁt in the short term, it may  tend  to  have a negative
impact on both production and  safety in the medium or  long
term. Optimizing maintenance is  crucial to optimizing pro-
duction without compromising safety. This perspective helps
to highlight potential pressures that may exist to reduce main-
tenance.
5.2.6.  Resilience  engineering  in  relation  to  maintenance
Since this perspective draws on elements from the earlier per-
spectives, the conclusions with regard to how maintenance is
viewed will also tend to coincide with elements from the ear-
lier discussions, in particular the discussion about HRO theory.
Anticipation and  learning can both be pointed out as  abilities
that will rely among others on  maintenance and  maintenance
records as  a basis for achieving this. Barrier maintenance is
part of this, but not any different from the energy-barrier per-
spective. Monitoring is a question of  detecting early warnings
and weak signals, of which lack of maintenance may  be one
of such signals.
Furthermore, according to Grote (2011), tools that support
the assessment and promotion of the basic requirements
for resilience (i.e. responding, monitoring, anticipating,
and learning) encompass “training emergency management,
handling fatigue of system operators, supporting preventive
maintenance, providing better rules for managing conﬂicting
goals, or improving incident reporting”.
5.3.  Prevention  of drift
Hale and Heijer (2006), like Leveson et al. (2006), also  recognize
two aspects of resilience: prevention of loss of control over risk
and recovery from that loss of control. Based on Rasmussen’s
model (Rasmussen, 1997) which explains the concept  of drift
to failure, Hale and Heijer (2006) deﬁne the former aspect of
resilience as “the ability to steer the activities of an organiza-
tion so that it may sail close to the area where  accidents will
happen, but always stays out of that dangerous area” (Hale and
Heijer, 2006). This, according to  them (Hale and Heijer, 2006),
implies knowing where an organization stands in relation to
the danger area and activating efﬁcient and effective  response
when indications of impending or  actual danger are detected.
Drifting into failure,  itself, as explained by  (Dekker, 2006), is
“a metaphor for the slow, incremental movement  of systems
operation toward (and eventually across) the boundaries of
their safety envelope” (Dekker, 2006).
One way  of preventing maintenance-related drift is by
avoiding maintenance postponement of safety-critical ele-
ments. An instance where postponement could be forced on
maintenance is  when a company wants to continue produc-
tion to satisfy a time-based demand of a customer rather than
lose the order to its competitors. If this happens repeatedly,
the company will continue to  drift toward the edge/boundary
of their safety envelope and eventually experience an acci-
dent.
Drift is  also indicative in accumulated errors in
maintenance-related decision making, e.g. accumulated
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Table 4 – Maintenance contribution to  organizational robustness.
Maintenance-
related
work
process
Links  Proactivity Decisiveness Learning Communication
and coordi-
nation
Simplicity Loose
couplings
Redundancy Management
of  change
(MOC)
Emergency
response
Performance
of  the
mainte-
nance
work
Between
maintenance
and
production
Use  of Job
Hazard
Analysis
Joint
agreement on
substituting a
part with a
non-original
one
Ensure
real-time
supervision
for hazardous
on-the-job
training
Cooperation on
hazard control
during the
maintenance
phase. Use  of
PTW, checklists,
HAZID, etc.
Reject
unmanning of
control rooms
If  bypassing
redundant
safety
systems,
apply suitable
safety
alternative
Applying
changes
speciﬁed by
MOC
procedure
Between
maintenance
and support
Applying
MOC
procedure
Between
maintenance
and the
environment
Warning
third parties
off hazardous
activities and
work areas
Cooperation with
host community
by paying
attention to
culture-sensitive
issues  being
raised
Applying
changes
speciﬁed  by
MOC
procedure
Performing
emergency
maintenance
to prevent  or
mitigate the
effects of
unsafe envi-
ronmental
conditions
Startup Between
maintenance
and
production
Doing
Pre-Startup
Safety  Review
(PSSR)
Joint
agreement on
optimal
deisolation.
Advising
against
unmanning
of control
rooms
Ensure
real-time
supervision
for hazardous
on-the-job
training
Cooperation on
use of PTW,
HAZID,
checklists, etc.
If  bypassing
redundant
safety
systems,
apply suitable
safety
alternative
Applying
changes
speciﬁed by
MOC
procedure
Between
maintenance
and support
Applying
changes
speciﬁed  by
MOC
procedure
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Between
maintenance
and the
environment
Warning
third parties
off  hazardous
activities and
work  areas
Cooperation with
host community
by paying
attention to
culture-sensitive
issues being
raised
Applying
changes
speciﬁed  by
MOC
procedure
Performing
emergency
maintenance
to prevent  or
mitigate the
effects of
unsafe envi-
ronmental
conditions
Normal
operation
Between
maintenance
and
production
Use of Job
Hazard
Analysis
Joint
agreement on
on-line
maintenance
procedure.
Advising
against
unmanning
of control
rooms
Ensure
real-time
supervision
for  hazardous
on-the-job
training
Cooperation on
use of PTW,
HAZID, checklist,
etc.
If  bypassing
redundant
safety
systems,
apply suitable
safety
alternative
Applying
changes
speciﬁed by
MOC
procedure
Between
maintenance
and support
Applying
changes
speciﬁed  by
MOC
procedure
Between
maintenance
and the
environment
Warning
third parties
off  hazardous
activities and
work  areas
Cooperation with
host community
by paying
attention to
culture-sensitive
issues being
raised
Applying
changes
speciﬁed  by
MOC
procedure
Performing
emergency
maintenance
to prevent  or
mitigate the
effects of
unsafe envi-
ronmental
conditions
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errors in P–F (potential failure–functional failure) interval
determination, critical spare parts management, mainte-
nance task selection or maintenance interval determination.
This can be prevented by using effective  maintenance
management tools.
The potential of  maintenance to  expose its personnel
to major hazard facilities and to  introduce new hazards,
new failures and initiating events for accident scenarios will
increase with increasing frequency (i.e. reducing interval)
of maintenance. This implies an increasing annual risk (i.e.
probability of fatality per hour × maintenance duration in
hours × number of maintenance intervals in a year  × number
of personnel exposed) and a drift to failure. A way to prevent
this is  to optimize maintenance intervals in terms of risk with
the objective  of minimizing the maintenance-related major
accident risk.
5.4.  Final  comment
Based on the aforementioned analysis, we have identiﬁed and
deﬁned some maintenance-related robustness and resilience
properties in relation to the organizational accident perspec-
tives and these are  shown in Table 2.
6.  How  the  robustness  and  resilience  of
maintenance  and  the  organization  can  be
improved
In  Tables 3 and 4, the steps  in the maintenance process have
been combined with the organizational properties associated
with resilience and robustness. For each  step and each  prop-
erty, it has been evaluated whether the maintenance process
can contribute to  strengthen the property. As far as possible,
concrete examples/suggestions have been provided.
In the following three subsections, some examples from
Tables 3 and 4 are  brought out and  brieﬂy presented.
6.1.  Between  maintenance  and production
The maintenance unit can pursue improvements in the fol-
lowing: (1) proactivity to risk management in maintainable
production systems, (2) decisiveness in discouraging risky
imbalances between maintenance and production, (3) a learn-
ing culture that promotes safety in maintenance of hazardous
production systems, (4) communication and coordination
between maintenance and production staff in the mainte-
nance work  process of safety-critical production systems, (5)
simplicity in maintenance planning, procedures and organi-
zation in relation to safety-critical production systems (Okoh
and Haugen, 2014b),  (6) looseness of couplings in mainte-
nance organization to tolerate  shortcomings in production
organization, (7) organizational and  technical redundancy
for safety-critical production systems, (8)  management of
change related to alterations in the maintenance–production
network, and (9) emergency preparedness and response to
accidental events arising from maintenance–production inter-
actions. Some of these and more  examples are presented in
Tables 3 and 4.
6.2.  Between  maintenance  and support
The maintenance unit can pursue improvements in the fol-
lowing: (1)  proactivity to management of obsolescence of
critical parts, (2) decisiveness in conﬁrming the responsi-
ble party for critical part replacement between maintenance
and external technical support, (3) learning on critical part
veriﬁcation, (4) communication and coordination for tech-
nical support via server-based maintenance management
systems, (5) simplicity of maintenance support systems, e.g.
maintenance-related cyber-physical systems, (6) looseness
of couplings in relation to fault tolerance of e.g. computer-
ized maintenance management systems, (7) organizational
redundancy in relation to suppliers of critical parts, (8)
management of change with respect to alterations in the
maintenance-support network, and (9) emergency prepared-
ness in conjunction with the dedicated emergency response
department. These feature more  prominently in the plan-
ning/scheduling/failure diagnosis phase of the maintenance
work process as shown  in Table 3.
However, in the other phases of the maintenance work
process, one tends to see more  of the adaptability of  mainte-
nance to  support, through the application by the maintenance
unit, of the management of change (MOC) procedure related
to both. This is also  shown in Tables 3 and 4.
6.3.  Between  maintenance  and the environment
The maintenance unit can pursue improvements in the
following: (1)  proactivity to management of unsafe environ-
mental conditions arising during maintenance, e.g. through
maintenance optimization in relation to  dynamic grouping of
maintenance activities (Wildeman et al., 1997), (2) decisive-
ness in adapting maintenance operations to the livelihood
of the host community, e.g. through diligent waste manage-
ment and site reinstatement efforts, (3) learning on keeping a
conducive working environment, (4) communication and coor-
dination on weather forecast and cultural  issues related to the
host community,  (5) simplicity in maintenance operations in
relation to concurrent activities in neighboring areas, (6)  loose-
ness of  couplings with respect to decentralizing maintenance
for speedy response to hazardous effects from environmental
forces, (7) management of  change (MOC) procedure rele-
vant to  maintenance-related environmental changes, and (8)
emergency maintenance to  prevent or mitigate the effects
of sudden environmental hazards. Some of these and more
examples are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
The contents of Tables 3 and 4 represent some recom-
mended best practices that  will  serve as  opportunities for
maintenance to contribute to the robustness and resilience
of the process industry organization. Some of the recommen-
dations are peculiar to a given phase of the maintenance work
process, whereas others necessarily cut across some phases.
7.  Conclusion
This paper is one among several intended to  give more
insight into how to  make the best out of maintenance in
the process industries. The direction in this paper has been
focused on what robustness and resilience properties exist in
maintenance and how these can be improved in relation to
maintenance interaction with other areas  such as  production
and support and in turn improve the robustness and  resilience
of the process industries organization. Over time, mainte-
nance has  been a proven contributor to the robustness of the
physical systems in the industries, but whether maintenance
can also  contribute to  the robustness and resilience of the
organization had yet to be  investigated. Hence,  the hypothesis
Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9  4 ( 2 0  1 5  ) 212–226 225
that maintenance can also  improve organizational properties
that inﬂuence the ability to resist or counteract accidental
events as  well as the ability to adapt and recover from such
events had to be investigated. This would  enable us to see
whether there  is  a possibility of developing new knowledge
for the exploitation of additional maintenance values.
The fact  that robustness can be seen as  the ability to
resist or  counteract accidental events motivated the use
of the various perspectives of organizational accidents (i.e.
energy-barrier model, normal accident theory (NAT), high reli-
ability organizations (HRO), man-made disaster (MMD) theory,
conﬂicting objectives, adaptation and drift (COAD) theory and
resilience engineering theory)  as bases for  the investigation.
Besides, some of these perspectives have explained that acci-
dents are  not  caused only  by technical failures of physical
systems, but in some cases by human and organizational fac-
tors or  a combination of these.
The contribution of maintenance to organizational robust-
ness and  resilience, based on the improvement of the
robustness and resilience properties of maintenance, were
derived by mapping robustness and resilience properties
(based on  the accident perspectives) to the maintenance work
process (i.e. Planning/scheduling/failure  diagnosis, mobiliza-
tion and shutdown, preparation for maintenance work,
performance of the maintenance work, startup and normal
operation) and the links between  maintenance and produc-
tion, maintenance and support, and maintenance and the
environment. A given industry was  considered as  a triplet
organization consisting of the maintenance unit, the pro-
duction unit and the support unit all in contact with the
environment.
It has been shown  in this paper how  maintenance can
improve robustness and resilience in organizations. The
operational links between maintenance and each of the
other elements (i.e. production, support and  the environ-
ment) possess the potential for additional robustness and
resilience to the organization. The links represent means by
which maintenance can interact in harmony with other units
for the purpose of improving organizational robustness and
resilience. As supported by  Rescher (2005), such harmonious
relationships at the elemental level will contribute to realizing
the organization’s goal. Recommendations to  the mainte-
nance management of process industries for strengthening
these links in order to achieve added robustness and resilience
have also been  proposed.
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